TRANSFORMATION WATCH #10:
COUP II (PART II) — WHAT THE U.S. SHOULD DO NOW

(Washington, D.C.): Events over the
past 48 hours suggest a further
unravelling of the democratic forces’
hold on power in Russia. Subsequent to
yesterday’s publication of a Center for
Security Policy Decision Brief
entitled, “Transformation
Watch #9: Coup II — The Unfolding Crisis
in the Former USSR”
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=92-D_133″>No. 92-D 133),
the following portentous developments
have occurred:

  • In remarks before senior Russian
    diplomats Tuesday, President
    Boris Yeltsin warned,
    “There is terrible danger.
    But in the West, they don’t yet
    understand this.”

    In particular, Yeltsin accused
    the National Salvation Front of
    advocating “the overthrow of
    legally constituted
    authorities.” Yeltsin has
    become sufficiently alarmed at
    the growing power of the Front
    that he banned it and
    the parliamentary guard (a 5,000
    man paramilitary force) on 27
    October.
  • The National Salvation
    Front has also announced plans
    calculated to provoke incidents
    in the Baltic States.

    During the period from 20-30
    November, Front members intend to
    visit Russian army garrisons in
    the Baltics for the purpose of
    “securing the rights of the
    troops and their families.”
  • Under the orders of Parliament
    Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov, parliamentary
    guards have also surrounded the
    offices of Izvestia,
    today a relatively independent
    newspaper, for the purpose of
    subordinating the paper to the
    control of the
    communist-dominated Parliament
    .
    Yeltsin has previously promised
    his support for preservation of Izvestia‘s
    autonomy.
  • According to a report broadcast
    today on National Public Radio,
    Khasbulatov has also
    assigned to this militia
    responsibility for the security
    of 75 buildings
    in
    Moscow, including state
    television, the Foreign Ministry,
    and the Constitutional Court.
    Importantly, NPR also quoted the
    unit’s head as saying he would
    take orders only from the Speaker
    of the Parliament — not from
    President Yeltsin or anyone else.

  • Yesterday, RFE/RL reported that representatives
    from the Russian Atomic Energy
    Ministry and other nuclear
    technology organizations have
    just concluded a nine-day meeting

    (15-24 October) with a
    delegation of Iranians

    and have apparently now agreed to
    a construction timetable to
    provide Iran with a VVER nuclear
    reactor — over U.S.
    objections
    .

Action Needed Now

It would be a tragic mistake in U.S.
foreign policy should the United States
now, in the words of former President
John F. Kennedy, “witness or permit
the slow undoing” of democratic and
free market reform in Russia — or
elsewhere in the former USSR — without a
strategic, U.S.-led effort to deter such
a momentous development. The Center for
Security Policy believes that those
communist and nationalist forces that
seek to turn back the clock to an
authoritarian — even fascist — Moscow
center must be put on notice
by the United States (ideally, in
coordination with its allies) that their
“Coup II” machinations, if
implemented, will entail real
penalties in terms of Western support and
assistance.

Toward this end, the men who
aspire to be the next president of the
United States need to let it be known now
that they will not permit U.S. resources
(financial, economic, technological,
energy-related etc.) to be used to
underwrite a new, re-centralized and
menacing proto-Soviet state
.
Markers must be put down at once
that the following sorts of steps will be
taken if either (or both) of these
conditions apply:

  1. the mandate of
    democratically elected officials
    like Boris Yeltsin is vitiated

    by the communist-controlled
    Congress of People’s Deputies in
    the absence of free and fair
    national elections
    or

  2. the process of
    democratic and free market
    economic institution-building
    continues to be stymied

    as hardline elements regroup and
    assert incremental political
    control.

Economic and Financial Measures

  • Paris Club negotiations
    concerning the rescheduling of
    some $80 billion in former Soviet
    debt will be suspended.
    Negotiations with those Soviet
    successor states who continue to
    pursue structural reform along
    democratic and free market lines
    should proceed.
  • Further lending to Russia
    by the IMF, World Bank, the
    European Bank for Reconstruction
    and Development and other
    multilateral institutions will be
    suspended.
  • The United States will work to
    interrupt most, if not all, G-7
    bilateral financial flows

    to Russia (e.g., commercial
    export-support loans would be cut
    off whereas funds designated for
    strict humanitarian relief or the
    destruction of nuclear, chemical
    or biological weapons might be
    continued).
  • Elements of the growing network
    of bilateral exchanges

