Summary of The William J. Casey Institute of the Center for Security Policy’s Symposia on Vital U.S. Security Interests in Cuba

Coral Gables and West Palm Beach, Florida
12 and 13 March 1998

In the wake of Pope John Paul II’s historic visit to Communist Cuba, the Center for Security
Policy’s William J. Casey Institute held two informative and exceedingly timely Symposia in south
Florida. The purpose: to discuss vital U.S. security interests in Cuba and to explore policy
prescriptions for normalizing relations with the Castro regime that are now being advanced with
increasing insistence.

The Casey Institute Symposia held on 12 and 13 March 1998 in Coral Gables and West Palm
Beach, respectively, however, offered powerful reasons why such recommendations
should be
rejected, lest Castro’s regime secure a new lease on life in political, economic and
moral
terms — and the abiding threats to the U.S. posed by that regime be actualized.

Between the Coral Gables event, held at the historic Biltmore Hotel, and the Symposium in
West
Palm Beach’s Governors Club the following day, roughly 150 people participated including: a
leading Member of Congress, Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-FL);
several former
senior American policy-makers; defectors and other refugees from Castro’s Cuba; representatives
of the Coast Guard in Miami and U.S. Southern Command; and a number of leading national and
local journalists.(1) (See the attached Lists of Participants
from Coral Gables and West Palm
Beach
.)

The following pages summarize many of the important insights regarding the threats that
continue
to be posed by Castro’s totalitarian regime — threats to his own people, to their neighbors in the
United States and to other vital American interests. Where possible, edited versions of direct,
albeit unattributed, quotes from participants are provided; the passages not in quotation marks
paraphrase key points made during the Symposia.

While no effort was made to formalize a consensus, the clear sentiment of most of those
participating in these events was that, under present circumstances, were the United States to
liberalize trade or otherwise begin to normalize bilateral relations, the effect would be to:
legitimate Castro’s historic enmity toward this country; provide economic life support to his
government; and abandon those seeking its removal from power in favor of a democratic and
peaceable government subject to the rule of law.

The Nuclear Reactor Complex Abuilding at Juragua, Cuba

One of the most serious, if for the moment latent, threats posed by Cuba today
arises from
recently resumed construction of two Soviet-era nuclear reactors at Juragua, near the city of
Cienfuegos, Cuba. A discussion of the near-certainty that these reactors will, if allowed to be
brought on-line, result in nuclear accidents was led in both of the Symposia by the holder of the
William J. Casey Chair, Roger W. Robinson, Jr. Mr. Robinson served as
Senior Director of
International Economic Affairs at the National Security Council under President Reagan, and is
one of the pre-eminent American critics of Castro’s nuclear program. Importantly, his warnings
about the dangers posed by a potential Chernobyl-style catastrophe 180 miles upwind from the
U.S. mainland were endorsed by Pelayo Calante, a Cuban engineer who
worked on quality
control and assurance aspects of the Juragua complex for seven years prior to his defection.
Among the highlights of this section of the Casey Symposia were the following:

The Juragua Complex’s Fatal Flaws

Some of the reasons why this reactor complex is a Chernobyl-like disaster off our shores,
ready to
happen if it is completed and fueled, include the following:

  • “It is estimated on the part of defectors from Cuba who were actively working on the plant
    itself in their nuclear industry that 60 percent of the Soviet/Russian-supplied materials
    used
    thus far in construction are defective.
    Even more disturbing, the critical welds
    in the
    cooling systems and other vital systems, of which there are at least 5,000 in the auxiliary
    pumping units alone, it is estimated that some 15 percent of those wells are also
    defective
    , due to a host of reasons.”
  • “Those defects became evident on x-rays that the Cubans themselves conducted, but
    according
    to these defectors, Cuban intelligence destroyed those x-rays, erased all of the
    serial
    numbers where they were placed in order to insure that the International Atomic Energy
    Agency and other regulators that would come into the picture on the safety side, would have
    no clue as to where they are and where repairs are needed.”

