Toward a Free and Independent Hungary

Introduction

In the final round of free and
competitive elections held on 8 April
1990, the Hungarian voters flatly
rejected the communist party — despite
its recent reforms and change of name. href=”#N_1_”>⁽¹⁾
Instead they elected a coalition, led by
the Hungarian Democratic Movement. This
party is committed to political
democracy, a full but prudently managed
shift to a market economy, and the
removal of all Soviet troops from
Hungary. It has also expressed support
for NATO and endorses a continued U.S.
military presence in Western Europe.

The election results and the formation
of a new government mark an important
turning point in the transition of
Hungary toward political democracy. And
yet, an effective U.S. and Western policy
may play a pivotal role in helping to
ensure the success of the new government
particularly with respect to securing the
dismantling of the hard-core, internal
and Soviet-supported communist
apparatuses.

The 1990 Elections: Results
and Meaning

While the reformist wing of the
communist party is credited with having
permitted dramatic changes during 1989 —
overcoming the strenuous objections of
the party’s more doctrinaire elements, it
nonetheless tried to bring about the
election of a president as head of state
while controlling both the government and
the media — and before national
elections were held to choose a
parliament.

Not surprisingly, several democratic
parties objected to this stacked deck,
arguing that it would give the government
a significant and decidedly unfair
advantage. They insisted that the issue
be decided by a free, popular referendum.
The regime reluctantly agreed and the
vote was held on 26 November 1990 with a
turnout of 58 percent. The result was a
vote to hold national parliamentary
elections first and then let the
new parliament establish the procedures
for selecting a head of state.

The campaigns leading up to the two
rounds of parliamentary elections were
vigorous and competitive. The twelve
parties competing on 25 March were
reduced to six by the second round.
Foreign observers from the Council of
Europe, the Helsinki Commission, and a
delegation of 64 officials from 16
countries led by former U.S. Vice
President Walter Mondale reported that
the voting process had been
“correct.”

Summary of the April 8, 1990
Election Results

Among the most important conclusions
from these results are the following:

• Ninety percent of Hungarian
  voters gave their support to the
  democratic parties; only 9
  percent voted for the renamed
  communist party even though its
  reformist leaders had become very
  well known — a clear rejection
  of communism, even of the
  ostensibly reformist type;
• Both coalitions of democratic
  parties endorse full democracy, a
  shift to a market-oriented
  economy and the restoration of
  private property rights. However,
  the winner, the Hungarian
  Democratic Forum, advocates a
  slower process of privatization
  with careful government
  supervision and broad use of
  Employee Stock Ownership Plans
  (ESOP) in contrast to the
  Alliance of Free Democrats’
  emphasis on a radical and rapid
  transition process;
• The likely next premier, Jozsef
  Antall, is a 58-year old author
  and museum director with strong
  anti-communist credentials dating
  back to an active role in the
  ill-fated 1956 uprising. His
  father was a democratic leader
  who opposed both the Nazis and
  the communists in the 1940s and
  who has been honored by Israel
  and Poland for having helped
  thousands of refugees, including
  many of the Jewish faith, to
  escape from the Nazis.
• A constructive foreign policy is
  likely because of Mr. Antall’s
  close links with the Christian
  Democratic parties of Western
  Europe and his stated view that
  the United States should maintain
  a military presence in Europe to
  counterbalance that of the Soviet
  Union.
• The 50 percent voter turnout in
  the April 8 election was lower
  than had been expected and has
  raised questions in some minds
  about the prospects for democracy
  in Hungary. Importantly, however,
  the leader of the main opposition
  party, Janos Kis, promised
  following a hard-fought campaign,
  that he would lead a party of
  “responsible
  opposition.”

Soviet Disengagement and
Dismantling the Coercive Apparatus

When the elected Hungarian government
takes office it will face the problem of
establishing full authority. To do so, it
will have to dismantle both the Soviet
controlling presence and the hard-line
communist elements within the party, the
military, and the secret police.

