TRANSFORMATION WATCH: AS CHECHNYA GOES, SO GOES DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA

(Washington, D.C.): After three years of responding
with largely benign neglect to efforts by the autonomous
province of Chechnya to secede from the Russian
Federation, Russian President Boris Yeltsin has adopted
the traditional Kremlin approach: the use of massive,
deadly military force to crush opposition to Moscow’s
dictates. One can only speculate as to why Yeltsin chose
this moment to act. That his decision to act in this
manner will have dire implications — for Russia, its
neighbors and the West — however, is indisputable.

Why Now?

Clearly, one factor in President Yeltsin’s decision to
adopt the coloration of a chauvinistic imperialist at
this juncture lies with domestic politics. He may have
calculated — wrongly, as it turns out — that he could
achieve a swift, crushing action against the Muslim
people of Chechnya and that this would be highly popular
with the Russian people. After all, on 4 October 1994,
within days of his storming of the Russian White House,
Yeltsin issued a decree ordering the round-up and
expulsion of “persons of Caucasian nationality”
from Moscow, a diktat ominously reminiscent of
Josef Stalin’s anti-semitic actions at the time of the
Doctors’ Plot in 1952-53 when “persons of Jewish
nationality” were incarcerated and, in many cases,
eliminated.

Yeltsin probably reckoned that, while members of
parliament would howl at his unilateral decision to
strike in Chechnya, the public would support him. The
Duma would, as a result, lose power to the executive,
marking at a minimum further movement toward a
Gaullist-style presidency — if not, effectively, a
dictatorship.

In the event, the Russian public has largely responded
in much the same way as its elected representatives: with
horror at the prospect of a long and bloody
Afghanistan-style conflict, perhaps compounded by a
campaign of terror that might be unleashed throughout
Russia by the tens of thousands Chechens estimated to
live outside of Chechnya.

Another factor may have been economic and strategic in
nature: Moscow is angling to participate in and
dominate the potentially enormously lucrative oil
exploitation deal Western companies have recently struck
with Azerbaijan. A major pipeline from the Caucauses
through Russia transits Chechnya. Recent Russian actions
that have had the effect of uniting Chechen opposition to
Moscow and that will likely result in vicious guerrilla
war against Russia are sure to send a chilling message to
any investors considering relying on that pipeline or
planning to build another one in that region.

Discounting American Objections — and
Power

Another consideration may well have been that Yeltsin
has concluded that the U.S. elections last month
substantially diminish the down-side risks associated
with a traditional Russian policy of domestic repression,
imperialism in the so-called “near abroad” and
assertiveness on the international stage more generally.
He may have sensed that Clinton, Talbott et.al. are lame
ducks and that the new Congress is going to be much more
insistent that U.S. assistance be conditioned on Moscow
exhibiting acceptable behavior both internally and
externally. Such judgments certainly would be consistent
with such recent, ominous Russian conduct as: the threats
and obstructionism evident at the recent meetings of the
Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe and
NATO; Kremlin obstreperousness in challenging U.S.
positions on Bosnia and Iraq; and the use of violence
against Russian citizens in Chechnya.

If so, the flaccid U.S. response to date — largely
characterized by a determined effort to accentuate the
positive and minimize the growing signs that U.S. policy
is out of synch with the emerging Russian reality — can
only serve to encourage the Kremlin’s worst instincts. An
urgent and fundamental reorientation of that policy is
now clearly in order.

The Bottom Line

The new Congress must make a comprehensive examination
of the direction and implications of developments in
Russia an urgent priority. Democratic forces there are
profoundly concerned that the Yeltsin transformation from
powerful ally to despotic adversary is well-advanced.
Even if Yeltsin does not or cannot continue down the path
of authoritarianism and revanchism, those among the Old
Guard who want to replace him may be able to seize the
present crisis to take charge. These include notably,
veterans of the Afghan war like Generals Lebed, Gromov
and Rutskoi who are determined to avoid another
protracted blood bath that did so much to erode the
esprit de corps and standing of the Russian military. href=”#N_1_”>⁽¹⁾

In short, the prognosis for further democratic reform
in Russia is not good. To the contrary, a growing effort
to respond to chaos in the North Caucasus and elsewhere
is likely to give rise to a greater degree of
authoritarianism, with grave implications for Russia’s
approach to individual liberties, economic
liberalization, remilitarization and foreign policies
contrary to Western interests.

The Center for Security Policy believes, accordingly,
that the United States must demonstrate convincingly its
opposition to such trends in Russia. The place to start
is with Chechnya. Washington must stop dismissing
this odious military crackdown as a legitimate, if
regrettable, response to an internal problem — a
response reminiscent of the Bush Administration’s when
Mikhail Gorbachev used force to suppress growing dissent
in the Baltic states.

It should, instead, be making it clear that
Russia’s failure to act in a manner consistent with
democratic practices and Western norms in dealing with
the Chechen independence movement will inevitably
have adverse consequences for U.S. and allied assistance
to Moscow and for efforts to integrate Russia into the
West. The United States should stand with those
genuinely committed to such practices and norms —
and not fall prey once again to the temptation to cling
to leaders who may have done so once, but whose actions
indicate they no longer do. If President Clinton cannot
bring himself to make such a principled statement, the
Congress must do so at the first possible opportunity.

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1. These veterans understand that
Chechnya may be for Yeltsin what Vilnius was for
Gorbachev: a no-win situation that will diminish the
power of the master of the Kremlin, irrespective of
whether he prevails or retreats. Still, these savvy
operators know that the Chechens are not like the
Lithuanians; they will exact a terrible price for Russian
efforts to reassert control over their homeland.