Summary of The Center For Security Policy’s High-Level Roundtable Discussion On The Future Of The Mideast ‘Peace Process’

17 September 1997
The Park Hyatt Hotel
Washington, D.C.

Against the backdrop of the unraveling of the Middle East “peace process,” the Center for
Security Policy convened on 17 September 1997 a high-level Roundtable Discussion to examine
the causes of that failure. An accurate assessment on this score is clearly necessary if one is to be
able to judge whether the Clinton Administration’s efforts to save that process by accelerating it
will serve to enhance or diminish the prospects for a durable regional peace.

Over forty past and present U.S. and Israeli government officials, internationally recognized
Mideast specialists, leaders of the American Jewish community and influential journalists
participated in this half-day event. The Lead Discussants were: former Assistant Secretary of
State Richard Murphy; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith⁽¹⁾;
Representative Michael Forbes (R-NY), a member of the influential House Appropriations
Foreign Operations Subcommittee; Dr. David Pollock, Middle East specialist on the State
Department’s Policy Planning Staff; and Dr. Daniel Pipes, editor of Middle East Quarterly.

The program also included a working luncheon which featured a discussion of the politics of the
Mideast peace process with key congressional aides moderated by Thomas Moore, an author and
former professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Another highlight
was the presentation by Yigal Carmon of a videotape documenting recent evidence of official
Palestinian statements and actions inconsistent with the idea of peaceful co-existence with Israel.
Mr. Carmon was a former advisor on counter-terrorism to Israeli Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin
and Yitzhak Shamir and is the founder of Palestinian Media Review, an organization which tracks
and translates what Yasser Arafat and his colleagues are saying to their people in Arabic.
Participants also joined in a recognition of the contributions made to the debate about the Mideast
“peace process” by the Zionist Organization of America and its President, Morton Klein.

The following pages summarize the Roundtable Discussion’s many important insights. While no
effort was made to define a consensus, some views expressed in the course of the Roundtable
appeared to enjoy widespread support among the participants — a fact noted where appropriate.

Roots of Failure of the Oslo ‘Peace Process’

There appeared to be virtual unanimity among the Roundtable participants that the “peace
process” which was sealed with a handshake on the White House lawn is now moribund. While
noting a variety of contributing factors, the Discussion returned again and again to a key problem:
the continuing refusal on the part of the Palestinian Arabs and the majority of Arabs
elsewhere to embrace a commitment to peaceful co-existence with Israel — a commitment
believed to be implicitly, if not explicitly, required by the Oslo “process” and, in any event,
one that is indispensable to any genuine peace between the parties.

In particular, the discussion considered the role played by rhetoric emanating in Arabic from
Yasser Arafat and other officials of the Palestinian Authority. Such rhetoric has, in the words of
one participant, amounted to “a hostile diplomacy” that feeds “high expectations and kind of
aggressive ambitions on the part of its own people.” Roundtable participants and the videotape
presented by Mr. Carmon detailed the nature of this “hostile diplomacy,” including: speeches
exhorting the Palestinian Arabs to jihad against Israel; the incessant use of symbols (notably the
adoption of a map of “Palestine” that encompasses the whole of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as
well as all of pre-1967 Israel); and actions (e.g., consorting with and supporting leading terrorists
and their organizations).

The contention was made that the use of such rhetoric by PA officials, from Arafat on down, was
essentially comparable to that of politicians elsewhere — designed to engender support from core
constituencies, but not necessarily indicative of actual policies to be pursued. The suggestion was
also made that prominent Israeli politicians and religious leaders engage in similar behavior. The
majority of those who spoke on the subject, however, regarded the role being played by
Palestinian officialdom in pursuing and promoting such a hostile diplomacy as contributing
decisively to a climate fundamentally incompatible to the negotiation of agreements leading
to a genuine and durable peace.

It was also noted that Israeli democracy permits the expression of a wide variety of views. To the
extent that there are instances where individual religious leaders and Members of the Knesset who
are not members of the government have engaged in extreme rhetoric, such behavior cannot be
confused with official policy. The same cannot be said of statements repeatedly made in Arabic
by Arafat and his lieutenants, disseminated widely through the PA media and echoed in
government-controlled outlets elsewhere in the Arab world. According to one participant, there
is a “fundamental asymmetry” between the efforts being made by Palestinian Arab leaders,
intellectual elites and media on the one hand and their Israeli counterparts on the other in “talking
about peace and talking about the immorality of violence as a political tool.”

