STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Delivered in
the U.S. Senate

24 May 1994

IAEA’s reaction [calling North Korea’s
removal of spent fuel rods from the
Yongbyon reactor a “serious
violation” of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)] was
perfectly appropriate under the
circumstances, but was apparently
inconsistent with the [Clinton]
Administration’s approach to grave
national security problems — an approach
which can be charitably described as
procrastinating, irresolute and
exceedingly dangerous.

* * *

What…ensued was a full court
Administration press to downplay the
significance of what the IAEA — an
agency not noted for its inflammatory or
belligerent rhetoric — condemned as a
serious violation of the NPT meriting the
immediate attention of the Security
Council. Secretary Perry’s recent
characterization of the situation as a
particularly grave, near-term crisis was
replaced with his calming assurance that
North Korea’s action constituted only a
procedural violation, giving the
impression that their conduct barely
warranted any U.S. interest.

…The fact that certain fuel rods had
not yet been removed from the reactor
does not in any way mitigate this latest
example of North Korea’s complete
disregard for its obligations under the
NPT. In fact, North Korea’s removal of
the fuel rods without IAEA monitoring is
a flagrant violation of the treaty and a
serious rebuke to U.S. diplomacy. That
the Administration would treat it as
anything other than that constitutes yet
another retreat from anything resembling
a coherent resolute and honest approach
to this crisis.

The IAEA’s declaration of North
Korea’s serious violation of the NPT
frustrated the administration’s intention
[to resume direct negotiations with
Pyongyang]. So Administration
officials attempted to intentionally
deceive the American people into
believing that Pyongyang had done
something that warranted a resumption of
the talks. That the
Administration would initiate such a
deception knowing full well that North
Korea would correctly recognize it as
another sign of American weakness is as
reckless an action as the administration
has taken to date in this crisis.

* * *

Irrespective of whether North Korea
has ignored our latest demand, the
administration intends to resume direct
talks with them. Administration officials
claim that North Korea has met all the
prerequisites for those talks. Whatever
those prerequisites might be remain a
mystery to the rest of us.

Mr. President, I assume that
the Administration hopes that its latest
transparent attempt at appeasement will
succeed where all their other attempts
failed.

* * *

I want to explain why I believe this
situation is so grave that the United
States must take whatever actions are
required to force an end to North Korea’s
unlawful nuclear ambitions. North
Korea’s nuclear program may be the
defining crisis of the post-Cold War
world. It represents a clear and
present danger to our closest Asian
allies and to the security of the United
States itself. I am greatly concerned
that the eventual outcome of North
Korea’s pursuit of nuclear status will be
a world where the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction explodes
exponentially; where in a never-ending
spiral of escalation all Asian powers
capable of producing nuclear weapons do
so and seriously undermine the stability
of all Asia; where the most
irresponsible, terrorist regimes in the
world have the capability to intimidate
regional rivals into total submission or
annihilate them; where the United States
itself might be the victim of a terrorist
attack like the bombing of the World
Trade Center – only this time the weapon
of choice will be a nuclear bomb.

From 1985 to 1992, North Korea
exported more than $2.5 billion in arms.
While most of the recipients of these
sales are classified, CIA Director
Woolsey has identified Syria, Iran, and
Libya among the countries….

To all those apologists for the
Administration’s appeasement policy who
argue that we must refrain from responses
that might provoke the North into
launching a military attack, I ask one
question: Would an attack be more
or less likely after North Korea acquires
a nuclear arsenal and after it has
completed its production of ballistic
missiles capable of delivering nuclear
warheads to Tokyo? I think the
answer is obvious.

Armed with a sufficient arsenal to
both export and use to their own ends,
North Korea could soon be blackmailing
South Korea, Japan and even the United
States into providing sufficient aid and
diplomatic concessions in order to
sustain their crumbling regime and
earning hard currency from its nuclear
sales abroad.