    “It is useful to note that, one defective weld in the United States takes down a
    nuclear reactor
    until there is abundant evidence that it is repaired.”

  • “In addition, the reactor dome cannot withstand anywhere near the over-pressures
    that
    would be involved in a nuclear accident of the meltdown variety like Three Mile Island.

    There are many technical considerations here, but just to give you orders of magnitude, we
    require 50 pounds- per-square-inch safeguards against these over-pressures. Cuba has built in
    seven percent. That is obviously flawed on the face of it.”
  • “The Soviet VVER 440 reactor design is the same nuclear reactor of which there were four
    in
    East Germany. All were closed within days of the reunification of Germany, because of their
    inherent dangers and flaws. NBC News reported that one of those reactors was near
    meltdown at the time it was closed. In Bulgaria and Slovakia, the same reactor design had to
    be shut instantly because obviously, it cannot hope to meet standard operating procedures as
    we know them in the West.”
  • The status of the nuclear facilities in Cuba are very poor. Conservation of the
    nuclear
    reactor and the other facilities is very bad.
  • “The other thing is, that the training for the nuclear reactor operation was very
    poor.

    Much of it was done in Russia in a facility that was not similar to the nuclear reactor in Cuba.”
  • “When the construction was stopped in 1992, the reactor base and the other equipment were
    exposed to the sea air, and corrosion is continuing in these reactors. And in the case if we put
    this reactor now together with the other facility, the probability that there will be an
    accident is almost 100 percent.

For these and other technical reasons, this reactor complex cannot be repaired.
It would
have to be razed to the ground and started over
with a Western design and, of course,
world-class safety standards in place.

Why Is Fidel Proceeding With This Dangerous Scheme?

  • “[The bottom line is that] this complex is absolutely required if Cuba is going to
    make up
    some 15 to 20 percent electricity shortfall on the island
    — a shortfall that must be
    overcome
    if Castro is to realize his hopes for new, direct foreign investment from our Canadian and West
    European friends, as well as certain countries in Latin America. Obviously, you cannot expand
    a tourism industry or build a robust mining industry if experiencing brown-outs and black-outs
    several hours a day, which is the case today.”
  • “New life-support has been offered the Juragua reactor complex [which] began construction
    in
    1982. For a time, it moved along at a very brisk pace, with Cuba and Russia investing
    some

    $1.2 billion in that complex. To give you a sense of the scale of this
    investment, remember
    that Cuba’s total hard currency income today totals $1.7 billion. You get a sense why
    the
    Castro regime, not to mention Moscow, would be loathe to walk away from that gigantic
    project.”
  • The Russians are anxious to sell nuclear reactors to others around the world. It is not
    conducive to such sales to show themselves unable to bring on-line two of their power
    plants.

    Russia is releasing to Cuba a $350 million line of credit,
    originally configured in
    1994, but withheld for various reasons. Those monies are now being released for what
    the Russians say are 12 priority projects on the Isle of Cuba. You can be sure…the
    Juragua nuclear reactor complex [is one of them.]”

  • “There are other reasons why Castro would proceed with this project despite the dangers.
    It
    is…a very potent distraction for the United States, a Cuban missile crisis without the
    missiles
    .”
  • “What does it say about a government that would willfully proceed with a program that
    would
    just be a catastrophe for its own people? I suggest to you that, that indifference to the
    welfare of the Cuban people is one of the greatest indictments against the Castro regime
    and one of the reasons why we feel very strongly that there can be no deals with Castro.

    There can be no life support extended to Castro. There can be no perpetuation — at least, at
    our hands
    — of this regime and the tyranny that it entails.”

What is at Stake?

  • “Consider the findings of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
    Administration
    , which
    has done elaborate mapping in terms of what would happen if a radioactive plume emanated
    from an accident in Cuba — an event that the General Accounting Office states
    is a question
    of when, not if:

    “‘Based on climatological data for the summer of 1991 and the winter of 1991-92,
    the
    summer east to west trade winds would carry radioactive pollutants over all
    Florida and portions of Gulf States as far west as Texas in about four days.
    In
    winter, when trade winds are weaker and less persistent, pollutants would encounter
    strong westerly winds that could move the pollutants toward the east, possibly as
    far north as Virginia and Washington, D.C. in about four days.
    ‘”

  • “In case of an accident, a nuclear accident and the people were irradiated, the Cuban
    government will not make this public.”

