It seems like there is a sea change in Tokyo’s lackadaisical, “overly reliant on the Americans” approach to national defense.
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has said he will double defense spending (maybe within five years) and also “fundamentally reinforce” Japan’s overall defense. Other Japanese politicians and officials have echoed this and the public appears to be on board as well.
However, Prime Minister Kishida has yet to provide specifics about how the extra defense money will be spent and more importantly, how Japan’s defense will be “fundamentally strengthened.”
Still missing in action is a well-considered plan based on a proper threat assessment, that lays out what Japan needs, and needs to do to defend itself. And as importantly, it should include a road map and timetable for bringing it to fruition quickly – and not a decade or two from now.
Walking the Talk
Prompted by the Chinese threat, Tokyo is revising ahead of schedule three key defense documents – National Security Strategy, National Defense Program Guidelines, and Medium Term Defense Program. These will be completed by the end of 2022.
One American with many years of direct involvement in the US-Japan defense alliance commented:
(The comments are) certainly progress of some sort but I’ll withhold final judgment until after we see what they (Japan) program into the new Mid-Term Defense Program. I read Kishida’s remarks. More sidling up to the problem tangentially…more of the same “we will endeavor to persevere, strengthen the Alliance, double dog try” etc.
If Alliance “improvement” was directly related to the number of promises to “strengthen” it, the People’s Republic of China would have apologized and stood down the PLA by now. Sorry, just a little tired of “Lucy” (Japan) pulling that football away at the last moment.
He has a point.
These reports are usually well written and accurately describe the dangers facing the nation. However, they tend to only propose incremental changes that tinker with the Japan Self-Defense Force’s (JSDF) existing structure and capabilities – rather than directing radical changes needed for Japan to fight an actual war.
They are also “hardware” focused. Just buy or build enough of this and that and Japan’s defense problems are solved.
‘Online Shopping’ versus Defense Capability
A retired Japanese defense official recently remarked to this writer that Japan’s approach to defense is like “online shopping.” You see something that looks cool and you click “buy” — without much sense of how you’ll use it, much less use it effectively, or if you really need it.
This quirk was on display recently when Japan announced it will acquire and place 1,000 cruise missiles onto the Ryukyu Island chain – also known as the Nansei Shoto. These islands extend 700 miles from Japan’s southernmost main island, Kyushu, almost to Taiwan and are adjacent to the Senkaku Islands that China is trying to pry loose from Japanese control.
Hopefully, somebody has also thought about how the sensing, targeting, and command and control will work.
And does it include all three JSDF services? You see, JSDF joint capabilities are lacking – so that when it comes to Nansei Shoto defense, each service typically has done whatever it thinks best.
So installing 1000 missiles is nice. But it would be better if JSDF established a joint operational headquarters – say, “Joint Task Force Nansei Shoto” – to defend the region, with the missiles being one part of a coordinated multi-service effort.
And hopefully the Americans are being brought in – not least so they don’t get shot by accident. But even better would be to meld US surveillance and targeting networks and long-range weaponry with JSDF resources.
You can see where this is going: make the entire defense of the Nansei Shoto a combined Japanese-US effort. It’s deadlier to an enemy, and consider the political effects of Japan and America (and maybe other free nations) combining resources – and also being able to reach over and cover Taiwan.
Don’t forget: Capabilities are as important as hardware.
Read more.