‘A Peace Process’ or Simply a ‘Negotiating Process’?

It was observed that this “terrible asymmetry” has two effects: First, it signals that the most
influential people in the Palestinian and other Arab societies do not embrace the idea of peaceful
co-existence with Israel.⁽²⁾ And second, the incessant promotion of such sentiments encourages a
climate that is hostile to the expression of opposing views. As a result, evidence of popular
support among Arabs for peace with Israel is reduced to those statements made in English for
foreign consumption and polling data indicating what one participant called a “solid majority” in
favor of continuing the “peace process.”

There appeared to be widespread agreement among Roundtable participants that such polling data
reflected, in part at least, an Arab view of the purpose of the peace process that differs
importantly from that held by most Israelis. As one participant put it, “The Israelis want peace
and the Palestinians want a state.” The extent to which, as he asserted, solid majorities in the
Israeli and Arab communities accept that “both sides need to achieve their minimal aspirations”
remains a matter of considerable disagreement.

For example, as one discussant noted, if the “peace process” is really just another “negotiating
process” which a “hostile regime” uses to advance its interests “under the banner of peace”
without ever actually embracing the fundamentals of peaceful co-existence, it will not produce a
permanent end to hostilities any more than such processes did when pursued by “Lenin, Stalin,
Hitler, Saddam Hussein [and] Slobodan Milosevic.”

Sources of Irreconcilable Hostility Towards Israel

In order to calibrate correctly the nature of the process now underway, it would seem important
to understand not only the Palestinians’ ultimate objectives, but also the motivating forces at work
in the Arab community. As one discussant observed, the U.S. tends to overestimate the
importance of economic motivations, given Americans’ own predilections and concerns, and to
underestimate the importance of politics. He contended that the Palestinians, and Arabs more
generally, are driven by dreams and hopes, memories, loves and hatreds rather than by economic
goals. This difference has two implications for policy: First, the Palestinian Arabs will give up
economic benefits for a political cause; and second, prosperity will be used to fuel political
goals.

Also working against the constructive role economic incentives might play, one participant
contended, is the deep suspicion many Arabs feel that Israel has an ulterior motive in pursuing
peace, namely its hope for economic hegemony in the Middle East. This was not an unreasonable
inference to draw from former Prime Minister Shimon Peres’ vision of a “New Middle East” in
which the Arab-Israeli conflict would give way to a regional transformation along the lines of the
European Union — a Mideast in which borders would be eliminated and a single transnational
economy forged. Naturally, such a vision is utterly anathema to those whose vision remains one
of a Middle East without Israel.

The fact that the Arab world remains as-yet unreconciled to the legitimacy and permanence of the
State of Israel appears to be contributing to other manifestations of the failure of the present
“peace process.” The most glaring examples include, notably, the PLO’s failure to amend its
Covenant so as to remove references to the destruction of the Jewish State and the PA’s refusal
to prevent terrorists from operating in and from areas under its control.

Would Peace be Served by a Palestinian State?

Against this backdrop, the implications of a sovereign Palestinian state take on greater
significance. Roundtable participants widely agreed that such a state would be the inevitable
upshot of a “Final Status agreement.” To be sure, there are evident disagreements between the
Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu and Arafat’s PA about the extent of the sovereignty to
be exercised by such a Palestinian entity. As a practical matter, these disagreements will
complicate — if not prevent completion of — Final Status negotiations.

The Roundtable Discussion made clear that before plunging into such negotiations, the United
States and Israel would be well advised to address whether the creation of a Palestinian state —
which, whatever its other attributes, will enjoy internationally recognized borders and what
amount to sizeable armed forces — will actually enhance the prospects for real peace, or
undermine them. One Roundtable participant asserted that such a step will be a pre-condition for
an end to “violence against individuals” in Israel. A more generally held belief, however,
appeared to be that the creation of a Palestinian state west of the Jordan river will intensify the
dangers facing Israel. In the words of one discussant:

“…The Israelis will face all of the problems that they currently face with the Palestinian
Authority — which the promotion of hostility, serving as a base for terrorism — except
that you will have the added aggravating factor that any Israeli action against, for
example, terrorists operating in the area would entail the violation of an internationally
recognized boundary.”