What Can Be Done About the Cuban Nuclear Threat?

  • “Some urge us to negotiate with Castro to allow inspectors — U.S. inspectors and United
    Nations inspectors and Organization of American States inspectors — to monitor whatever is
    being done there until the facility is functioning. Will we accept that deal? My short
    answer
    is, “No deals.”
    This reactor complex cannot be made safe by any infusions of technical
    support out of the United States or efforts in the safety categories from the United Nations.
    That is a function of technical and construction-related reasons and reasons of design.”

    “As far as trying to buy off Fidel Castro — in effect, cut a North Korean extortion kind
    of arrangement whereby we take down the reactors and build our own so that he
    won’t do something unsafe 180 miles off our shores — we view that prospect about the
    same way as we view the fatuous North Korean reactor complex: We are not going
    to be extorted by that kind of nuclear terror.
    We are not going to reward Fidel with
    new financial life support so that he may maintain his totalitarian hold on the Cuban
    people in this context.”

  • “In the next 90 days the Congress is going to be acting upon approximately $1
    billion in
    U.S. taxpayer aid flows to Russia.
    And I don’t think we had in mind that money being
    sluiced to create a Chernobyl-like disaster 180 miles upwind from the American mainland.
    We
    need to make it clear to Moscow that, all 350 million of those dollars are coming off of
    the $1 billion that they are seeking from U. S. taxpayers
    in the next 60 to 90 days on
    Capitol Hill. One thing we can certainly do in this gathering is to come away with a new
    conviction that that is simply not on. Moscow is not going to have it both ways.”
  • I recommended that we impose or threaten import controls against any Western
    supplier for the reactor scheme —
    France, Germany, Italy, Brazil and even the U.K. have
    all
    expressed interest in playing the role of suppliers. The bottom line is, that a choice has
    to be
    made. It’s going to be the Cuban market or the American market. But it can’t and
    shouldn’t
    be both.”
  • We have had naval blockades and the like before when our country was in clear
    and
    present danger of a nuclear threat from Cuba. I suggest to you, we are facing that clear
    and present danger today.

    “It is not unreasonable to warn Moscow that they are not to fuel that
    reactor
    ; that
    we will seek to interdict such fuel and, if necessary, at the end of the day, that — prior
    to that reactor being fueled and becoming a ‘dirty,’ as they say in the trade,
    radioactive site — it’s F-117 time.
    (2)

    “This can be done in a manner that is very transparent, but it must be done if we
    ever get to that sad eventuality due to the kind of contemptuous performance on
    the part of our allies that we have seen to date with respect to supplying Fidel
    Castro with economic life-support.”

Status of Cuba’s Armed Forces

At both Symposia, Commander James McKenzie of the U.S. Coast Guard
led discussions of
the status and readiness of the Cuban military. In addition, several members of the U.S. Southern
Command participated in the 12 March session. While making clear the decline in the size and
readiness of Castro’s military, this discussion offered a more nuanced assessment of its residual
potential for trouble-making than some other recent estimates. href=”#N_3_”>(3) Among its highlights were the
following:

Castro’s Unchanged Military Philosophy

  • “Looking at the philosophy of the Cuban armed forces over the past 38 years, one can see
    that
    Castro has repeatedly vowed that if the U.S. dares attack Cuba, that his military and supporters
    would be ready to wage a scorched earth campaign. According to this strategy, the military [is
    expected] to fight a highly mobile and sophisticated defensive war that takes advantage of the
    island’s geography. Any type of invasion would be met with resistance from all of the people,
    again, a war of all the people — which Castro has frequently referred to — with the
    result being
    a bitter, costly, timely and deadly engagement. This wartime consciousness that Castro has
    built among the people forces them to always be ready to repulse any aggression or violation
    of Cuban sovereignty.”
  • Castro has been for a long time trying to convince the military that the end of the
    regime is the end of the armed forces.
    The end of the regime means that, many of the
    officers will go to prison or will be executed or that kind of thing.”
  • “The philosophy and the doctrine that Fidel Castro has established, has been
    practiced
    for over 38 years and he has not backed away from it in the least bit.

