Supporting the forces of democracy

Throughout the numerous articles written on the pages of the Americas Report, and in recent testimony given by the Center for Security Policy’s Hemispheric Security Project, we stated our vision of the current Latin American problem.

To sum up, Hugo Chavez is the leader of a new plan that goes beyond Venezuela. He advocates not merely socialism but also a totalitarian project. This totalitarian vision is not only aimed at Venezuela but also towards as many Latin American countries as possible.

In order to achieve this Chavez interferes in his neighbors internal politics and establishes direct connections with groups who share his goals. In order to accomplish this he has established alliances with violent groups that have the potential to destabilize a particular country’s government. This need for violence leads him to form alliances with regimes that have mastered the art of violence such as Cuba and Belarus and countries that know how to convert violence into systematic terrorism like Iran.

[More]Latin America is already experiencing a situation of violence and international instability as the recent confrontation between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela has shown. Recent meetings sponsored by the Organization of American States in Santo Domingo were aimed at reconciling the parties and as such attempted to be evenhanded. However, it is abundantly clear that it is Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa who should be held responsible for supporting and enabling an ominous anti-Colombian terrorist organization (the FARC). However, Correa would not have dared to host terrorists in his country if it weren’t for the previously mentioned regional tactics of Hugo Chavez.

Therefore, in the name of regional peace in Latin America and geo-political security, it is crucial that the United States government as well as other governments in the Western Hemisphere help those who can be effective in counterbalancing these developments. Venezuela is the epicenter of the Latin America earthquake and as long as Chavez is in power these threats will continue.

We depart from the assumption that if the Chavez regime collapses the revolutionary intensity and potential international escalation in the region will significantly decline. All those who believe that Chavez’s regime is facing major economic problems which he will not be able to survive forget that a regime can survive even under economic hardship.   It is enough to look at what Fidel Castro has done for the last five decades, what the Soviet Union did for seven and a half decades and what the Iranians have done for three. Paraphrasing writer Isaac Bashevis Singer we can say "Between dying and dead there is long leg."

Illusions and hopes will not bring us results but taking a good look at the forces operating in Venezuela today may provide a better understanding of the situation and help us act accordingly. In Venezuela, like in many countries in Latin America, the natural vehicles of political debate and opposition-the political parties- have become weak as a result of ongoing corruption, disconnection from the public, aloofness from sources of societal support, and lack of social and political vision. The virtual collapse (but not total disappearance) of the two traditional parties, the AD and COPEI, that ruled Venezuela for forty years gave way to a plethora of political parties, none of them capable of properly challenging Chavez. Moreover, attempts at unity between the parties to form a single front against Chavez have often ended in disunity and collapse of coalitions.

Non-political elements such as business, workers and oil associations have played a role in opposing Chavez, particularly before the recall referendum of August 2004. These groups comprised the most active opposition by organizing strikes and massive protests against the government. Newly mobilized groups that collected signatures during the recall referendum and other groups who demanded electoral transparence joined them.

However, these groups as well as the political parties lost importance as they experienced major defeats during the 2004 recall referendum, parliamentary elections in 2005 (where the political parties’ abstention determined the virtual elimination of a real opposition in parliament) and the Presidential elections in 2006. These events strengthened Chavez’s position and left behind a demoralized and passive opposition that waited for another round of elections to win. However, it was General Raul Isaias Baduel who turned events around in Venezuela when he publicly denounced the December 2, 2007 Referendum on Constitutional Reform as an attempt by Chavez to carry a coup d’etat and perpetuate himself in power. During the campaign Baduel loudly urged Venezuelans to vote against the reform. The referendum ended in a major defeat for Hugo Chavez.

General Raul Isaias Baduel turned events around in Venezuela when he publicly denounced the December 2, 2007 Referendum on Constitutional Reform as an attempt by Chavez to carry a coup d’etat and perpetuate himself in power. Source: Diario Critico.

The importance of Baduel’s intervention was manifold. First, he denounced the Chavez reform as an attempt to take power away from the people and he did it publicly. The fact that Baduel was a military man, a former Chavez chief of the Venezuelan army and a former defense minister sent a message to the people of Venezuela that Chavez’s power system was being challenged from within. Consequently, Venezuelans lost fear and defeated an otherwise self-confident Chavez. By the same token, Baduel’s actions motivated disenchanted Chavistas to join forces against their former master. Such action was followed by other actions. During the hostage crisis in Colombia last February when the Colombian narco-guerilla group known as the FARC negotiated, with Chavez mediation, the release of Colombian hostages, Baduel publicly criticized the President’s complicity with the FARC.