This problem is further aggravated by the setbacks Israeli counterintelligence has already
experienced in operating against terrorists enjoying sanctuary in the PA-controlled areas. As one
participant put it, Israel’s counterintelligence capabilities have been “totally destroyed” as a result
of steps taken by Arafat’s myriad security organizations to roll-up Israeli informants and
discourage individual Palestinians from cooperating with Israel in anticipating and thwarting acts
of terrorism in the Jewish States.⁽³⁾

Such a development may also prove to be a threat to Hashemite Jordan and therefore, ironically,
inimical to the best interests of the Palestinian people themselves. Several participants remarked
that a growing percentage of younger Palestinian Arabs — frustrated with the capricious, corrupt
and increasingly despotic authoritarianism they are experiencing under Arafat’s Palestinian
Authority — favor seeking a “relationship” with Jordan.

In short, a Final Status agreement that resulted in the creation of an internationally recognized
Palestinian state west of the Jordan would likely help destabilize the region. It would certainly
compound Israel’s present security problems. Consequently, those seeking a genuine peace
between Israel and the Palestinians should be very chary of the idea of accelerating the “peace
process” by plunging into negotiations on a Final Status agreement. There are no readily apparent
means of resolving the explosive issues that have been remanded to such negotiations including, in
addition to the problem of a sovereign Palestinian state discussed above: the location of borders,
the disposition of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian “refugees,” the status of Jerusalem and
Israeli rights in Palestinian areas.

For all these reasons, a number of Roundtable participants expressed skepticism about the
decision now embraced by both the Israeli and U.S. governments to move directly to Final Status
negotiations. Even those most optimistic that these negotiations will produce a mutually
acceptable agreement, however, emphasized that peace would depend upon Israeli military
superiority.

Can Israel Retain its Military Superiority?

The Roundtable addressed at some length the risks of renewed, higher-intensity conflict in the
Middle East. Differing opinions were offered regarding the chance of another Arab-initiated
assault upon Israel. Even among those participants who subscribed to the view that another
Arab-Israeli war was just a matter of time, there was disagreement about when such a conflict
would arise.

One important variable in both the timing and consequences of another war involving Israel is the
development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by several hostile regional powers, notably
Iran, Iraq and Syria. Several Roundtable participants tied the start of such a war with the
acquisition of quantities of such weaponry and ballistic missiles to deliver them against Israel.

Of particular concern are developments involving Syria. In August, press reports indicated that
the Syrians had deployed some of the approximately 150 SCUD missiles they have obtained with
help from North Korea and China. These weapons could devastate Israel with chemical weapons,
which Syria is known to have produced. According to one worrisome scenario discussed in the
course of the Roundtable, the Syrians may believe that they could launch an attack aimed at
quickly recovering some or all of the Golan Heights and obtain international diplomatic
intervention to impose an immediate cease-fire on Israel which would enable Damascus to
consolidate its position. Such an agenda would not necessarily be inconsistent with Syria’s
participation, such as it is, in a “negotiating process” with Israel and the United States. After all,
as was noted by one participant, Syria may be using the “peace process” as a shield to protect
itself from U.S. sanctions similar to those imposed upon other terrorist-supporting states such as
Iran, Iraq, Libya and Sudan.

Concern was expressed by some Roundtable participants that an Arab offensive may in part be
prompted by a miscalculation of the United States strategic relationship with Israel. The danger
of America adopting the role of “honest broker” between Israel and the Arabs is that Israel’s
regional adversaries may perceive an opportunity to drive a wedge between the Jewish State and
its most important and powerful ally.

The risks of this sort of miscalculation are made all the greater by the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction which could be seen as placing a premium on pre-emptive action against Israel.
It seemed generally agreed by participants that such a danger made all the more imperative the
continuing and unmistakable commitment on the part of the United States to Israel’s security and
to the preservation of its “qualitative edge” over potential adversaries.

Fortunately — as remarks by representatives of the legislative branch made clear — Congress is, if
anything, increasingly concerned about the dangers emerging for Israel and remains committed to
the Jewish State’s security. Several indicated that reduced support on Capitol Hill for the “peace
process” as it has been practiced to date reflects a growing anger over the absence of an Arab
commitment to peaceful co-existence with Israel.