The Cuban Military’s Reduced Condition

  • “Cuban armed forces currently numbers around 150,000. That includes 75,000 conscripts.
    Another 35,000 reserves receive instruction and training. So, you have a total of about
    285,000 active duty and reservists. The armed forces budget for the Cuban armed forces totals
    somewhere between $325 and $600 million, depending on what source you look at.”
  • “What that translates into is, limited food supplies for soldiers and sailors — which we have
    seen as the military now grows a large percentage, if not all, of their food supply. We see
    extremely limited fuel and lubricants and spare parts for equipment. That places an even
    greater pressure on the need for hard currency.”

    “As a result, training and actual operations are limited to an as-necessary
    basis.

    Poor salaries, limited job satisfaction due to limited equipment, limited opportunities
    for advancement motivate members of the Cuban armed forces now to seek black
    market dollars, to seek off duty employment, to seek ways to support their families and
    basically to maintain an existence.”

  • Lack of maintenance of their railways, lack of maintenance for the major
    highways, the
    major seaports falling into disrepair result in widespread deterioration and reduced
    readiness to support a major military campaign.

The Future of the Cuban Military

    “One must look at the slow economic recovery that we see the Cuban economy
    making, slowly overcoming this economic crisis, brought on by the collapse and pullout
    of the Soviets in the early 1990s.”

  • The threat that returns with any improvement in the economy is a return of
    economic
    resources to the military budget and with that, an increased threat to the U.S. and the
    regional neighbors in the Caribbean.
  • “I think it’s important for the United States and for others to try to get information into
    Cuba,
    because if one looks at the role of the military and other transitions to democracy, whether in
    Chile or in Spain or in Central America or in Poland, the military play a very important role in
    the transition. They open the door to the negotiated settlements with the Church and with
    other elements in civil society to permit a transition that is not bloody and one in which most of
    the military remain in place.”

The Threat Posed by Russian/Cuban Electronic Espionage Operations in
Cuba

The Symposia also examined the danger posed by the massive Russian and Cuban
signals-intelligence facilities in the vicinity of Lourdes, Cuba.
This huge
electronic-eavesdropping
complex involves some 28 square miles of radio dishes used to intercept telecommunications
throughout the Eastern United States — including the fax, e-mail and telephone transmissions of
U.S. businesses and government agencies alike. The following were among the most important
points made about the offensive character of such activities:

  • “All of our private conversations can be swept up by these sophisticated computer systems
    at
    Lourdes …. In 1996, an $85 million upgrade of Lourdes took place because of the
    post-Soviet
    degradation of Moscow’s overhead intelligence collection systems — affecting both their
    imaging and eavesdropping capabilities — that has made the Russians increasingly
    dependent on the Lourdes facility.
  • Our most secret battle plans for the Gulf War — including the ‘Hail Mary pass’ that
    ultimately outflanked Saddam Hussein’s forces — had all been picked up by the Lourdes
    facility and communicated to Moscow.
    They could have been passed on to Saddam
    Hussein
    by the man who was then Russia’s foreign intelligence chief, and is now its foreign minister, a
    notorious thug by the name of Yevgeny Primakov.”
  • “Today, we have our men and women on the ground in the Persian Gulf and on our carriers
    poised for attack if necessary to address another Saddam-induced crisis and remember, their
    lines of communication are being monitored by Lourdes. Incredibly, the Clinton
    Administration actually calls the Russian operation there ‘helpful’ since it allegedly
    advances the verification of arms control agreements.”
    href=”#N_4_”>(4)

