Radargate: Soviet Admission Of An “Open” Treaty Violation Makes Fools Of American Apologists

(Washington, D.C.): Today, the Soviet Union formally acknowledged what it has systematically denied since July 1983 when the United States first detected the construction of a large, phased array radar (LPAR) near the Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk. After rejecting for six years formal U.S. accusations of wrong-doing, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze admitted what all but the USSR’s most determined apologists have long since recognized: "The construction of this [radar] station…constituted an open violation of [the] ABM [Treaty]."

More interesting still is the fact that, as reported by Reuters, Shevardnadze disclosed "the [Soviet] leadership had known this for some time." He tried to downplay the significance of that statement by suggesting that it took four years "to sort out matters with this [radar] station." The reality, however, is that this radar was a violation of the ABM Treaty from its inception. Moreover, there can be little doubt that the Soviet leadership has always known that to be the case.

The basis for these conclusions is elementary: The Krasnoyarsk radar is of essentially the same design as eight other LPARs the Soviets themselves have described as early warning radars. The ABM Treaty prohibits the Soviets from constructing a radar with such characteristics at a site and with an orientation like those of the LPAR at Krasnoyarsk.

The Great Soviet Stonewall

In fact, so transparent was this violation that it was a testament to the Soviets’ audacity, their disdain for U.S. complaints and contempt for international challenges about the radar at Krasnoyarsk that they steadfastly stuck to their line. For years, scientists like Dr. Yevgeni P. Velikhov of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, top arms control negotiators like Ambassador Victor Karpov, propagandists like Georgi Arbatov and Gennadi Gerasimov and senior military officers would be trotted out to deny that the Krasnoyarsk facility was for early warning or that it in any other way violated the ABM Treaty.

Instead, such official spokesmen contended that this radar had been designed and located at Krasnoyarsk for a purpose permitted by that accord — tracking objects in space. While virtually any radar would have some capability for such space tracking, the inappropriateness of the Krasnoyarsk facility for this purpose was obvious even to individuals untutored in radar technology like Congressmen Tom Downey (D-NY), Bob Carr (D-MI) and James Moody (D-WI).

These congressmen were part of a group allowed to visit the Krasnoyarsk radar in September 1987 at the invitation of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Soviet Committee of Scientists Against the Nuclear Threat. They came away unpersuaded of the space-track rationalization for this radar.

Helping the Soviets Get Away With Murder

Unfortunately, having thus satisfied themselves that the Soviets were lying in ascribing to the Krasnoyarsk facility a space-track function, Messrs Downey, Carr and Moody came up with an even more outrageous excuse — one so preposterous that the Soviets themselves had not seen fit to propose it: The congressmen argued that the Krasnoyarsk radar would only represent a violation once it had become operational.⁽¹⁾

In so doing, the American visitors became among the most prominent of a number of Western officials and private citizens who — knowingly or unknowingly — played a part in helping the Soviets to perpetrate the fraud that the Krasnoyarsk radar did not violate the ABM Treaty. These included top members of the U.S. State Department who argued against using the term "violation" in favor of more ambiguous formulations like "breach" and "circumvention." Another prominent figure in this group was then-Minister of Defense of the United Kingdom, Michael Heseltine, who sought strenuously to prevent an alliance-wide consensus that the Krasnoyarsk radar violated the terms of the ABM Treaty.

Hard Questions Following the Soviet Admission:

Now that the Soviet leadership has at last acknowledged its longstanding violation of the ABM Treaty — and, at least implicitly, admitted that it knowingly lied in the course of repeated denials of this fact from 1983 to the present — a number of important questions must be asked:

• Have the Soviets similarly dissembled about other violations with which they have been charged on such diverse treaties as the Biological Weapons Convention, the SALT I and II accords, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, etc? If so, what will it take to obtain a comparable confession of these violations?

 

• What will the absence of the Krasnoyarsk radar — assuming the Soviets now live up to their commitment to dismantle it — do to alter the prospects for a near-term territorial defense of the USSR against ballistic missiles?

 

Recently disclosed information suggests that the Soviet Union may have illegally deployed nearly 10,000 ABM-capable interceptor missiles. Taken together with other defensive systems (notably, relevant radar and command and control assets) these interceptors would afford the Soviets a formidable ability to break out of the ABM Treaty even if the LPAR at Krasnoyarsk is destroyed.⁽²⁾

 

• Can the United States prudently rely upon the word of the Soviet Union in negotiating arms control agreements and other bilateral security arrangements in the future? As the Krasnoyarsk example vividly demonstrates — even where it is possible to verify Soviet non-compliance — the USSR may well cheat and, if caught at it, prove resistent to U.S. efforts to obtain corrective action.

 

• What credence should be given the current claims of self-styled experts in Congress, in Washington think-tanks and elsewhere who steadfastly argued that the Soviets were correct in maintaining that Krasnoyarsk is legal? Should we now believe the claims made by many of these same individuals when they aver with equal assurance the validity of Soviet statements opposing SDI, the prospects for "progress" in arms control, the USSR’s commitment to reduce its defense budget, Moscow’s adoption of a new, "defensive defense" strategy, etc?

Conclusion

Far from an indication of a new era of glasnost and openness in U.S.-Soviet relations, today’s admission of Moscow’s past prevarications should be a cautionary tale to the West. Those in Moscow who now seek credit for disclosing the truth have been party to the lie for the past four years, if not longer. It is only prudent to assume that other, as yet uncorrected, misrepresentations continue to be features of Soviet policy.

At the very least, with the Soviet Union’s admission of the Krasnoyarsk violation, the United States should feel unburdened of any responsibility to help the Soviets "save face" over having to tear this radar down. In particular, there is no reason to honor the ill-considered pledge made by Secretary of State James Baker at the Wyoming ministerial meeting to "consider [Soviet] concerns in consultation with its allies" about the legal U.S. early warning radars in Thule, Greenland and Fylingdales, Great Britain.

Make no mistake: If the United States were, for example, to permit Soviet visits to these facilities, the Soviet Union will use the occasion to reinforce its contention that the American radars violate the ABM Treaty. It makes no sense under present circumstances for the United States gratuitously and needlessly to expose the operation of these key warning sensors to further controversy.

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1. William J. Broad, "Secrets of Krasnoyarsk — Soviet Eye on the Sky: Questions of Trust," The New York Times, 20 September 1987, p. 3.

2. This point is strongly supported by an analysis released last year by the Center entitled "Truth or Consequences: 1988 ABM Treaty Review Conference," 23 August 1988, No. 88-01