Too clever by half

by FRANK GAFFNEY JR.
The Washington Times, JANUARY 3, 1991

The Bush administration has, in the words of Richard Nixon, made one thing perfectly clear: It will not let a messy Soviet crackdown on independence-minded republics, democratic reformers and free market entrepreneurs interfere with ever warmer U.S.-Soviet relations — so long as Moscow does not alter its foreign policy course.

That such a crackdown is coming is no longer seriously disputed; the only remaining questions are when will it come and what will be its severity? Regrettably, the American government has probably ensured that the repression comes sooner and is more brutal, thanks to statements like that of Secretary of State James Baker, who said on Dec. 20: "I think it’s important that we understand…what we mean when we start using terms like ‘crackdown’ and we must, I think, appreciate the desire to employ measured force to protect citizens against inter-ethnic violence, armed militias and things like that, versus using that force to suppress or stifle peaceful dissent or peaceful expression of opinion."

In fact, no such distinction in the use of force can be drawn credibly at this point or sustained over time. Given their conscious blurring of categories — democratic elements portrayed as "dark forces," free market entrepreneurs as "economic saboteurs" and national independence movements as "enemies of socialism" — the Soviet central authorities will be able to justify virtually any repression citing the Baker guidelines for an acceptable crackdown

Indeed, on Dec. 23, KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov — with whose organization Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has become ever more closely aligned in recent days — actually quoted the U.S. secretary of state approvingly on the question of the central authorities in Moscow setting reform aside in favor of restoring order. For good measure, Mr. Kryuchkov accused the West of causing the Soviet Union’s internal difficulties and of exploiting them to speed the breakup of its empire. Both of these charges are laughable on their face; they have, however, probably had their intended effect: to dissuade the Bush administration from reconsidering its exclusive relationship with and immense investment in Mr. Gorbachev. Against this backdrop, it must be asked: Are the benefits of Soviet foreign policy so great that the United States must, as the Bush administration believes, follow the dictates of realpolitik — supporting Mr. Gorbachev, come what may, and ignoring the anguished cries of those whose desire for Western-style liberties and institutions will make them targets of Kremlin repression? Even a cursory examination of such "benefits” shows this approach to be as strategically bankrupt as it is morally reprehensible.

• Arms Control: President Bush is anxious to wrap up a new agreement with Moscow that would reduce strategic arms. He is persuaded that negotiated constraints on Soviet military capabilities are all the more important in light of the increasing assertiveness of the Kremlin’s armed forces. The value of such agreements has been dramatically challenged, however, by Soviet conduct under the recently completed Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

The Soviets have preserved as many as 60,000 tanks, armored personnel carriers and other equipment that should have been destroyed under the CFE accord by moving them east of the Ural Mountains. From there, such materiel may be readily employed in support of a crackdown inside the Soviet Union or over a somewhat longer period, brought to bear anew against Europe. In addition, the Soviets have simply lied about the quantity of such equipment still within the zone affected by the treaty. Coming on top of the Gorbachev regime’s violation of the INF Treaty and its continued failure to destroy the Krasnoyarsk radar, it is hard to see how a Soviet commitment to continue its present foreign policy in the arms control arena is in the West’s interest.

• Regional Settlements: The Bush administration has been assiduously working to develop agreements with Moscow that will end various regional conflicts between former superpower proxies now viewed by Washington as expensive throwbacks to the Cold War. After months of negotiations about the wars in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Angola, however, Soviet-supported governments remain in place in Kabul, Phnom Penh and Luanda; it is unclear at this writing that any of them will give up power as a result of settlements brokered by Washington and Moscow. Is this the Soviet foreign policy we are supposed to want to perpetuate?
• The Gulf Crisis: This, of course, is the most immediate source of concern for the Bush administration over the future direction of Soviet foreign policy. The fear is that, instead of the double game the Soviet Union has pursued since the outset of this crisis — featuring helpful U.N. votes and unhelpful diplomatic, intelligence and military contacts with Baghdad, the Soviet Union might become more overtly supportive of Iraq.

The unpleasant truth of the matter is that the Kremlin has every incentive to perpetuate and complicate the Gulf crisis. For one thing, Moscow has a vested interest in the survival of one of its most important strategic clients, Saddam Hussein. Fur another, it is profiting handsomely from the increased cost of oil resulting from speculation about a war and the possible resulting disruptions in supply — netting roughly $1 billion extra in annual hard currency earnings for each additional dollar in price of a barrel of crude.

But perhaps most important of all, the Gorbachev regime needs the United States to be distracted and felicitous of Soviet support at a moment when Moscow center is poised to undertake a crackdown. Only under such circumstances can the Soviet Union hope to continue to benefit from Washington’s largesse and that of other Western capitals in the face of bloody repression at home.

In short, the Bush administration’s present policy toward the Soviet Union is likely to produce the worst of both worlds — considerable Soviet mischief on various foreign policy fronts and a crackdown on democratic and free market reformers in the Soviet Union to which the United States will be at best acquiescent, at worst a silent partner.

Frank J. Gaffney Jr. is the director of the Center for Security Policy.