Following the Casey Symposia, the Miami Herald reported that the most
senior defector
from Soviet/Russian military intelligence, Col. Stanislav Lunev confirmed the extent to which
Lourdes collection assets permitted the penetration of even secret U.S. military communications
during Operation Desert Storm. Additional concerns have also been raised recently about the
inherent capacity of these assets to engage in information warfare attacks against the United
States.(5)

Castro’s Continuing Contribution to International Instability

The Cuban regime no longer enjoys the multi-billion dollar annual subsidies from Moscow
that
once enabled it to serve as the USSR’s Foreign Legion in Africa and Latin America and as a
proxy for the Kremlin in the subversion of democratic and other, pro-Western governments
throughout the Western Hemisphere. Participants in the Casey Symposia, however, noted that
Castro has, to some degree, offset this diminished revenue stream by allowing Cuba to be used as
a staging area for narco-trafficking under the protection and with the assistance of the Cuban
military. Several made reference to evidence that Castro was still involved in this Hemisphere’s
leftist insurgencies, as well as its drug cartels.

In this connection, one of the most influential Members of Congress with respect to U.S.
policy
toward Cuba, Rep. Lincoln Diaz-Balart, supplied a copy of an 18 November 1996 letter he and
two other congressional leaders on U.S.-Cuban issues — Reps. Dan Burton
(R-IN) and Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen
(R-FL) — sent to Gen. Barry McCaffrey, President
Clinton’s Director of the
Office of Drug Control Policy. It states, in part:

    Overwhelming evidence [including a number of cases cited in the letter] points
    to ongoing involvement of the Castro dictatorship in narco-trafficking.
    The
    Congress remains deeply concerned about this issue, and we are deeply disappointed
    that the Administration continues publicly [to] ignore this critical matter.”

Another participant said: “Smuggling, drug trade, money laundering,
including
laundering through non-traceable capital market transactions and shady deals through
third countries produced the bulk of Castro’s financial muscle to support his repressive
apparatus.

Two other observations from the Symposia bear mentioning in this connection:

  • “[In early March,] Castro-inspired leftist guerrillas inflicted heavy casualties on the army of
    Colombia in order to derail the elections in that country.”
  • “The cultural violence continues to flow from Castro’s terrorist niche into Latin America and
    the United States.”

Castro’s Capacity for Biological Warfare

At the West Palm Beach Symposium, Rep. Diaz-Balart challenged the notion that a so-called
“small and insignificant” island like Cuba could — under a ruthless dictator like Fidel Castro —
pose a threat to the United States. He expressed particular concern about Cuba’s suspected
biological weapons (BW) program. Particularly noteworthy was the following intervention by
Rep. Diaz-Balart:

    “There is a developing file on the biological weapons component of the Cuban reality.
    It is obvious that we are seeing a cover-up by the Clinton Administration of the drug
    trafficking aspect of that reality. I have more than enough evidence of that cover up.
    And I am reaching the conclusion, as well, of the existence of a cover up on the
    biological weapons reality.

    “The Clinton Administration has decided that Castro is to be confronted in no
    way — that there is not to be made public any possible concern that could
    affect the national security of the American people from Castro’s Cuba.
    That is a policy of the Clinton Administration.
    I say that publicly, privately,
    and everything in between, because I am absolutely convinced of it.”

Other participants noted that the Castro regime certainly has the potential to field
fearsome
biological weapons. The technology involved is very well understood worldwide. And people,
like the Cubans, with long-standing relations with the Kremlin — which has acknowledged
maintaining an illegal BW program during the Cold War (and is suspected of continuing to do so)
— certainly had access to both the necessary technology and know-how to produce and deploy
biological weapons.(6)

Castro’s Brutal Tyranny

Critical perspective on the persistent malevolence of the Castro regime was provided by a
number
of participants in the two Casey Symposia who had personal experience with Fidel’s totalitarian
rule. Among these was José Basulto, President of Brothers to the
Rescue, who led an
impassioned discussion in the course of the 12 May meeting. Some of the highlights of the
relevant portions of both days’ proceedings include:

The Character of the Castro Regime

  • “[Since he came to power,] Castro has ruled by the reason of force, in place of the
    force of
    reason.
  • Repression in Cuba is state terrorism. It is perhaps the worst violation
    of human rights,
    physical and mental torture institutionalized since the very inception of the tyranny, to attempt
    to uproot Cubans from their culture and beliefs and convert them into robots. Its objective is
    to control the minds and souls of citizens and condition their behavior to act within the
    parameters of the official doctrine, continuously re-interpreted and even contradicted by the
    state to serve its own purposes.”

