Talbott’s ‘Vision Thing’: Renewing Mission on Mir

(Washington, D.C.): There is a certain irony that NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin’s announcement today that the United States would send a replacement astronaut to Mir after all coincided with the publication of Strobe Talbott’s latest paean to Russia in this morning’s Wall Street Journal.

In an article entitled “The Struggle for Russia,” the Deputy Secretary of State explains the political imperative the Clinton Administration feels concerning the “integration” of Russia into international institutions and activities in the interest of making things come out right in the former Soviet Union. As Talbott puts it:

“The key concept is integration. It is crucial to U.S. foreign policy in general, since it captures the imperative of working with other states to revitalize and, where necessary, create mutually reinforcing international organizations and arrangements to ensure peace and prosperity in an increasingly interdependent world. Integration is key to U.S. policy toward Russia in particular, since that country’s attainment of its most worthy aspirations will depend in large measure on its ability and willingness to participate in, contribute to and benefit from the process of globalization.”

Safety, Schmafety

In short, the Administration’s theories about Russia’s international “integration,” “globalization” and the pivotal role U.S.-Russian cooperation can play in advancing these concepts must be recognized as the policy context in which the Goldin decision was taken. To be sure, the NASA Administrator justified this action on other grounds. These included internal and independent assessments of the “safety” of the Mir space station⁽¹⁾ and Goldin’s first-hand discussions with those responsible for assuring it on the Russian side.

Still, in light of the testimony taken at last week’s hearing of the House Science Committee, it strains credulity that — in the absence of overriding political considerations — responsible U.S. officials would willingly deem Mir safe enough to justify the risk to U.S. lives and national treasure. In this regard, it is worth noting that Charles Harlan, safety director at the Johnson Space Center in Houston (which is responsible for U.S.-Russian space coordination), wrote senior NASA administrators on 29 June 1997: “NASA management has accepted a different standard for human safety for the Phase 1 Shuttle-Mir program than it has been willing to accept for either the Shuttle or the International Space Station.” Such candor is, alas, the exception since — according to the NASA Inspector General (IG) — some officials working closely with the Russians “feel it would jeopardize their careers to be frank in their opinions, observations and assessments of the Mir program.”

In the course of the hearing, Committee Chairman James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) summarized the situation:

“[NASA I.G. Roberta Gross’] interim response and the mountain of documents and materials she has provided to this committee detail a litany of mishaps, excuses, inconsistencies, and tolerance for failure that I never expected to be confronted with in a NASA program.

“[In this context,] I have four main concerns. First, public assurances by NASA about Mir safety have been contradicted by the facts. Second, it appears that the existing safety procedures are not being completely followed. Third, Russia is not committing adequate resources to ensure Mir’s safety. Finally, I can’t conclude from what I’ve seen so far that the benefits of visiting Mir are still commensurate with the increasing risks.”

What About Koptev’s ‘Night’ Job?

The absurdity — not to say, recklessness — of the Talbott mantra of Russian “integration” uber alles is evident in an issue that regrettably was not addressed in Rep. Sensenbrenner’s hearing: The reported involvement of Yuri Koptev, Goldin’s counterpart as the head of the Russian Space Agency, in the Kremlin’s ongoing effort to help Iran acquire long-range ballistic missile manufacturing know-how and technology.

Koptev and his agency have been beneficiaries of one of the Clinton Administration’s flagship “integration” initiatives — the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. Popularly known by the name of its chief congressional sponsors, former Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), the CTR program has been the vehicle for testing the proposition that, if the U.S. provides work/funding for Russia’s space program and other parts of the old Soviet military-industrial complex, Russian scientists and technicians will not make their expertise available to dangerous third parties.

American tax-dollars going, in effect, to help Iran build ballistic missiles is, presumably, not the sort of “globalization” Talbott et.al. have in mind. In fact, he felt constrained to address this problem at the outset of his op.ed. article (albeit superficially) by stating, “We are…working with Moscow to ensure that Iran does not have access to Russian equipment, material and know-how with which to build ballistic missiles.” Unfortunately, “working with Moscow” seems mostly to mean: seeking and accepting at face value, as Vice President Gore put it, “reassurances” that the Russians were not helping Iran gain such access; asserting that it is a “rogue” operation going on without the Yeltsin government’s knowledge or assent; and “sharing” (read, compromising) U.S. and Israeli intelligence on this subject with those like Koptev likely to ensure, not the discontinuation of Iranian-Russian missile cooperation, but that a better job is done of concealing it.

The Bottom Line

It is bad enough that the Clinton Administration is allowing political considerations to enter into, let alone to drive, decisions concerning the further U.S. involvement in the Mir program that should be made exclusively on the basis of realistic net assessments of the considerable safety and financial costs weighed against what are, at best, limited prospective scientific and technical benefits. Even more reprehensible is the fact that this sort of policy-override is occurring despite the mounting evidence that “integration” is proving a mug’s game.

Talbott concludes his essay with one of his most romanticized and Russophilic outpourings — a plea that the United States must “give [the Russians] time”:

“Give them time to consolidate the reforms that constitute the good news of the past few years; give them time to beat back the forces that have generated the bad news; give them time to work out their identity and destiny in ways that will not only best serve a modern Russia’s real interests but that will also be, to the greatest extent possible, compatible with the interests of the U.S. as well.” (Emphasis added.)

Unfortunately, inattention to what the Russians are actually doing with the time and resources the United States has already given them is a formula for real grief down the road. As Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ), one of Congress’ most astute minds on national security matters and a recipient of the Center for Security Policy’s Keeper of the Flame award, told the Washington Times last week: “The evidence is mounting that significant amounts of [Russian] technology are being transferred while people are dithering and talking. There is a point at which it could be too late; Iran will have what it needs. There has to be action, not talk.” Indeed, Sen. Kyl — the chief Senate sponsor of a resolution calling on the President to “demand” an end to Russian missile technology sales to Iran and to impose sanctions required under existing statutes (i.e., the Gore-McCain Act) “if the Russian response is inadequate” — is quoted by the Washington Post today as adding: “It’s my opinion that the time has passed for talk and it’s time to do something.”

In this matter, as in so many others, Sen. Kyl is right, and Strobe Talbott is dead wrong.

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1. One of the independent studies was produced by a task force reporting to an advisory group chaired by a respected former Air Force aviator and NASA astronaut, Gen. Thomas Stafford. It concluded that “the current risk to a U.S. astronaut aboard Mir [is judged] to be no greater than that we have accepted in the past.” Unfortunately, that standard may be an unsatisfactory basis for placing another American’s life at risk since, as the IG’s report has documented, the United States has not always been kept properly informed about Mir’s actual status.