The Soviet Union has promised to
withdraw all of its estimated 65,000
troops from Hungary by June 1991; it
reportedly moved about 300 personnel out
last month. But Moscow has presented
Hungary with a bill for 42 billion
forints ($650 million) for the barracks
and facilities it plans to vacate. In
response, the Hungarians have discounted
this demand by 40 billion forints due to
poor maintenance of the facilities.
Obviously, this Soviet demand opens the
way to others and to delays in their
political and military withdrawal.

Indeed, the opportunities for Soviet
coercion are considerable. In January
1990, two of the newly established
democratic political parties (Association
of Free Democrats and Association of
Young Democrats) presented a secret
police defector who had revealing
videotapes. The tapes proved that despite
its adoption of reformist policies and a
new name, the Hungarian communist party
had used the secret police to continue
extensive surveillance of democratic
political groups. This despite the fact
that, in October 1989, the communists
claimed to have dissolved the
organization and to have halted all such
activities.

These revelations produced a political
scandal for the former regime which was
quickly dubbed “Danubegate.”
Four investigations were begun, the
Minister of Interior and other key
personnel resigned, and in all likelihood
the renamed communist party’s fortunes
suffered at the polls as a result.

Of particular concern at present,
however, is the defector’s further
allegation that the Hungarian secret
police was in continuing contact with the
KGB. Hungarian democratic leaders are now
left with the key question: How much of
this apparatus currently remains?

Toward the end of 1989, the Hungarian
government said its armed forces, then
estimated to stand at 107,000 troops,
would be cut by 9 percent in 1990 and by
25 percent to about 75,000 — by the end
of 1991. Lt. Gen. Laslo Borsits, the
chief of staff, in April 1990, reported
further military reforms: Hungarian
military officers have taken a new oath
to protect the constitution rather than
the communist party. Some Hungarian
forces have been redeployed from west to
east in line with a new concept of having
a national defensive army. And communist
“political officers” have been
replaced by “education
officers” who are charged with
instructing the armed forces in civilian
control and citizen’s rights.
Undoubtedly, the newly elected government
will want to confirm and accelerate such
trends as well as cut the armed forces
more to save funds for economic
improvement.

Recommendations for U.S.
Policy

In the coming months the U.S. can help
consolidate democratic institutions
through a number of actions:

• Encourage an immediate and
  sizable effort to provide both
  the elected government and all
  the democratic political parties
  with practical assistance in
  building and strengthening their
  institutions;
• Encourage links between the
  Hungarian democratic parties and
  their corresponding free-world
  international associations and
  political parties;
• Provide immediate and meaningful
  diplomatic support for the likely
  request of the new government to
  accelerate the June 1991 date for
  completing Soviet troop
  withdrawals;
• Assess and report publicly on a
  regular basis whether there is
  any further Hungarian
  collaboration abroad with Soviet
  espionage, technology theft, or
  other hostile activities such as
  support for aggressive foreign
  regimes and terrorists;
• Provide regular, public reports
  of any continuing Soviet efforts
  to coerce or control any
  Hungarian institutions.
• Pursue an allied effort
  to develop a Contingency
  Energy Fund as a means of
  reducing Hungarian
  exposure to the sort of
  Soviet energy leverage
  currently being employed
  to coerce Lithuania.
• In addition, on a
  quarterly basis, public
  reports should be
  provided concerning
  progress being made: in
  the dismantling of the
  Soviet and coercive
  apparatus inside Hungary
  (including all elements
  of the secret police), on
  the actual withdrawal of
  Soviet troops and
  regarding the reduction
  and/or restructuring of
  the Hungarian military.
• Provided the elected Hungarian
  government takes steps to assure
  that all such hostile
  international actions have
  ceased, encourage the various
  sources of free world economic
  assistance to help develop
  institutional and entrepreneurial
  mechanisms as catalysts for
  democratic, free market forces.

1. The Hungarian
Socialist Workers Party was renamed the
Hungarian Socialist Party.