STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: SYRIA’S STRATEGIC ALLIANCE WITH IRAN REVEALS BOTH NATIONS’ TRUE MIDEASTINTENTIONS

(Washington, D.C.): Iran’s recent,
controversial deal to buy three advanced
diesel submarines from Russia is but the
latest evidence of the growing danger
posed by Iran to U.S. and allied
interests in the Persian Gulf. The
gravity of the situation was also
underscored when Teheran decided in
August to flex its muscles in a
confrontation with the United Arab
Emirates over the island of Abu Musa.

In a quote to the Washington Post
on 25 September 1992, an unnamed Gulf
diplomat characterized the emerging
regional problem this way: “It’s
become crystal clear that Iran is a
threat. We need a security system
directed against both Iran and
Iraq.” In fact, there is increasing
reason to believe that the needed
security system must also be directed
against Iran’s ally — Hafez Assad’s
Syria.

The Iranian Threat

The Iranian rearmament effort has been
underway for some time. In late March
1992, Director of Central Intelligence
Robert Gates told the House Armed
Services Committee that Iran is engaged
in a rearmament operation costing over $2
billion per year. Between 1990-1994, he
estimated, Iran will have purchased more
than $10 billion worth of arms.

According to a 7 August 1992 report in
the New York Times, in 1990-1991
alone, Iran allocated some $4 billion
toward the purchase of tanks, missiles
and fighter jets from the Peoples
Republic of China, North Korea, Russia,
and some of the former communist nations
in Eastern Europe. The Times described
Teheran’s arms-buying spree as including
the purchase of: 24 MIG-31s, 24 MIG-27s,
68 MIG-29s, 12 Tupolev-22M bombers and
several airborne early warning Ilyushin
76s. Iran has also apparently ordered 72
F fighter airplanes and 200 T-72 tanks
from China.

At the time of the New York Times
story, Iran was also negotiating to
acquire SA-5, SA-11 and SA-13
anti-aircraft missiles. Teheran also has
under construction a factory intended to
build their own version of the improved
SCUD missile — and perhaps, in due
course, other ballistic missiles.

Director Gates has also warned
that Teheran is moving rapidly to develop
its weapons of mass destruction
capabilities. He testified that
by the year 2000, Iran could very well
have developed a nuclear weapon
capability. It will probably field
chemical warheads for its inventory of
Scud missiles and biological warfare
weapons even sooner.

The Iranian-Syrian Alliance

In light of Teheran’s undisguised
hegemonic ambitions, its strident
opposition to any U.S. presence in the
region and its virulent antipathy toward
Israel, this massive military build-up
must be viewed as dangerous and alarming.
It is all the more so, however, in light
of the ominous axis evolving between Iran
and Hafez Assad’s Syria.

In fact, at the very time that Syria
has been credited by the Bush
Administration with improving the
prospects for peace with Israel, Assad
has concluded several key treaties of
cooperation with Iran covering the
political, economic and military spheres.
These bilateral agreements — coupled
with Syria’s continuing, lavish praise of
Iran’s leadership in the “struggle
against Zionism” — are a
better indicator of Hafez Assad’s true
intentions than either his
rhetoric designed for foreign consumption
or American representations of his
policies. Regrettably, the real Syrian
agenda does not appear to be interested
in fashioning a genuine, comprehensive
and lasting peace with Israel.

To the contrary, Syria’s deepening
alliance with Iran strongly suggests that
Hafez Assad is simply “buying
time” to reach his long-stated
objective of achieving strategic parity
with Israel. What is more, should Syria
— either on its own or through a
Syrian-Iranian alliance — achieve such a
prodigious level of military power, it
seems exceedingly unlikely that any peace
agreement reached with Damascus would be
worth the paper it was written on.

The depth of the alliance is indicated
by the creation of a “Higher
Syrian-Iranian Joint Committee,” an
organization whose purpose is to attempt
to ensure policy cooperation between the
two governments in virtually every area.
The Committee, which is scheduled to meet
every two months, held its latest meeting
in Damascus from 5-8 August 1992 to
discuss “all that matters to the two
countries and the region with a view
towards coordinating our two
positions.” Among the portentous
issues discussed at the meetings
reportedly were developments in Lebanon
and Iraq and Palestinian issues.

The coordination of Syrian-Iranian
policy toward Iraq should be of special
concern. While the Bush Administration
continues to praise Syria’s actions in
the Gulf War, both Iran and Syria have
opposed any further action against Saddam
Hussein. In fact, the 22 June 1992 Vienna
meeting of Iraqi opposition forces was
pointedly boycotted by Islamic groups
loyal to Syria and Iran. This
“neutral” stance on Iraq is of
note particularly due to continuing
reports that both Syria and Iran are
aiding Iraq in its campaign to circumvent
the economic sanctions imposed upon
Baghdad by the United Nations.

The Nuclear Component

Of even greater strategic import is
the concerted effort apparently being
mounted by a joint Syrian-Iranian working
committee on nuclear weapons development
and strategy established in January 1992. href=”#N_2_”>⁽²⁾
Technical collaboration underwritten by
Iranian oil resources would appear
greatly to improve the likelihood that
Assad’s nuclear ambitions will be
realized in due course.