In particular, continuing acts of terrorism mounted from within and with the acquiescence, if not
active support, of the Palestinian Authority have resulted in an increasing congressional
unwillingness to provide American tax-dollars to the PA. Some participants anticipated that
Congress would be still more assertive about its concerns with the direction and implementation
of the “peace process” in the months ahead.

Recognition of the Efforts and Contributions of Morton Klein and ZOA

The Roundtable Discussion also afforded an opportunity to recognize the work of the Zionist
Organization of America (ZOA) under the leadership of its President, Morton Klein. In the
years since the signing of the Oslo accords, Mr. Klein and his organization have closely monitored
the implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian agreements.

The work of ZOA in tracking non-compliance by the Palestinian Arabs with their commitments
has not always been welcomed by those who fancy themselves supporters of the “peace process.”
Their criticism ignores the fact that without such accountability the “peace process” is, at best, a
negotiating process cynically exploited as a constraint on the democratic party by the non-democratic one; at worst, it is a prelude to a new and more virulent threat to Israel.

The Center for Security Policy and the participants in its Roundtable joined in commending Mr.
Klein for his myriad, significant contributions to the debate about the value of the present “peace
process” and for his efforts to ensure that it actually serves to advance, rather than retard, the
cause of peace in the Middle East.

Conclusion

The Center for Security Policy’s Roundtable Discussion on the future of the Mideast “peace
process” offered important insights into the most decisive impediments to this and related
diplomatic efforts. While there was general agreement that the current effort has reached the
point of diminishing marginal returns — a perception seemingly reflected in the almost complete
absence of self-congratulatory commemorations of the fourth anniversary of the White House
signing ceremony, which roughly coincided with the convening of the Roundtable — there was no
such agreement about what to do next.

Unfortunately, if the prospects for achieving a Final Status agreement conducive to a real peace
are as remote as they appear to be in the absence of an Arab commitment to peaceful co-existence
with Israel, the Jewish State’s other options are not very attractive, either. As one discussant put
it, there are basically three possibilities:

“First, muddle through, maintain the status quo, continue to endure the terrorism
problem. A second option is re-occupy the territories because the territories are
serving as a base for terrorism. The Israelis can’t rely on the PA to suppress the
terrorists; they have to do the job themselves. That second option, of course, entails
the enormously difficult problem of what do you do with the 40,000 or 50,000 or so
Palestinian security forces who are fairly well armed? Re-occupation would be a very
high cost and bloody option.

“The third option, which some people are talking about, is some kind of
separation reviving an idea of Rabin, and this essentially means some kind of
Israeli unilateral withdrawal, a building of walls, a recognition that you don’t have
peace, and try to keep the terrorists out, not by — from the Israeli point of view —
re-occupying the area, but by cutting off all ties to the area and relying on walls
and fences as the basis for security.

“None of these options is a peace option, obviously.”

Under present — and foreseeable — circumstances, one thing seems clear: As long as
Israel’s commitment to peaceful co-existence with its neighbors remains unreciprocated, the
prospects for a genuine and durable peace will remain remote. The various options, involving
both negotiations and unilateral action by the Israelis, must be carefully weighed in that light.

— End of Summary —

1. Mr. Feith, a founding member of the Center’s Board of Advisors, authored an essay entitled
“A Strategy for Israel,” which appeared in the September 1997 edition of Commentary Magazine.
This article was addressed by a number of the Roundtable participants and is required reading for
those interested in the present state and future prospects of the Middle East “peace process.” See
the Center’s Decision Brief entitled ‘Say It Ain’t So’: Ross’ Trilateral Intelligence Gambit
Threatens U.S. Security, Interests (No. 97-D 112, 14 August 1997).

2. One discussant pointed out that there have been some Arab leaders, most especially Egypt’s
Anwar Sadat and Jordan’s King Hussein, whose embrace of peaceful co-existence with Israel is
genuine and open. The former tragically “died unmourned,” the latter is politically isolated in the
Arab world. He also observed that those opposed to such co-existence cite the apostasy of these
leaders as evidence of their illegitimacy as, in the words of a fundamentalist Lebanese ayatollah, as
“unelected Arab and Moslem regimes that do not represent their people.”

3. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled Denial Is No Basis For Securing A Durable
Mideast Peace (No. 97-D 110, 11 August 1997).