TRANSFORMATION WATCH: ‘AND THE WINNER IS…’: THE WEST SHOULD BE CAREFUL WHAT IT WISHES FOR

(Washington, D.C.): At this writing, it appears that Russian
President Boris Yeltsin has managed — despite evident infirmity
— to retain his title, by hook or by crook. If so, the outcome
will inevitably be trumpeted as a substantial victory for
democratic and free-market ideals, a triumph over the
authoritarianism of Russia’s past. Unfortunately, the growing
prominence of National Security Advisor Alexander Lebed, the
uncertain condition of the President himself and the ominous
trend in the Yeltsin regime’s policies in recent months suggest
that Mr. Yeltsin’s reelection will not long be a cause
for celebration in the West.

Hold the Champagne

As of today, the individual in Russia likely to emerge from
this vote with the greatest concentration of political power will
be neither a president nor democratic. Indeed, in the two weeks
since his appointment to oversee Russian national security
issues, Gen. Lebed has worked to expand his portfolio to
something more akin that of a proconsul. The attendant access his
elevation has given him to Western media, however, has diminished
the enthusiasm of many in the West who initially welcomed it as a
prelude to the restoration of “law and order” in
Russia. The following have offered troubling insights into Gen.
Lebed’s intentions:

• Gen. Lebed declared that only three religions are
  acceptable in modern Russia: Eastern Orthodoxy, Buddhism
  and Islam. Conspicuously absent from this list
  is Judaism (there are 1.5 million Russian Jews, compared
  to 400,000 Buddhists) and “alien” forms of
  Christianity. The Church of Latter-Day Saints in
  particular was a target of Lebed’s vitriol, as he called
  Mormons “mold and scum” and linked them to the
  Aum Shinrikyo cult believed to be responsible for the
  poison gas attack on Tokyo’s subway.
• Gen. Lebed oversaw the production of a draft
  document entitled “A New Approach to National
  Security Problems.” This document decries
  International Monetary Fund and other multilateral
  lending to Russia and proposes strict state control of
  natural resource exports and agricultural products.
• Gen. Lebed has urged tighter visa requirements on
  foreigners entering Russia as a means of securing
  Russia’s borders against excessive exports and damaging
  imports. His views are consistent, moreover,
  with recent, reprehensible decisions by the Russian
  government to deny visas to representatives of Jewish
  organizations.
• Gen. Lebed has identified himself as a
  “semi-democrat,” and expressed the view that
  “parliamentary democracy is not good for
  [Russia].”
• Gen. Lebed has attempted to redefine the term
  “national security” to include economic,
  environmental and moral concerns, thereby expanding his
  authority into each of these areas. href=”96-D67.html#N_1_”>⁽¹⁾

In response to the growing concern expressed over some of Gen.
Lebed’s positions, he has attempted of late to cast a more
moderate spin to his comments, for example by denying a
connection to the national security strategy paper and by
apologizing to the Mormons. He must, nonetheless, be held
accountable for what he said the first time — outrages
that cannot be simply papered over by subsequent reformulations
and excuses. This is all the more true since, even as he has
acknowledged and tried to discount rumors of his attempted power
grab, he restates that economics, the environment and
morality are fundamental to national security; while
clarifying his religious comments and recognizing that
“Judaism exists, like Catholicism” in Russia, he
nonetheless affirms that foreign “sects” are
“alien” to the Russian people. Far from reassuring,
these comments reveal the depth of his autocratic and jingoistic
convictions.

What’s Next?

The truly vexing question for Russians and Westerners alike is
now: what will Yeltsin do with his renewed mandate, or,
more accurately, how will those around Yeltsin exploit the power
vacuum created by his frequent absences or general
incapacitation? There is a real danger that, as long as
the Kremlin’s kleptokrats nurture the illusion of democratic
reform, the West will continue to be lulled into a false sense of
complacency on security issues even as popular discontent with
the reform process fuels reactionary movements.

Unfortunately, Gen. Lebed is not the only figure
likely to be vying for power as Yeltsin fades from the scene. He
may not even be the most nefarious. Alexander Korzhakov,
the head of Yeltsin’s personal security forces who was fired at
Lebed’s instigation but apparently remains in place, is unlikely
to be far from the fray. Similarly, General Pavel Grachev, the
former Defense Minister — one of Gen. Lebed’s long-time rivals
who was also relieved of his duties thanks to the new National
Security Advisor — is undoubtedly plotting his revenge. Then
there is Foreign Minister Primakov, a KGB thug bent on
resuscitating Moscow’s close strategic alliances with the likes
of Saddam Hussein, Hafez Assad, Li Peng and the Iranian mullahs.

Lebed may have overplayed his hand by taking on Korzhakov and
Grachev at once. This is especially so given that he has
simultaneously attempted to usurp Prime Minister Viktor
Chernomyrdin’s authority — a man he has accurately denounced as
an “energy baron” who has become rich on Russian oil
and gas while acquiring “overwhelming influence.” If
Yeltsin is up to the task, he may be tempted to dispose of Gen.
Lebed after the election leaving one or the other of these actors
free to advance their own agendas — probably to the detriment of
Russian free market democracy and U.S. interests.

If, on the other hand, the expected power struggle between
Chernomyrdin and Lebed occurs with Yeltsin absent from the
scene, the loyalties of the military (lebed) and of Russia’s
new rich (Chernomyrdin) are likely to clash — potentially
violently. The net result to the West will be: a deepening
economic crisis requiring further Western taxpayer involvement, a
Russia increasingly hostile to U.S. interests around the world
(e.g., in the “near abroad,” the Balkans, the Middle
East and vis a vis China), and a faltering commitment to
multilateral (e.g., disarmament projects, International Space
Station) and free market commercial (e.g., energy development,
the institutionalization of financial markets) undertakings.

The Bottom Line

None of these outcomes is likely what the West had in mind in
the aftermath of “free and fair” elections in Russia. The
West, however, should not be surprised at the result of its
latest cult-of-personality. Its “see no evil” support
for Yeltsin even as he morphed into a nationalistic, autocratic
Lebed has encouraged the rise of the genuine article.

Ironically, a Zyuganov victory may have resulted in a more
clear understanding by the West of these ominous trends in
Russia. It may also have catalyzed a more prudent, coordinated
response.

If President Yeltsin has indeed secured a new mandate, it will
be incumbent upon the Congress, the press and the security policy
community to articulate the dangers likely to arise under the new
Yeltsin-Lebed regime and to insist that the Clinton
Administration undertake the necessary policy course-corrections.
The ultimate course correction, however, may have to await the
decision of an American electorate appalled by this latest
foreign policy fiasco and determined not to renew Mr.
Clinton’s mandate.

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1. For additional information on some of
Gen. Lebed’s more onerous views, please see the Center for
Security Policy’s Decision Brief entitled Transformation
Watch: Lebed Is Not A Man We Can Do Business With ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=96-D_59″>No. 96-D 59, 18 June 1996).