Taiwan as the frog in the pot: Beijing turns up the heat one more degree
A recent survey of 52 so-called “leading experts” by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) China Power Project did not think the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was capable of conducting an “effective invasion” of Taiwan today and not likely in the rest of this decade. Despite these prognostications, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has not received the word. Despite the assessment of “leading experts,” the CCP has once again demonstrated that they are continuing their preparations to conquer Taiwan.
In an important, if subtle, measure, the PRC’s Civil Aviation Administration (CAA) announced that as of February 1, 2024, an offset measure that had been applied to the M503 air route, which was created in 2015 for flights transiting from north to south in the Taiwan Strait, would be cancelled. This cancellation would allow aircraft to transit within 7 kilometers of the centerline. Additionally, in the same announcement, the CAA reported the activation of two routes (W122 and W123) that connect the M503 route to west-to-east routes from the mainland cities of Fuzhou and Xiamen in the PRC’s Fujian Province directly across from Taiwan.
This is a direct threat to Taiwan. The consequence of what the PRC did is that their aircraft transiting in the Taiwan Strait would now be able to operate closer to Taiwan and in much larger numbers. That places greater pressure on Taiwan’s air defenses as it shortens their time to respond and adds further complications to an already complex air defense environment.
While Beijing asserted this announcement was a simple and justified “adjustment under the one-China principle, within the scope of China’s sovereignty, and out of the need for civil aviation safety and convenience,” the reality is that this change represents another incremental change in the cross-strait security environment in favor of the PRC’s ability to launch an invasion from a position of closer proximity and with an increasing number of aircraft than have previously operated in the strait.
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