"The Case For Ending US And Israeli Strategic Vulnerability"

REMARKS BY FRANK J. GAFFNEY, JR.
Director, Center for Security Policy

before the
JEWISH INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
Washington, D.C.
22 May 1991

Surely, this audience does not need to be persuaded of the importance of ending Israel’s vulnerability to ballistic missile attack. Indeed, no one committed to the security of the State of Israel — who watched with bated breath as Iraqi Scud missiles rained down on Tel Aviv — could have failed to appreciate the imperative of countering this dangerous, emerging threat.

Several points are clear from that experience:

Being defended is better than not being defended.
Imperfect defense is better than no defense.
Offensive counterfire, considered by some to be an acceptable alternative to strategic defense, is not necessarily a reliable means of either deterring an adversary from attacking with ballistic missiles or limiting the effectiveness of such an attack.

I am proud to say that I have long been among those who believed that U.S.-Israeli collaboration on strategic defenses was in the mutual interests of both nations. I had the opportunity during my service at the Pentagon to lead the U.S. delegation that negotiated the 1986 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), pursuant to which the two nations are cooperating on such programs as the Arrow interceptor.

Naturally, I am enormously pleased with the progress that has been made on Arrow. The test program — both that conducted to date and that planned for the future — has been of considerable value to the United States. Of particular significance are: the flight data being generated (notably in the areas of optical effects, thermal effects on interceptor guidance windows, predictive codes); clever Israeli engineering (notably, in the warhead and seeker designs, U.S. access to which is assured under the terms of the MoU); and emerging operational concepts (notably, kill assessment and second interceptor-launch criteria). It is gratifying that acceptable cost-sharing arrangements have, according to published reports, been agreed upon for the next phase of collaborative research, as was the case for the first phase.

The Bigger Picture

There are, however, a number of considerations pertaining to Israeli — and U.S. — security interests that extend beyond the narrow question of the Arrow interceptor. Specifically, the following four issues warrant JINSA’s close attention:

First, other programs are needed to make Arrow effective as an "upper-tier" defense system. Specifically, two radar components are likely to be required:

A fire-control radar — an Israeli design may be utilized but questions remain as to where the funds will come from for this essential element of an operational ballistic missile defense system; and
An early-warning radar — Israel has been talking to the United States about collaborative efforts in this area, so vital to the effectiveness of Israel’s larger strategic defense needs; but as of now, no agreement exists concerning either technology nor funding.

It is imperative that the constructive program management arrangement between U.S. SDI Office and Israel be preserved. The Arrow program could easily suffer significant slippage if the existing interface between the two governments has to be reconstructed — especially if that will involve a new management team at the American end that is less committed to early realization of Arrow’s capability due to the perception that the Israeli program’s success would represent a threat to indigenous U.S. programs under development.

Second, every effort should be made to enhance Arrow’s effectiveness in defending the State of Israel. In this connection, it should be understood that Arrow would obtain powerful force-multiplier benefits from an overlay provided by the U.S. "Global Protection Against Limited Strikes" (GPALS) program’s space-based interceptors, known as Brilliant Pebbles. GPALS will afford improved warning and greatly enhanced battle-management capabilities as well as the opportunity to destroy incoming ballistic missiles even farther away from Israeli soil than would the Arrow, further reducing the danger of devastating chemical, biological or nuclear weapons "leaking" through the defense. This point has particular salience in the light of the Patriot’s valiant efforts to destroy relatively primitive, conventionally armed Scuds.

Third, the Persian Gulf war underscored a lesson that cannot be impressed strongly or often enough on the Jewish community, among others. Just as the strength of a chain is determined by its weakest link, Israel can be no more secure than America is! Consider for a moment, the impact on the U.S. and allied commitment to resist Iraqi aggression if Saddam Hussein had had intercontinental-range ballistic missiles.

Senior DoD officials have privately speculated that the "grand coalition" would not have survived very long if Europe — as opposed to only Israel and Saudi Arabia — had been within range of Saddam’s missile force! Would that have been any less true if the United States itself had been subjected to Iraqi blackmail? One can only imagine the dramatic arguments opponents of the war resolution in Congress would have used had they been able to argue that the consequence of conflict with Iraq would have been ballistic missile strikes on the United States! As a practical matter, in the absence of an American defense against such attacks, the first victim of blackmail backed by ballistic missiles may well have been the U.S. defense commitment to Israel.

Finally, members of JINSA and the larger American Jewish community should have a strong, if forgivably selfish, interest in effective U.S. strategic defenses: As U.S. citizens, support for SDI is fully warranted on the basis of our nation’s own, direct and legitimate security needs.

Brilliant Pebbles/GPALS is the only affordable, practical means available to protect the United States and its allies against the growing, world-wide danger of accidental, unintentional or terroristic ballistic missile launches. Why should we accept less security for ourselves than we recognize must be provided for Israel? Should U.S. cities intentionally be kept less secure against ballistic missile attack than Tel Aviv was during the war — or than we know how to make them?

The only justification for preserving American strategic vulnerability — whether we choose to cooperate in reducing that of Israel or not — is allegiance to an obsolete arms control agreement, the 1972 ABM Treaty. This agreement is predicated on the notion that the only way in which the U.S. can be perfectly secure is by being perfectly vulnerable to attack.

Such a proposition was dubious twenty years ago when the only threat of ballistic missile attack was from the USSR and involved nuclear weapons. It is simply preposterous today, however, in a climate featuring multiple adversaries, threats involving both nuclear and other warheads capable of genocide and a growing degree of uncertainty over what will deter such attacks.

The House of Representatives Endangers U.S. and Israeli Security

These are more than abstract considerations. Indeed, they are real-world issues. Consider the actions that the U.S. House of Representatives is taking even as we speak:

Today, the House will approve a defense authorization bill with considerable potential to disrupt the Arrow program by shifting theater defense responsibilities from SDIO to the Army.
The House action would undermine Israeli security by eliminating the capability for a Brilliant Pebbles overlay for Arrow.
The House action would also endanger both American and Israeli security by effectively eliminating the option of providing comprehensive, near-term strategic defense for the United States — the inevitable consequence of its proposals to: break-up SDIO; gut space-based defenses; emphasize procurement of large numbers of additional Patriots at the expense of more capable systems; and give theater defense options priority over strategic defensive capabilities.

Conclusion

The simple truth of the matter is that the same lessons I noted at the outset in connection with Israeli interests in strategic defense are true in spades for the United States.

Being defended is better than not being defended.
Imperfect defense is better than no defense.
Offensive counterfire is not necessarily a reliable means of either deterring an adversary from attacking with ballistic missiles or limiting the effectiveness of such an attack.

It is time to get on with the task of defending both the United States and Israel. JINSA can play a key role: I urge you to use your influence on Capitol Hill and with the executive branch to correct the House of Representative’s irresponsible actions concerning SDI and to accelerate deployment of strategic defenses for both Israel and the United States.