* * *

What is the nature of the regime that
currently threatens us? It is led by the
same man today who over 40 years ago
misread American resolve and launched the
Korean war — a war for which the United
States was not prepared and which cost us
dearly. It is a regime that in one 1983
incident assassinated most of South
Korea’s government. It is a regime that
captured the U.S.S. Pueblo,
imprisoned and tortured its crew. It is a
regime that in 1987 blew up a South
Korean airliner carrying over 150 South
Korean construction workers home from
work in the Middle East. It is a regime
that has committed numerous other
terrorist acts so ruthless that they defy
brief summarization.

Mr. President, North Korea has utterly
impoverished its nation in order to
finance its enormous military and its
nuclear weapons programs. I find it
difficult to accept that any number of
economic and diplomatic rewards from the
United States, by themselves, would
sufficiently entice Pyongyang into
abandoning the aspirations they have paid
so dearly to achieve. Given the
Administration’s appeasement policy’s
sorry record of accomplishment to date, it
is abundantly clear to any rational
person that the time for more forceful,
coercive action is long overdue.
Any further delay in
hardening our policy would constitute
Administration negligence so gross as to
damage our security interests for a
generation or more.

Before describing the stronger action
I have referred to, let me first quote
Secretary Perry from remarks he made last
week prior to the administration’s latest
change in policy.

“Whatever risks we are
facing by actions we take today, I
believe they would be less than the risks
we would face if we tried to face their
program two years from now after
they had developed a substantial
inventory of nuclear bombs and missiles
for their delivery vehicles.”

Secretary Perry had it exactly
right. North Korea’s recent
purchase of 60 submarines from Russia
which, Jane’s Weekly contends
could be adapted to fire ballistic
missiles, underscores the urgency of the
Secretary’s remarks. So, let us now — at
long last — consider those steps that
would bring this expanding crisis to its
earliest and most favorable conclusion.

The United States should once again
inform North Korea that, should they
abandon their nuclear ambitions, we are
prepared to normalize our economic and
diplomatic relations with that isolated
country. After we have reaffirmed that
intention, we should talk no more
of carrots. Any further discussion of the
crisis should only detail the punitive
measures we are prepared to take
immediately to force their cooperation.

We should make clear to China, quietly
but very forcefully, that there is no
other issue involved in our relations of
comparable importance. A mutually
advantageous engagement between our two
countries will simply not be possible
absent their cooperation on the sanctions
question. The administration must
spare no effort to be persuasive in this
endeavor. China must understand that
should they decline to cooperate, we will
have reached an insurmountable impasse in
our relations.

In discussions with our allies before
we go to the Security Council, we should
make clear our expectations of Japan.
Even if a sanctions resolution is vetoed,
Japan must cut off all remittances from
Korean-Japanese to North Korea.

…Financial flows to North
Korea from Koreans residing in Japan
[have] reached $1.8 billion annually. Of
that figure, $600-700 million is in the
form of cash remittances. They account
for 40 percent or more of North Korea’s
foreign exchange earnings, and a little
more than 8 percent or more of its GNP.
Depriving North Korea of this important
source of hard currency will be sharply
felt in Pyongyang as it struggles to keep
the collapsing North Korean economy from
plunging the entire society into chaos.

North Korea has threatened to go to
war over the imposition of sanctions. I
do not think they will, but I am not
certain. Thus, it is critical
that the United States prepare for such a
contingency immediately for two obvious
reasons: First, we have 37,000
American troops in Korea and we must take
every measure to ensure that they are
protected to the extent possible from
North Korean attack and would prevail as
quickly as possible in a conflict.
Second, visibly improving our readiness
to counter North Korean aggression will
emphasize the seriousness of our
intention to resolve this crisis on our
terms.”

* * *

Unfortunately, the administration has
done nothing to act on [Secretary
Perry’s] prudent assumption that [the
risk of war will be increased if
sanctions are voted]. With the
exception of the very slow deployment of
the Patriot missile batteries, the
United States has done nothing to prepare
for a possible attack from the North.

