Remarks By Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. Before The Library of Congress Symposium On Nuclear Testing

Washington, D.C., 19 July 1993

"RECKLESS ABANDON: THE CLINTON NUCLEAR TEST BAN — AND NUCLEAR FREEZE — ENDANGER NATIONAL SECURITY"

I welcome this opportunity to place the issue of nuclear testing in a larger context. President Clinton’s recent decision [on nuclear testing] is, after all, just one decision among many taken by the previous Administration and this one that bear upon the safety, reliability and effectiveness — in short, the credibility — of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

For example, we no longer produce nuclear weapons. Neither do we manufacture the special nuclear materials that go into them. We are also rapidly dismantling or otherwise allowing to atrophy the industrial infrastructure and skilled workforce that supports our nuclear deterrent.

Taken together, these conditions — and the recent, complementary decision not to conduct even the fifteen tests explicitly authorized last year by Congress to prepare the U.S. nucleararsenal for a permanent test ban — are even more alarming than each of these actions individually.

As a practical matter, they amount to a unilateral nuclear freeze — a much ballyhooed, but ultimately repudiated, arms control gimmick of the early 1980s. Ten years ago, President Reagan and the majority in Congress recognized that such a step would recklessly endanger the national security. I believe that it makes no more sense for the United States today to be embracing a nuclear freeze, either in its component parts or in its entirety.

The World Still Requires a Credible U.S. Nuclear Deterrent

Those who disagree often cite mostly positive political changes in the former Soviet Union as a principal reason why the U.S. is today less in need of nuclear deterrence than in the past. This disregards an ominous reality: Virtually every Soviet nuclear weapon pointed at us during the Cold War is still pointed at us. Russia also continues to manufacture nuclear arms and material and to develop new classes of strategic delivery systems. Political intentions can change practically overnight; if Moscow’s do, a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent will be as important as ever.

The argument is also frequently made — by, among others, President Clinton — that stopping nuclear testing will help discourage the many nations currently trying to build — or buy — nuclear arms. Unfortunately, the likes of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and North Korea’s Kim Il Sung are more apt to regard such unilateral restraint as contemptible weakness than a model for their nations.

Indeed, I know of no basis — other perhaps than wishful thinking — for positing a connection between the presence or absence of U.S. testing and global proliferation. If anything, I believe that such restraint is likely to impel, rather than restrain, proliferation.

For one thing, pariah states will, I suspect, regard the deterioration of America’s nuclear arsenal as an inducement to acquire nuclear capabilities that will, by definition be more formidable than would otherwise be the case. For another, developed nations that have in the past been willing to entrust their security to the protection of the American nuclear umbrella will probably feel obliged to revisit that decision.

In my view, Japan has already signalled that decision with its actions at the G-7 Tokyo Economic Summit opposing an unequivocal endorsement of making the NPT open-ended. South Korea, Taiwan, Germany and perhaps others may well follow suit.

Real Costs from Foregoing Nuclear Testing

Let there be no doubt about it: If the United States forgoes nuclear testing for an extended period of time, there will be deterioration in its nuclear arsenal. It is instructive on this point to reflect upon a report submitted to Congress by the Reagan Administration in September 1988 … condemning The Relationship between Progress in Other Areas of Arms Control and More Stringent Limitations on Nuclear Testing.

This study continues to be the most comprehensive, publicly available official analysis of the need for U.S. nuclear testing and should, I believe, be required reading for anyone interested in this subject. After observing that: "Nuclear testing is indispensable to maintaining the credible nuclear deterrent which has kept the peace for over 40 years." And "…We do notregard nuclear testing as an evil to be curtailed, but as a tool to be employed responsibly in"As long as we must depend on nuclear weapons for our fundamental security, nuclear testing will be necessary." pursuit of national security." It concludes that

According to the Reagan study, the United States must test: "to ensure the reliability of our nuclear deterrent"; "to improve the safety, security, survivability, and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal"; "to ensure we understand the effects of a nuclear environment on military systems"; and "to advance our understanding of nuclear weapons design, nuclear testing serves to avoid technological surprise and to allow us to respond to the evolving threat."

Importantly, the study notes that none of these requirements can "currently be met without nuclear testing." I know of no technical basis for reaching a different conclusion today. Interestingly, the Bush Administration concluded on 9 January 1990 that: "The United States has not identified any further limitations on nuclear testing beyond those now contained in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) that would be in the U.S. national interest."

The Bottom Line

I believe we are in serious jeopardy of having to rely for the foreseeable future for deterrence on increasingly unreliable nuclear weaponry. This is what Charles Krauthammer in the Washington Post last Friday called "denuclearization." This is particularly dangerous insofar as the Clinton Administration and the Congress also appear determined to deny the nation the capacity to defend itself and its allies against ballistic missile attack.

In fact, the failure to provide for a routine source of tritium will ensure that by sometime in the next decade, all of our nuclear weapons will become inoperable. It is incumbent upon our elected leaders to acquaint themselves with the facts — particularly, the cumulative effect of the array of actions now being taken that will undermine the robustness of our nuclear deterrent.