The Character of ‘Support’ for Castro’s Regime

  • The people of South America or Latin America in general support the aspirations
    of the
    Cuban people.
    They know what it was like to live under Pinochet or under the
    Argentinian
    generals. They understand that the Cubans, like the Haitians, would also like to have some
    basic human rights.”

    “Governments are somewhat different. The Latin American governments use
    Cuba
    as a political ploy to show their independence of the United States.

  • It should be noted, in addition, that at least some governments in the region are prompted to
    lend support to Castro by their perception that his regime remains capable of supporting
    subversive elements within their countries — in other words, a sort of protection
    racket
    is
    operating in Cuba today.
  • “More people have voted for [Reps.] Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, for Lincoln Diaz-Balart and for
    Bob Menendez (D-NJ) in the last 40 years than have had the opportunity to
    vote in Cuba for
    anybody
    , because in Cuba, there are no real elections. In Cuba, there are no
    candidates.
    In Cuba, there’s no media.
  • “Lamentably the moral problem of Cuba can be traced down to one issue, and that is
    the lack
    of legitimacy of the Cuban regime.
    There is a crisis of legitimacy in Cuba. Leaders
    must
    have authority to govern; Castro has power but not authority or legitimacy.”

    “What we have in Cuba right now is only one remaining source of legitimacy
    and
    that is the undeniable, unquestionable charismatic nature of Fidel Castro.
    Fidel
    Castro is a seducer and charisma has always been the basis of his authority.”

    “But legitimacy cannot be built on a rosary of defeats. Legitimacy cannot be built
    only on the basis of our personal magnetism, but also on the basis of victory. The
    fact that he defeated Batista, the fact that he defeated the United States in the Bay
    of Pigs, the fact that he was behaving like imperial Britain all over Africa, toppling
    governments and setting up governments — all of these things gave a sense of
    invincibility to Fidel Castro. But recently, he has faced a situation in which all
    these things are going down the tube.”

  • The Cuban people feel abandoned and betrayed by the Free World,
    which for the past
    39 years has basically sided with the oppressor by overlooking the suffering and the abuses
    committed against the entire nation. This has significantly contributed to enhance and
    perpetuate the tyrant’s capacity for repression.”
  • “[In response to a question about why people who are facing the sort of repression meted
    out
    by Castro’s regime do not] take matters into their own hands — particularly when they have, in
    theory, at least, some base of support within the military — is, of course, not an issue narrowly
    confined to Cuba. We’re seeing very much the same question arise in connection, for example,
    with Iraq.”

    One simply cannot underestimate effectiveness of a totalitarian regime in
    suppressing dissent
    — in the first place, psychologically suppressing, and
    then, when
    necessary, physically suppressing any sort of opposition.”

    “The ruthlessness of Castro’s repression — as with the ruthlessness of Slobodan
    Milosevic in Serbia or Saddam in Iraq or the mullahs in Iran and so on — has, in
    fact, created conditions under which there is an opportunity for upheaval in
    principle, but very little opportunity in practice, in the absence of some
    exogenous forces being brought to bear.”

