Regional security issues: from the Reagan Doctrine to a Bush Doctrine in support of freedom

As part of a vigorous effort to protect and strengthen the forces of freedom throughout the world, the Reagan Doctrine promised support — including arms — for insurgents fighting Third World communist dictatorships that had forcefully seized power with Moscow’s aid during the 1970’s. This doctrine established new credibility for America insofar as it helped indigenous freedom fighters reverse militant Soviet expansionism and fight for national self-determination.

Today, the United States’ policy of peace through strength in the cause of freedom has brought the promise of major international gains for the forces of freedom. But the promise of the Reagan Doctrine is also shadowed by new perils. For, even as the Soviet Union has pledged "restructuring" at home and a more peaceful approach abroad, it has undertaken no irreversible steps toward genuinely democratizing its totalitarian society or ending its traditional expansionism abroad. Importantly, the agreements the USSR has recently reached (or is currently negotiating) with other parties — including the United States — may well suffer the fate of previous international agreements the Soviets have violated.

How these issues are understood and addressed will be crucial in defining a Bush Doctrine for the further expansion of freedom and self-determination around the globe.

Findings

• The American people believe the United States’ greatest value to be its commitment to the defense and expansion of freedom.
• In support of freedom and national self-determination, the Reagan Doctrine sought to reverse the tide of the Soviet Union’s militant expansion in the Third World.

During the 1970’s, 11 Third World countries became Soviet-supported Communist dictatorships — prey to the Soviet Union’s expansionist Brezhnev Doctrine.

During the 1980’s, the United States provided military as well as economic and diplomatic aid to major resistance movements against Soviet-supported Communist regimes in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua and used its own forces in rescuing American hostages, and Grenada, from Cuban/Soviet domination.

The U.S. military aid was generally channeled through regional allies. Such aid usually was provided in a fashion that was designed — or simply came to be — politically overt, though operationally covert.

• Such U.S. support was to America’s comparative advantage, changing the correlation of forces and raising the Soviets’ costs of empire.

Indeed, the Soviet Union appears to be retrenching in the face of problems at home and sustained military resistance abroad. As a result — due unquestionably at least in part to the effectiveness of the U.S. policy of supporting the latter — the Soviets have agreed to remove all their forces from Afghanistan by February, 1989; their Cuban and Vietnamese proxies have, similarly, agreed respectively to withdraw from Angola and Cambodia within two years.

When the United States provided military aid to the Nicaraguan contras, real leverage was exerted on the Sandinista regime — at least temporarily — to ease human rights abuses and to reduce its militancy abroad. Unfortunately, opposition to providing military aid to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance has critically endangered their survival and the chances of democracy in Nicaragua and peace in Central America.

The present circumstances entail serious uncertainties. In fact, they risk fatally undermining the preliminary gains U.S. assistance has helped achieve for those striving for independence from Soviet domination in the Third World.

The Soviet Union has, thus far, failed to take irreversible steps either at home or abroad to reduce its capabilities to threaten Third World countries with its own military forces, or via those of its militant allies (including Cuba, Vietnam, terrorist groups, etc.)

Importantly, Soviet foreign retrenchments are not evident where the United States has failed to support strong resistance movements or where the Soviets have been left relatively free to exploit existing Western vulnerabilities — most critically in Central America.

Any agreements involving promised Soviet and/or Soviet-proxy troop withdrawals and future political settlements must confront the pattern of consistent Soviet, Cuban and Vietnamese violations of existing international agreements.

Policy Recommendations

• A Bush Doctrine in support of self-determination in the Third World should be clearly articulated early in the new Administration.

It should state that the United States will provide economic, diplomatic and appropriate military assistance to reverse the consolidation or expansion of communist regimes in the Third World and to promote self-determination and freedom through the achievement of independent, non-communist regimes.

It should remain clear-eyed about the dangers inherent in defective agreements and pledge that for any existing or new agreements, appropriate U.S. aid –including military aid — will be continued until Soviet and Soviet/proxy military aid ceases and independent, non-communist governments have been established.

It should press for the early resumption of U.S. military assistance to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance and undertake vigorous public diplomacy efforts in support of such assistance.

• As should be the case with sound arms reduction agreements, the United States must not accept unverifiable or asymmetric timetables in troop withdrawals. It must also closely monitor and safeguard the integrity of the reductions, verification and compliance process.

U.S. military assistance should be reduced only as Soviet and Soviet-proxy military assistance is reduced.

Soviet and Soviet-proxy expeditionary forces, including associated intelligence apparatuses, must be withdrawn totally and on a timetable not slower than that of any other foreign forces.

International verification machinery should be supplemented by an independent U.S. presence.

Appropriate safeguards must be maintained, including graduated phasing-out of U.S. military assistance and the ability quickly to reintroduce such assistance in the event of any non-compliance by Soviet or Soviet- proxy forces.

• The United States must clearly signal to the Soviet Union and our Allies that Soviet performance in the Third World will directly affect progress on issues such as arms control and trade.

The United States should insist on full Soviet compliance with existing international agreements before undertaking new agreements.

In providing both constraints and incentives for Soviet behavior and that of Soviet allies, the United States should expand the instruments available to policy- makers. The United States should work with its allies to assure that any commercial and technological activity with the Soviet Union and its clients contributes to genuine restructuring, openness and democratization in the recipients’ countries; such activity must not be used simply to build up military capabilities, to postpone reform at home or to finance Communist oppression and subversion abroad.

With its key allies, the United States should define and seek support for Western aid to freedom fighters as a form of defense "burden-sharing."

• The United States will need to undertake special efforts to bolster regional alliances in support of assuring the cause of self-determination and freedom from Soviet domination.

America’s friends and adversaries must be left in no doubt about the United States’ determination to remain a force in specific regions — including, where necessary, through military assistance.

The United States should seek to buttress regional efforts in support of resistance movements, to enhance regional legitimacy and to reduce the need for independent U.S. action.

Where possible, military assistance to resistance movements should be overt. Where required by allied sensitivities, the fact of U.S. assistance could be overt, but the channels and volume of assistance should be kept covert.

• No American commitment can be established — to say nothing of maintained — if it lacks bipartisan backing. If the necessary political base is to be sustained for a Bush Doctrine along the lines described here, it is essential that the President be seen to be personally committed to such a policy; that he work with responsible elements within the Congress to make the case for the required assistance; and, above all, that he enlist the support of the American people through steadfast, visible leadership and continuing educational efforts.