Shades of Bosnia: Clinton’s Strong Rhetoric to Be Followed By Fecklessness In East Asia?

(Washington, D.C.): In recent days, the Clinton Administration has drawn a number of lines in the sands of East Asia concerning: monitorable Japanese progress toward greater openness in trade relations with the U.S.; America’s commitment to human rights; and its determination to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. As with his earlier, dismal translation of robust rhetoric about the unacceptability of Serbian aggression in Bosnia into action, the early returns suggest that the Administration’s actual policies in the Asian Pacific will bear little resemblance to President Clinton’s rhetoric.

‘Breakthrough’ or Breakdown on Trade with Japan?

For months, Administration spokesmen and the President himself have stressed the need for specific numerical commitments from Tokyo to permit quantification and transparency in opening up Japan’s markets to U.S. goods and services. Despite Mr. Clinton’s rhapsodizing over the economic accomplishments of the Tokyo summit in general and the "breakthrough" ostensibly accomplished with the Japanese on bilateral trade in particular, it is striking that there is not a single commitment to a specific number or otherwise quantifiable goal in the entire agreement.

In fact, according to one seasoned observer — the Washington Post‘s T.R. Reid — in its desperation to obtain an agreement, the U.S. side "blinked." As a result, the document is filled with ambiguities and commitments subject to differing interpretations and numerous exculpatory caveats.

Human Rights and Democracy in the Asian Pacific — Except for Vietnam

In his address to the South Korean parliament on 10 July, President Clinton stressed that, as part of a four-part American strategy toward the region, a "[U.S.] security priority must be to support the spread of democracy throughout the Asian Pacific." This commitment was belied, however, by his decision on 2 July to end American opposition to renewed borrowing from the International Monetary Fund by communist Vietnam.

This step, which is slated to be acted upon by the IMF today, will have the inevitable effect of providing financial life-support for one of the world’s most repressive regimes. Far from promoting the spread of democracy to Vietnam — or to the neighboring nations of Laos and Cambodia, in whose internal affairs Hanoi continues to meddle with a view to undermining freedom there — the Clinton Administration’s actual policy will have the effect of postponing such a development, possibly by many years.

Worse yet, the predictable (and predicted⁽¹⁾) pressure to take the next step toward full normalization of relations with Vietnam — lifting the U.S. economic embargo — is already beginning to mount. President Clinton said in announcing his decision on new IMF lending to Hanoi that: "Progress to date [by Vietnam on the POW/MIA issue] is simply not sufficient to warrant any change in our trade embargo or any further steps toward normalization."

Still, the resulting situation is clearly problematic. As noted in a darkly threatening op.ed. article by Alan Tonelson entitled "Mitsubishi’s Secret Plan for Vietnam: While We Play POW Politics, Japan Inc. Is Tooling Up," which appeared in the 11 July Washington Post: "The U.S. decision not to oppose multilateral loans to Hanoi will make even more credit available to the government although, thanks to the embargo, U.S. firms will not get any of the resulting business."

Here again, the President’s words, intended to convey American resolve, commitment to principle and robustness, are likely shortly to ring hollow. Like many previous promises, commitments to the families of unaccounted-for Americans — to say nothing of the Vietnamese people yearning for freedom — will probably be blithely sacrificed to political and economic expediency. When that happens, the image of a United States that can be had will be powerfully — and perhaps tragically — reinforced.

Empty Braggadocio on North Korea’s Nuclear Program?

Nowhere has Mr. Clinton’s tough rhetoric been more in evidence over the past fortnight than in connection with the emerging threat of nuclear weapons in North Korean hands. Before departing for the Tokyo summit, he described the Korean peninsula as "the scariest place on earth" and a nuclear-armed Pyongyang as "our biggest nightmare." At the Demilitarized Zone yesterday, he went further:

"When you examine the nature of the American security commitment to Korea, to Japan, to this region, it is pointless for [North Korea] to try to develop nuclear weapons. Because, if they ever use them, it would be the end of their country."

 

The President added, "We cannot let the expanding threat of these deadly weapons replace the Cold War nightmare of nuclear annihilation."

For those who have been concerned about the North Korean nuclear threat for some time⁽²⁾, the President’s apocalyptic description of the dangers posed by Pyongyang’s weapons program is both appropriate and welcome. Unfortunately, as in the aforementioned aspects of Clinton Administration policy toward East Asia, the rhetoric seems disconnected from the reality of U.S. policy.

After all, American negotiators have in months of direct and indirect negotiations been trying to appease North Korea in the hope that Pyongyang would not implement its announced intention to withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Discussions of inducements or "carrots" — such as U.S. commitments to forego further joint military exercises with South Korea and to end the North’s political and economic isolation — have bought Kim Il Sung precious time to complete his weapons program. They have also signalled unmistakably Washington’s refusal to respond to the new military situation being created in the region by Kim’s nuclear ambitions.

The Bottom Line

The Center for Security Policy believes that U.S. interests will be jeopardized in East Asia — and beyond — to the extent that American policies are perceived to be feckless or supine. This perception can only be intensified, and the costs made more severe, if accompanied by official pronouncements communicating a determination and robustness that does not exist. Such a practice stands Teddy Roosevelt’s prescription of speaking softly and carrying a big stick on its head.

To be sure, the Center supports the thrust of President Clinton’s forceful rhetoric when he describes the United States’ commitment to democracy, free trade, its own security and that of its allies, etc. — just as it did his strong statements during the campaign and early in his presidency about the need to stop Serbian ethnic cleansing. In particular, it endorses his explicit repudiation of the Tarnoff Doctrine — the "too-poor-to-lead" strategy promulgated by his State Department in May of this year⁽³⁾: "To some in America there is a fear that America’s global leadership is an outdated luxury we can no longer afford. Well, they’re wrong."

Clearly, words are no longer enough, however. If, as Mr. Clinton says, the United States cannot afford to forego providing global leadership, then it certainly cannot afford cheap talk about U.S. engagement in international affairs unsupported by concrete, effective action. The consequences of such a doomed approach are already evident in Bosnia. America dares not repeat them in the vastly more strategically sensitive Asian Pacific region.

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1. See the Center for Security Policy’s recent Decision Brief entitled ‘New Democrat’ Watch #7: New IMF Loans to Vietnam Ill-Advised, Unwarranted and Betrayal of Stance on Human Rights (No. 93-D 57).

2. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled What To Do About North Korea’s Nuclear Threat: Execute the ‘Osirak’ Remedy (No. 93-D 20, 19 March 1993).

3. For more on the Tarnoff Doctrine, see It’s Official: U.S. Abdication of International Leadership is State Policy, Not Mere Ineptitude (No. 93-D 42, 26 May 1993) and America the Impotent? ‘Tarnoff Doctrine’ Begets the ‘Please Hold’ Military Strategy; Sets Stage for Abandoned Commitments, Future Combat Losses (No. 93-D 43, 1 June 1993).