Following Baduel’s statement, the army, a source of silent support for Chavez, expressed uneasiness with the Venezuelan leader’s association with the FARC sending a clear signal to Chavez. At the same time, Baduel also urged Colombian President, Alvaro Uribe to dismiss Chavez’s threats against Colombia. Early in March after a Colombian incursion in Ecuador killed a senior FARC leader, Chavez threatened to unleash war. Baduel then courageously called on the Venezuelan army not to fight and defended Colombia, in open defiance of Hugo Chavez. In that instance, the General also openly accused Chavez of inventing an external enemy to encourage nationalistic feelings in order to hide the internal failures of the Bolivarian regime.

General Baduel has demonstrated his effectiveness by having challenged Chavez’s unquestionable authority and arrogant behavior. He was effective because he aborted Chavez’s totalitarian project. Totalitarians want to show omnipotence. Baduel took that away from Chavez after the December 2nd election. Despite these brave actions, General Baduel’s motives are now being questioned. Is General Baduel an opportunist looking for recognition and personal gain? Or is h e for real? Should we trust him ? Should the Venezuelan people trust him? If yes, what role could he play in Venezuelan politics? Is he another military man that will depose a civilian and impose a bloody regime? Or can he become a leader of a civilian political party and defeat Chavez via constitutional means?

Let us take a look at the man. One day before the constitutional referendum he published an article in the New York Times where he expressed his opposition to those reforms. He opposes a socialist state because "it has absolute control over the people it governs". In this well-written article Baduel criticized the traditional political parties for seeing "the Venezuelan people as clients who can be bought off" and for using oil money to dispense "favors, subsidies and alms".   Under Chavez, Baduel believes the situation is even worse because of "exorbitant public expenditures, the recurrence of government deficits even at times of record-high oil prices, the extreme vulnerability of foreign investments, exceedingly high import tariffs, and our increased domestic consumption of fuel at laughably low prices".   Baduel predicts that the economy will crash and along with it, Chavez’s neo-populist policies. He suggests that a strong office of the President under the leadership of Chavez can only accelerate this national deterioration. [1]

Thus, Baduel has tried to bring Venezuelans into a debate on national issues of importance such as oil policy and how to use oil resources and oil income. Baduel, as a military man has made declarations that are atypical of traditional Latin American generals. Curiously enough, Baduel is the man known for having intervened to save the Chavez’s regime during a coup d’etat against him in April, 2002.   This has legitimately raised some eyebrows. However, Baduel in a declaration a month later explained that he was committed to the constitutional order and the rule of law. This may explain Baduel’s opposition to the coup d’etat [2].

These views were ratified later in 2006 in a different context. In reaction to Chavez’s assertion that the Venezuelan armed forces as well as the national oil company were "red" (communist), Baduel pointed out that the "constitution establishes that the armed forces are strictly professional ¼ . (Therefore) I understand that there should not be any relation between political and military power". [3] In April, 2007 Baduel again reaffirmed this principle [4]. In July, 2007 at the time of his retirement as Secretary of Defense he warned that socialism cannot be part of a marxist orthodoxy but has to be deeply democratic and respectful of the division of powers. [5] Judging by his words and actions, Baduel does not fit the profile of an opportunist. Opportunists abound in the world of politics but Baduel has defended a number of principles that typical opportunists cannot even articulate. Baduel is still commited to socialism (which explains his previous association with Chavez) but at the same time has issued a convincing affirmation of   democracy and constituionalism as a supreme principle of governance. He has criticized Chavez in a timely manner on very specific points without the typical generalization of a demagogue. He criticized the Chavez oil policies, his aggression against Colombia, and his support for the FARC.   He not only helped to bring about Chavez’s defeat in the December 2nd Referendum but has made his influence felt among army officers who rejected Chavez’s complicity with the FARC and his anti-Colombian aggression.

Baduel seems to be, by virtue of his actions, the natural leader of a peaceful and democratic social movement whose de-facto goal seems to be to to put an end to Chavez’s irresponsible and aggressive domestic and international practices. He seems to have the potential to seriously weaken the current Bolivarian Project. If Baduel’s voice continues to be heard it may bring about another Chavez defeat in the October, 2008 regional and municipal elections. There are a number of candidates from oppositionat parties that will be running. This does not mean that there is no room for other parties in a post-Chavez era but Baduel may well be the man most capable of triggering the transition. For his actions Baduel has taken a big risk. His own life is at the mercy of the unscrupolous Chavez’ regime which may try to harm him.

In relation to US policy, we can say that every decision involves a risk. Not making a decision also involves a risk. In considering our policy options, the United States should provide encouragement and support to people like General Baduel.