* * *

…The objects of American policy in
Korea should be to deter a North Korean
attack; to ensure a decisive win and the
least loss of life possible if deterrence
fails; to compel North Korea to terminate
its nuclear weapons program; and to
enforce any economic embargo which might
be imposed.

In order to ensure the readiness of
U.S. and South Korean forces to serve
those ends, the administration should
have already ordered the following
action. Unfortunately, they have not yet
seen fit do so. Lack of strategic
lift makes it imperative that the
following deployments occur well ahead of
any anticipated military action.

• First, increase the readiness and
  alert posture of U.S. and South
  Korean forces.
• Second, deploy to South Korea
  additional troops from the United
  States.
• Third, deploy additional fighter
  aircraft squadrons and Apache
  helicopters to South Korea.
• Fourth, deploy a carrier battle
  group to the area.
• Fifth, preposition bombers and
  tankers in the region.
• Sixth, preposition stocks in
  South Korea since, again
  significant lack of strategic
  lift precludes the timely
  sustainment of our forces during
  the crisis.
• Seventh, enhance intelligence
  assets, both satellites and
  aircraft systems, in the theater.
• Eighth, enhance South Korean
  defenses with Multiple Launch
  Rocket Systems (MLRS),
  counter-artillery radars, and
  precision-guided munitions. And
• Ninth, neither American and South
  Korean forces nor the population
  of Seoul have effective defenses
  against a chemical or biological
  attack form the North. Their
  failing should be quickly
  remedied.”

…These are but a few of the actions
which the United States should quickly
take in accordance with Secretary Perry’s
prudent assumption directive. That
none of them have yet been ordered
exposes the administration’s considerable
negligence….I ask that the
administration act on these
recommendations because I believe they
will have a deterrent value they will
better acquaint North Korea with the
futility of any attempt to conquer the
South.

…I think the administration should
take pains to inform North Korea that
these actions are purely defensive. But
should they decide to make a fight of it
nevertheless, we should also have
informed them in unmistakable terms that
any war they begin on the Korean
peninsula will end in Pyongyang. They
must be made to understand that the
United States intends to make their
regime the last casualty of a second
Korean war.

I hope they will heed that warning,
Mr. President. But if they do not, we
must not be dissuaded form our commitment
to prepare for the prospect of North
Korean aggression, and to resolve the
North Korean nuclear crisis on our terms
by whatever means necessary.

* * *

The administration would have us
believe that a military response to
Pyongyang’s intransigence would be
ineffective. That is not true, Mr.
President. Air or cruise missile
strikes on North Korea’s nuclear
facilities would not completely destroy
their nuclear program, but they could
damage it severely over both the near-
and long-term. There are risks
involved, of course, that must be
minimized to the greatest extent
possible.

Disabling or limiting North Korea’s
near-term nuclear capability poses the
most difficulties. However those are
difficulties are not insurmountable.

* * *

Precision targeting could
effectively damage the capabilities of
both facilities [a reprocessing facility
at Yongbyon and a nearby fuel
rod-assembly facility] without
requiring that they be reduced to rubble,
and with little or no radiation release.

It would be preferable to strike the
reactor while it is not operational. But
even it is fully refueled and has been
restarted, I am told that the
radiation release would be minimal with a
new fuel load. Strikes
could be designed in a way as to cause
the building to collapse in on itself
without seriously damaging any of the
fuel rods in the core.

Less difficult options — if also less
effective against North Korea’s near-term
threat would be strikes against North
Korea’s huge new 250 megawatt reactor
which is scheduled to become operational
by the end of the year, another even
larger reactor which will be operational
by 1996, and an associated reprocessing
plant that will begin operations in about
six months. Since these facilities are
not on-line, and have no nuclear fuel at
this time, there would be no risk of
radiation release.

Let it not be said of this
administration that in a defining crisis
of the post cold-war world, they faced a
choice between dishonorable appeasement
and war, they chose appeasement first and
got war later.