Take Out Saddam

(Washington, D.C.): As President Clinton casts about in search of a response to Saddam
Hussein’s latest acts of defiance, one thing is becoming clear: There is really only a single
option left — removing from power the Butcher of Baghdad and his partners in crimes
against the Iraqi people, among others.⁽¹⁾

Even some of the more thoughtful members of the Bush Administration — the Administration
whose decision to allow Saddam’s regime to survive Operation Desert Storm made the present
crisis just a matter of time — have reached this conclusion. Specifically, Paul Wolfowitz and
Zalmay Khalilzad, President Bush’s Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Assistant Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning respectively, have concluded in a op.ed. article published
in Sunday’s Washington Post that nothing short of deposing the ruling clique in Iraq will do.

‘Giving Sanctions a Chance’ Remains a Mug’s Game

Just as the Gulf War showed the folly of the thesis that “giving sanctions a chance to work”
would have liberated Kuwait, the intervening six years have demonstrated that the post-war
sanctions regime is incapable of liberating Iraq. This was true even before the “international
community” became transparently divided about the wisdom of continuing that regime. Now,
however, with the rift between those unabashedly queuing up to make money in Iraq once
sanctions are lifted (notably, Saddam’s former KGB handler and now Russian Foreign Minister,
Yevgeny Primakov, the French oil companies and a Chinese government always looking for new
markets for their weapons of mass destruction) on the one hand and the United States and Britain
on the other, the question is not whether further erosion will occur in the magnitude or
enforcement of sanctions, but when.

The fact that Saddam has lost none of his determination to have the means of threatening his
neighbors and other adversaries — especially the United States — with fearsome missile-deliverable chemical, biological and perhaps even nuclear weapons makes such a prospect
intolerable. Left to his own devices, it follows that the use of weaponry of such deadly
indiscriminateness against our allies, our troops and/or our people is also a question of
when, not if.

Give Force a Chance

Under these circumstances, there is no practical alternative to the use of force — unilaterally, if
necessary; together with like-minded states, if possible — to bring about conditions leading to the
early end of Saddam’s reign of terror. These conditions would involve the disruption, if not
the significant destruction, of the police state apparatus upon which the Iraqi despot
depends to remain in power. In its absence, the people of Iraq would succeed where they failed
in 1991 when then-President Bush urged them to rise up, but declined to help by suppressing the
praetorian Republican Guard.

If President Clinton is going to accomplish this goal, though, he will have to reverse course on
several important fronts:

• Mr. Clinton will have to replace his policy of trying to “contain” Saddam with one of
  actively and explicitly seeking his removal from power. The result may be the demise of
  this ruthless war criminal, an outcome currently barred by Executive Order. It would,
  nonetheless, be more moral — as well as more therapeutic — than the devastation being
  wrought by sanctions currently harming, and in some cases killing, the people of Iraq with
  whom we have no quarrel.
• The President will have to be prepared to risk criticism from those who are more
  interested in collaborating with Saddam than in seeing him removed from power. It is
  predictable that the Russians, French and Chinese will be joined by a chorus of Arabs who
  would rather try to appease the unappeasable than be seen as abetting his overthrow by
  infidels.
• Mr. Clinton will have to depart from his Administration’s assiduous embrace of
  multilateralism — a policy whose futility on such matters is a foregone conclusion thanks, as
  Margaret Thatcher has put it, to the impossibility of achieving “leadership by consensus.” As
  with Operation Desert Shield/Storm, useful international support for American initiatives is
  more likely to emerge from an appreciation that the United States is committed to a course of
  action and has the capacity to pull it off, with or without foreign assistance.
• In order to have such a capacity, President Clinton will have to revisit some of his previous
  decisions on defense programs. In particular, military options against Saddam Hussein’s
  security apparatus will be considerably expanded if B-2 bombers are staged to Diego Garcia.
  Such a step is in order even if it — to say nothing of actually demonstrating the effectiveness of
  this long-range, stealthy and highly accurate weapon system in combat over Iraq — would
  undercut the Administration’s shortsighted efforts to fend off congressional support for more
  B-2s. A similar requirement to be able to use force independently of other nations argues for
  maintaining multiple carrier battle groups in proximity to Iraq — a step that will require a
  reversal of budget decisions to reduce the number of these assets and the long-range aircraft
  they carry.

The President should also immediately reverse his recent action in vetoing the line item
containing funds for the SR-71, an extraordinary spy plane capable of collecting
intelligence throughout Iraqi airspace. By contrast, the U-2s now tasked to overfly
Iraq will likely be obliged to compromise their mission performance in order to operate
high enough or far enough away to stay out of range of Saddam’s defenses.

• Finally, the Clinton Administration will have to reconsider actions that impinge upon its
  ability to stimulate and support opposition to the regime in Bagdad. The CIA must be
  directed to mount a renewed and far more rigorous effort in Northern Iraq. This should begin
  by forging: a new modus vivendi between the rival Kurdish factions there; an understanding
  with the Turks anxious to prevent the creation of an independent Kurd state on their border;
  and close cooperation with genuine, democratic Iraqi opposition figures.

A Radio Free Iraq should be operated under the sponsorship of the existing “freedom
radios” so as to provide the sorts of information and programming in the audiences’
languages that helped throughout the Cold War to keep alive the hope for liberty in the
former Soviet empire. This will require, among other things, that the Administration
suspend the planned termination of these surrogate broadcast services in 1999.

The Bottom Line

To be sure, it will take courage for the President to reverse course in all these areas, as it will to
execute successfully the policies thus made possible. This is especially so since a policy explicitly
aimed at taking out Saddam and his ruling clique is not without risks. Still, those risks appear
acceptable when weighed against the dangers posed by the renewed aggressiveness of the Iraqi
regime, and the growing unreliability of nations whose support is essential to maintain — let alone
intensify — punishing international sanctions on Iraq.

– 30 –

1. The Center for Security Policy has repeatedly called for such action. See, for example, the
following Center products: Baker’s ‘Open Door’ Policy On Negotiating An End To The Gulf
Crisis (No. 91-P 02, 8 January 1991); On To Baghdad! Liberate Iraq (No. 91-P 16, 27 February
1991); On To Baghdad! Liberate Iraq (Take Two) (No. 91-P 23, 25 March 1991); Unfinished
Business: Christopher, Perry Depart But Saddam Abides — Will ‘Clinton II’ Finally Put Him
Out Of Business? (No. 96-T 111, 8 November 1996); and Clinton Watch # 3: Saddam Lives to
Fight Another Day (No. 97-D 106, 28 July 1997).