    — such easily abused initiatives
    as assistance to the strategic
    Russian energy sector and defense
    conversion-related
    “cooperation” — will
    be put “on ice.”
  • A moratorium will be imposed upon
    U.S. projects in the
    Russian energy sector

    initiatives that could ultimately
    generate revenue streams
    sufficient to fund the reversal
    of private entrepreneurship in
    that country, not to mention the
    political freedoms that accompany
    it.
  • Dual-use exports
    to Russia will be curtailed
    immediately and a concerted
    effort will be made to
    reconstitute multilateral export
    controls on such items both in
    COCOM and in individual G-7
    control and enforcement regimes.

Political and Military
Measures

  • Planned deep cuts in U.S.
    defense spending
    will be
    postponed, if not reversed.
  • Russia — and other Soviet
    successors departing from the
    path of wholesale political and
    economic change — will be
    suspended from the North
    Atlantic Coordination Council
    .
  • Space cooperation
    — a technology field that is
    particularly susceptible to
    dangerous transfers of know-how,
    equipment and software (e.g.,
    those concerning ballistic
    missiles, guidance systems,
    communications, advanced
    simulation and design technology,
    etc.) — between the United
    States and Russia will be
    suspended.
  • Sharing of information
    and similar cooperation between
    the CIA
    and other U.S.
    intelligence agencies and law
    enforcement organizations with
    their Russian counterparts will
    be put on hold.

Diplomatic Measures

  • A public diplomacy
    campaign
    will be
    initiated to focus international
    opprobrium on those bent on
    thwarting the democratic and
    economic transformation of the
    old Soviet Union. Such a campaign
    would demonstrate that this
    time
    the United States
    stands unambiguously on the side
    of the beleaguered forces of
    reform in Russia, such as those
    supporting the economic program
    of Acting Prime Minister Yegor
    Gaidar.
  • State visits and
    other traditional courtesies (if
    not all lower-level working
    visits) would be denied to agents
    of the anti-reform movement.
  • No special treatment will
    be accorded to Mikhail Gorbachev

    should he reemerge as a front-man
    or leading light in such
    anti-reform factions as Civic
    Union. In particular, his
    predictable appeals in the West
    for more assistance flows and
    “political understanding and
    empathy” for the resurgent
    Old Guard will be firmly
    rejected.
  • Unhelpful Russian
    initiatives at the United Nations

    and in other multilateral
    settings, such as Moscow’s
    insistence that Belgrade be
    expelled only from the U.N.
    General Assembly
    — but not
    from myriad other United Nations’
    organizations — will be
    resisted.

The Bottom Line

In light of the rapidly deteriorating
situation in the former USSR, it is
imperative that a sharp departure from
past practice be made. Today, there need
to be publicly declared
milestones in the political, strategic
and economic fields — milestones against
which the performance of Russian leaders
can be judged
by the United
States and its allies.

Congress, moreover, must be made a
co-equal partner in enforcing these
sensible, disciplined and transparent
standards. Under no circumstances
should the decision whether to respond or
not to slippage on Russian reform be left
up to a handful of executive branch
officials
with a vested interest
in not rocking the boat or preserving their
interpretation
of “positive
momentum.”

After all, totalitarians tend to be
masters of the almost imperceptible
garrotting of Western-style reform.
Insensitivity to this fact helped get the
Bush Administration into the trouble now
known as “Iraqgate”; the
Congress and the American people need to
understand the goals and the stakes —
and be party to them at the take-off,
not just in the crash landing.

Such a clear-eyed policy will, in all
likelihood, be made more difficult by the
reemergence of a gaggle of apologists for
Civic Union and other Russian anti-reform
elements. Many of these will be the same
“experts” who were last heard
mindlessly extolling the virtues of
Mikhail Gorbachev’s communist regime and
warning against supporting the democratic
forces in Russia. They will doubtless be
no less deaf, dumb and blind when it
comes to the hardliners who would now
topple the latter and try to reconstitute
the empire lost by the former.

Professors Stephen Cohen
of Princeton, Jerry Hough
of Duke and Ed Hewitt of
the Brookings Institution and the Bush
NSC — among many others — have been
sufficiently wrong in the past that
future recommendations they might make
about the need to treat with resurgent
Russian hardliners should be sharply
discounted. Better yet, they
should be rejected outright.

Center for Security Policy

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