It seems, moreover, quite possible
that — with the disintegration of the
Soviet Union and its successors’ severe
economic difficulties — shortcuts may be
available that enable Syria and Iran to
get into the nuclear business relatively
quickly. For example, last April it was
reported that Iran had procured two
tactical nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan.
Although the Kazakh government denies
these reports, claiming that the
artillery shells in question had been
misplaced (i.e., not sold) and
subsequently located, there is no way of
confirming this contention. Even if such
a parlous transaction did not occur in
this case, there is ample reason for
concern that similar sales might be
arranged in the future.

There is also extensive cooperation
between the two countries in developing
advanced means for delivering nuclear and
other weapons of mass destruction. For
example, in May 1992, the London
Sunday Telegraph reported that four
Syrian army officers were killed while
working in Iran on a project to extend
the range of Teheran’s Scud missiles. The
Syrian officers were in Iran as part of a
military technical cooperation treaty
signed between the two countries earlier
in the year.

What Are Syria’s Real
Intentions Towards the Peace Process?

The comments of Syria’s
government-controlled press at the end of
the Higher Committee meeting in August
are very instructive as to the intentions
of the two governments. For example, at
the conclusion of the August meeting of
the Higher Committee, Damascus’ Al-Ba’th
newspaper praised Iran’s commitment to
“liberating Jerusalem from the
destruction of the Zionist usurper.”
The two sides reportedly discussed the
“firm, joint struggle being waged by
Syria and Iran against Zionist ambitions
and expansionist schemes in the
region.”

At the same time, the Syrian paper Al-Thawrah,
in an article entitled “Advocate of
Aggression, Not Peace,” stated that
the new Israeli government policies were
“a brandished sword that slaughters
peace and that increases tension in the
region pushing it towards conflagration
and war.”

Arab diplomatic sources have told the
Center that shortly after that meeting
Hafez Assad addressed his military
forces, telling them to prepare
for the inevitable war with Israel.
Echoing the comments in Al-Thawrah,
Assad was reported to have said that the
new Israeli government was not committed
to a real peace and that the peace talks
would result in no treaty.

The fact that these comments are not
simply empty rhetoric designed for
domestic consumption is made clear by the
Joint Committee’s other activities. On 6
August 1992, Iranian leaders held
separate meetings with a variety of
Syrian-supported terrorist groupings
totally opposed to the peace process.
Among the participants were: Ahmad
Jibril, head of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command;
Nabih Berri, leader of the Amal movement
(and newly installed Speaker of the
Lebanese Parliament href=”#N_3_”>⁽³⁾);
and Sheik Hasan Nasrallah, head of the
Hezbollah.

The actual intent of these meetings
was made explicit by an interview given
by the Hezbollah’s Nasrallah to Agence
France Presse following the meeting.
Nasrallah told AFP that “We will not
renounce the armed resistance so long as
Israel occupies territory.”

The Bottom Line

The Bush Administration’s
“trademark” response to these
ominous developments has been to appease
Hafez Assad. Just two weeks
after the Joint Committee’s meetings,
President Bush and Secretary of State
James Baker both sent toadying letters to
the Syrian leadership. According to a 21
August 1992 Syrian radio report,
President Bush attempted to
“reassure” Assad — among other
things — of his “firm belief that
the coming phase will see a tangible drop
in [Israel’s] building [of] settlements
in the occupied Arab territories.”
For his part, Secretary of State Baker
“noted the importance of the role
Syria is playing” in the peace
process.

The Center for Security Policy
believes that the Bush-Baker
failure to recognize the strategic
significance of the Syrian-Iranian axis
is of a piece with the Administration’s
determination to overlook a range of
other, malevolent Syrian activities
documented by the Center’s Syria
Watch. These include: drug
dealing, support for international
terrorism, abuse of external financial
assistance, offensive arms acquisitions,
disregard for human rights, etc.

The real prospect that the United
States will soon be faced with the
consequences of yet another failed effort
to bring an autocratic pariah state into
the “family of nations” demands
an urgent post-election
reassessment of U.S. policy toward Hafez
Assad’s Syria. Should Washington
not promptly undertake such a
reassessment — and adjust its policies
accordingly, the strategic repercussions
are likely to make those associated with
the earlier, catastrophic courting of
Saddam Hussein appear trivial by
comparison.

– 30 –

1. This
is the eighth in a series of Center for
Security Policy Decision Briefs
on the Bush Administration’s misbegotten
and potentially recklessly dangerous
policy toward Hafez Assad’s Syria.

2. See
the Center’s Decision Brief
entitled, “The Iraq
Syndrome: Bush Administration Ignores,
Facilitates Syrian Arms Build-Up,”
(No. 92-D 111,
14 September 1992).

3. See
the Center’s Decision Brief
entitled “Syria’s Terrorism,
Hegemony in Lebanon Makes Mockery of
Mideast Peace Process,” ( href=”92-D136.html”>No. 92-D 136, 2
November 1992).