Russian appointment of Lebed is not a step forward

(Washington, D.C.): Today’s appointment by President Boris Yeltsin of retired General Aleksandr Lebed as head of the Russian National Security Council and as personal security advisor to Yeltsin is but the latest indication that democratic elections have not served to halt the Kremlin’s reversion to form. In fact, the deal swiftly cut by Yeltsin in the aftermath of Sunday’s balloting — in which this classic Russian “man on a white horse” emerged as a crucial power-broker for the second round — signals a powerful new impetus toward authoritarianism at home and assertiveness abroad.

To be sure, the ascendancy of General Lebed and the unceremonious firing of Defense Minister Pavel Grachev may mean an early end to hostilities in Chechnya — an action that would be welcomed by everyone in Russia and elsewhere who has been appalled by Yeltsin’s genocidal conduct of that war. Unfortunately, the replacement of the hapless Grachev, who was the principal architect of the scorched-earth Chechen campaign, by a man who is — by all accounts — a competent military officer as well as a forceful and charismatic leader, augurs ill for others who have been the object of Moscow’s designs in the past.

From the ‘Horse’s’ Mouthpiece

This disturbing prospect was evident in remarks made last week by one of General Lebed’s senior advisors, Vladimir Titov, in the course of a visit to the Center for Security Policy. Emphasizing the General’s campaign theme of “Truth and Order,” Mr. Titov described Lebed’s view that Russia needed a rule of law with an iron fist. Contending that such an iron fist does not have to be used to hurt and could, instead, be employed to support something or someone, he declared that strong leadership would help solve Russia’s problems in much the same way that DeGaulle did those of France at a similar, difficult moment in the latter’s history.

Questions concerning the General’s views about various issues affecting Russian external policies, however, produced a series of responses chilling to a foreign audience. These can be summarized as an implicit endorsement of the Primakov Doctrine — the strategy of resuscitating and expanding the Kremlin’s traditional relationships with rogue and other authoritarian regimes hostile to the West that is being aggressively pursued by the former KGB thug-turned Yeltsin Foreign Minister, Yevgeni Primakov. For example:

• Titov acknowledged that Primakov had been working to resuscitate relationships with Iraq, Syria, Libya and Cuba. He denied, though, that the effect would be to recreate the old client-patron arrangements. Titov, nonetheless, acknowledged Moscow’s desire to resume its profitable oil-for-arms barter arrangement with Iraq.




• Titov indicated that Gen. Lebed would support the completion of two VVER-440 nuclear power plants at Cienfuegos, Cuba, averring that there was little danger of these reactors experiencing the sort of catastrophe 180 miles up-wind from the United States that caused such devastation to Chernobyl and the surrounding region.




• When asked about the possibility that Russian sales of militarily relevant technology to Iran might result in more deadly acts of terrorism, Titov averred that the terrorism was unlikely to be directed against Russia and that, Moscow, therefore would feel unconcerned about undertaking lucrative transactions with Tehran.




• A similar response was offered concerning strategic cooperation with China and, in particular, reports that Russia was offering SS-18 ICBM technology to Beijing. Titov declared that “though China was not a friend and there are some problems, Russia has nothing to fear” from the Chinese. He added that China was more likely to move south, making its policies a problem for the United States, not Russia. While Titov indicated that the General was opposed to missile sales, he declared that the Duma (in which Lebed was serving at the time) was impotent to stop them “if the military wants to sell them.”




• Titov declared that “As far as I know, not one ruble has been budgeted for development in the past year” on modernizing Russian strategic forces. While he acknowledged that the “Topol M” ICBM (the next generation of SS-25 missiles) program is continuing, Titov asserted that it was “just leftovers” from an old project. He declined to respond with any specificity when asked about two new classes of submarines also under construction. He did, however, state the General’s strong view that offensive nuclear weapons will continue to keep the peace in the future as they have for the past fifty years.





These statements stand in stark contrast to information provided earlier this year to the U.S. Congress by Defense Intelligence Agency director, Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes, and recounted by Richard Staar in an op.ed. published by the Wall Street Journal on 14 June 1996. According to Gen. Hughes, among the “new Russian offensive weapons systems” under “continued production” are: the Topol M-2 which “has been flight-tested and will go into serial production this year”; “miniature nuclear weapons (weighing under 200 pounds)” which are “coming off the assembly line” and are expected to go into “a new, highly accurate tactical missile for Russia’s ground forces”; and “seven quieter nuclear-powered Severodvinsk-class submarines, being built to supplement the 13 Akula-class ones, [to] carry the new D-31 submarine-launched ballistic missile.”





• Titov said that Gen. Lebed would oppose a missile defense system for the United States because it would violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, although he would not oppose a tactical defense system, “to defend Taiwan against attack from China, for example.”




• Titov announced that the General “does not support START II.”

The Bottom Line

General Lebed’s emergence as the pivotal factor in the next round of elections and a strong candidate to succeed Yeltsin ought to occasion a serious reappraisal of the Clinton Administration’s policy of unalloyed support for the incumbent. If anything, Lebed’s new influence seems likely further to reduce the differences between an incumbent in the Kremlin who is ever more authoritarian at home and aggressive abroad, and his communist challengers. It is particularly imperative that America’s blank-check underwriting of the Yeltsin regime be brought to a prompt halt — especially since it is now clear that direct and indirect U.S. funding (i.e., those channeled through multilateral institutions like the IMF) is enabling Moscow to extend its own supplier credits to unsavory nations like Libya, Iran, Iraq (e.g., $10 billion commitment for expanded oil production upon the lifting of sanctions) and Cuba and is being used to sustain — not dismantle — the Russian military-industrial complex.