Reading Between The Lines In Soviet Military Power

The Center for Security Policy today expressed profound concern over this year’s version of the Defense Department’s annual publication Soviet Military Power, released yesterday.

"For the first time since 1982, when then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger introduced this important document as an authoritative unclassified assessment of Soviet military might, Soviet Military Power has deviated from its original purpose," Frank J. Gaffney, Jr, the Center’s director said. "Instead of an unflinching depiction of actual Soviet capabilities, the 1989 edition in important ways represents a paean to Mikhail Gorbachev. In its praise of so-called Soviet ‘new thinking,’ it indulges in vast quantities of American wishful thinking about the future. The discredited ‘end of history’ theory seems to be underpinning much of the assessments in this publication."

Gaffney added, "The politically shaded conclusions lacing Soviet Military Power are the more remarkable insofar as they sharply contrast with sensible remarks by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney contained in its preface. He notes, in part, that ‘It is…clear that despite the dramatic changes occurring in the Soviet Union and the Soviet leadership’s declaration of benign intentions toward the Western democracies, Soviet military capabilities continue to constitute a major threat to our security (emphasis in original).’ Evidently, those who drafted the bottom-lines of this year’s Soviet Military Power apparently did not get the word."

The new edition also gives short shrift to a number of important subjects, previously treated in considerable detail. Notably, issues like the Soviet Union’s massive strategic defense programs — including work on active systems like those being researched by the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative and passive measures like the construction of deep underground shelters designed to enable the leadership of the USSR to survive and fight nuclear war — are scarcely mentioned.

Similarly, while the 1989 version makes passing reference to such things as Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements, the three-percent annual real growth in Moscow’s defense spending since 1985, and the continuing massive support it is providing directly or indirectly to communist regimes in Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Vietnam, the serious implications of such developments are simply not addressed.

Roger W. Robinson, Jr., former Senior Director for International Economic Affairs at the National Security Council and a member of the Center’s Board of Advisors observed, "It is disappointing that the area of the Soviet military’s greatest weakness and the West’s greatest strength — the economic, financial and technology security portfolio — did not receive adequate attention."

Robinson added, "The extent to which Western nations are selling the Soviets militarily relevant technology and permitting Gorbachev to off-load Moscow’s financial obligations to impoverished client states from Soviet books to Western balance sheets is of increasing strategic significance. The cost to American taxpayers in additional U.S. defense spending to counter the consequences of undisciplined Western largesse toward Moscow and its allies is on the order of several billion dollars annually. These issues warrant more thorough consideration in Soviet Military Power."

Gaffney concluded, "This year’s edition of Soviet Military Power begs a frightening question: Is the politicization of intelligence it epitomizes being permitted to influence classified assessments of Soviet power and prospects? At a time when there is — necessarily — profound uncertainty about the future course of the USSR, were wishful thinking to displace objective analysis, U.S. interests could be seriously jeopardized."

The Center for Security Policy strongly believes that at such a time it is imperative that U.S. intelligence estimates be subjected to a rigorous and regular "second opinion." The Center calls upon the President to reinvigorate his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, an organization that has, in the past, helped ensure that American intelligence resources are being effectively and accurately utilized.