The Effects and Future of the Embargo

One of the liveliest topics of discussion during the Symposia concerned the U.S. economic
sanctions on Fidel’s Cuba. With an unequaled pool of experience in attendance at each of the
Symposia — including: Roberto Weill, founder and President of La Universidad
Latinoamericana
de la Libertad Friedrich Hayek; Frank Calzon, Director of the Center for Free
Cuba;
Ambassador José Sorzano, former Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
and U.S. Representative to the United Nations — the conversation offered a wealth of insights
into the value of the embargo today and the implications for U.S. interests should it be weakened
or eliminated while Castro remains in power. Highlights included the following:

  • The explanation of Cuba’s woes is idiotically simple. ‘It’s socialism,
    stupid.’
    The
    socialists obviously blame the U.S. embargo. It is an infantile alibi, not consistent with
    socialism’s record of systemic poverty generation.”

    “The Marshall Plan recovered Europe with $17 billion. From 1962 until 1989, the
    former Soviet Union pumped into Cuba over $100 billion. The result has been
    mind-boggling. The World Bank reported in 1996 that Cuba’s GDP per capita was
    $61, the lowest in the world, compared to $400 in 1959.

    “In 1985 — in the midst of $6 billion-a-year Soviet subsidies — the World Bank
    reports Castro had already brought Cuba down to the level of Haiti, with a GDP
    per capita of $334. Cuba in 1959, by Latin American standards, was a
    prosperous society, with a GDP of $2.6 billion versus $880 million in 1998.
    Imports stand today at one-third of 1959 levels.”

  • “After 1959, Castro stole 161 sugar mills. Of these, 35 were owned by American
    companies.
    In the late 1950s, they were producing between six and seven million tons of raw sugar
    annually, a ton per Cuban inhabitant. Today, double the population, Cuba hardly produces
    three to four million tons per year.”
  • “One of the arguments that have touched the hearts of many people is the idea that sanctions
    are responsible for the lack of medicine of Cuban children. If that were the case, I would be
    the first to be knocking on Senators doors to make a change in the law. That is simply not
    true. It is the kind of disinformation that many of us are familiar with from the Soviet Union in
    the 1950s and 1960s.”

    Cuba has a sizeable industry, what they call health tourism.
    Foreigners go to
    Cuba for everything from liposuction to eye care, surgery and so on. There are a
    number of hospitals and clinics that do that. The Cuban government has an agency
    called Servemet that encourages traveling to Cuba for those purposes.”

    “[In short,] lack of medicine is a result of Castro’s policies, not the result of
    the American embargo.

  • “Often a question asked is whether the embargo should be lifted and they try to force the
    Cuban-Americans or anybody else to say ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ I think that the question should be,
    under what conditions should the embargo be lifted, for what purpose, under what
    kinds of plans.
  • “Economic sanctions are, in fact, a weapon of mass destruction. We tend to adopt them
    because we prefer to punish a great many people who are not responsible for the policies we
    don’t like, rather than deal with the person or relatively small numbers of people who are.”

    “We are in a situation here — as in Iraq, North Korea and a few other places around the
    world — in which the lifting of sanctions while those people remain in positions of
    power would not only be a terrific legitimation of those governments, a great triumph
    over the forces of freedom. It will also translate into the opportunity for them to live
    to fight another day, to maintain their repressive apparatuses and pursue policies that
    translate into the loss of human lives on the part of the few brave enough to resist.”

  • “If we could say that an American business could go to Cuba and function in Cuba as if you
    were in Costa Rica or in Madrid, I would agree. That is not what Castro wants to do
    and
    that is not what he is suggesting.

    “He is suggesting that an American company go to Cuba and — like the Spanish Crown
    used to do 200 years ago — the government will collect the cigars and the tobacco and
    give it to the foreigners and the foreigners will give Castro the money. No relationship
    with the Cuban workers. No business between groups of Cubans and groups of
    foreigners.”

    In the absence of Castro accepting something else, then all you are doing is
    providing hard currency for a government that has demonstrated that,
    whenever they have hard currency, they have used a big part of it to
    promote anti-American interests around the world.

  • “The investment that we have been making, nominally in our interest, has not
    transformed the
    political systems in countries which whom we have been ‘engaging.’ You can argue about
    how much it has changed the economic system in China, but it certainly has not created the
    liberty, the freedoms to say nothing of democratic institutions that have often been promised as
    the inexorable result of engagement — if only capitalism is allowed to work.”

    “As a result, even if some small subset of America were to benefit economically
    from this sort of investment, I really believe that it will not translate into, on net,
    a positive result for the country as a whole. It certainly is not going to help the
    people of Cuba.

  • “[When] America’s friends…vote consistently against the United States, it seems to me, that
    on
    those issues, the White House has not placed an adequate priority. If Washington is dealing
    with Country X and there are seven or eight issues involved, they might decide that, well, the
    Cuba issue is not that important as long as the other government goes along on other matters.
    It is not that the U.S. does not have any influence. It is that sometimes American
    governments either don’t have the political will to exercise it or it is a question of
    priorities.
  • “Fidel Castro wants to lift the embargo because he wants to be able to re-energize his
    legitimacy …. If the United States were to officially scrap its embargo, what arguments
    would the U.S. representatives to the World Bank, to the IMF, and the Inter-American
    Development Bank use in order to exclude Cuba from those multilateral lending and
    granting institutions?

The Need for Surrogate Broadcasting to Cuba

One of the most promising ways of counteracting Castro’s tyranny would be to redouble
efforts
to counter his determination to control popular access to news and information. This can best be
accomplished by enhancing surrogate broadcasting service to the people of Cuba. In recent years,
the value of such broadcasting to countering repressive regimes has earned increasing attention
and political support in Washington — both with respect to the contribution made by Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty to promoting freedom in their respective listening areas and the hope
that a similar contribution might now be made by Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Iran and a Radio
Free Iraq.

In this regard, the 12 May Symposium benefitted from remarks by Herminio San
Román
,
Director of Radio/TV Marti. Mr. San Román discussed the systematic repression of
independent
sources of news and information by the Castro regime and the role being played by his surrogate
broadcasting units, both in countering the Cuban government’s propaganda and disinformation
and in creating an essential building block for the transition to functioning democracy. In the
latter regard, he noted that — even where Castro’s determination to deny his people access to
Radio/TV Marti’s broadcasts — these services are making a contribution by preparing an
experienced team of journalists and broadcasters for the day when their services will be needed by
a Free Cuba.

Conclusion

As the foregoing summary makes clear, the Casey Symposia established that the United States
does indeed have vital interests in Cuba. The conversation over the two days demonstrated that
the American government minimizes the abiding threat from Castro’s regime — to say nothing of
giving that regime a new lease on life through normalization of economic and/or diplomatic
relations — at its peril.

— End of Summary —

1. Portions of the Symposia were broadcast into Cuba by Radio/TV
Marti — the vital surrogate
broadcasting operation that is, as was made clear by its Director in the course of the first day’s
discussion, serving a unique purpose in providing the sort of news and other programming in
Spanish that is denied the Cuban people by their government.

2. The first step toward preparing such an option may have been
signaled in a letter dated 6 May
from Secretary of Defense William Cohen to Senator Strom Thurmond formally transmitting the
DIA estimate of the Cuban threat. It read, in part: “I remain concerned about…the
environmental health risks posed to the United States by potential accidents at the Juragua
nuclear power facility.

3. For more on such low-ball estimates, see the critique of retired
Commander-in-Chief Atlantic
Command Gen. John Sheehan’s comments on the subject contained in the Casey Institute’s
Perspective entitled Castro’s Cuba: A Classic ‘Asymmetric’
Threat
(No. 98-C 59, 3 April
1998).

4. To his credit, Secretary of Defense Cohen did, in his recent letter
to Sen. Thurmond
transmitting the DIA intelligence report on Cuba, write that: “I remain concerned about the use
of Cuba as a base for intelligence activities directed against the United States.”

5. See No Apologies To Castro: Politicized Pentagon
Study Misses Abiding Nature of Threat
From Cuba, Promotes Wrong Response
(No. 98-C
54
, 30 March 1998).

6. In his 6 May transmittal letter to the Congress, Secretary Cohen
wrote: “I remain concerned
about Cuba’s potential to develop and produce biological agents, given its biotechnology
infrastructure.”

Center for Security Policy

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