Treaties Alone Will Do Little

By James Schlesinger
The Wall Street Journal, 14 April 1997

James Schlesinger, a former secretary of defense and secretary of energy, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee April 8 in opposition to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Following are excerpts of his testimony:

Mr. Chairman, I start with the interesting and somewhat checkered history of efforts at the control of chemical weapons. The introduction of poison gas in World War I and then its widespread use in the later stages of that war led to a horrified reaction. That reaction plus the unease concerning its subsequent use by colonial powers led to the Geneva Convention, which forbids the use of poison gas by all signatories.

Iraq has been and is a signatory to the Geneva Convention. In the Iran-Iraq war of the ’80s, Iraq used poison gas as a way of stemming the “human wave” attacks of the Iranians. What was our reaction and the reaction of other Western powers at that time? In brief, to avert our gaze.

Later, as the war died down, Saddam Hussein used gas against Iraq’s Kurds. Our reaction was, to say the least, somewhat muted. For what were regarded as sound geopolitical reasons, we failed to take action despite Iraq’s blatant violation of the Geneva Convention. This manifest failure of the existing arms-control regime did stimulate renewed effort on the convention that lies before you. Aha! Perhaps if we were unwilling to enforce the existing ban on the use of poison gas, we might be more willing to take strong actions against its manufacture.

Ambiguous Evidence
Would we actually do more in enforcement when the evidence is far more ambiguous and the menace more distant? The use of poison gas is readily detectable; manufacture is not. Tapes and photographs were widely available of Kurdish women clutching their children to their breasts in the vain attempt to protect them against the gas. And yet we did nothing–for then it was not regarded in our interest to intervene.

By contrast, in the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein did not use poison gas against our troops. In the famous letter from President Bush to Saddam Hussein in early 1991 in which we demanded Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait, we reminded Saddam that the United States had nuclear weapons. As [former] Secretary [of State James] Baker has said, we also “made it very clear that if Iraq used weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons against U.S. forces, that the American people will demand vengeance, and that we had the means to achieve it.”

What are the lessons learned from these episodes? Treaties alone will do little. To prevent the use (or the manufacture) of chemical weapons requires a structure for deterrence backed by real capabilities.

Mr. Chairman, let me turn from history to specific problems in this convention.

1) Nonlethal Chemicals. In the negotiations we were pressed to ban nonlethal chemicals along with lethal chemical weapons. President Bush reiterated prior American policy and indicated that use of riot control agents would not be banned. The Clinton administration has been far more ambiguous on this subject.

Two days ago, the New York Times stated that the administration “has also refused to interpret the treaty in a way that would allow the use of tear gas for crowd control, mainly because the Pentagon has said it has no need to ever use non-lethal gases.” I trust that the Senate will seek clarification of the administration’s position, and indeed insist that the use of tear gas will not be banned either in peace or war. Otherwise, we may wind up placing ourselves in the position of the Chinese government in dealing with the Tiananmen Square uprising in 1989. The failure to use tear gas meant that the government only had recourse to the massive use of firepower to disperse the crowd.

2) Sharing chemical weapons technology. Article 10 of the treaty requires that signatories have a right to acquire CW defensive technologies from other signatories. This may mean that the United States is obliged to share such technologies with Iran, Cuba and other such nations that may sign the convention. But even if the Senate were able to prevent such obligatory transfers, it is plain that Article 10 legitimizes such transfers by other industrial nations, which will argue that they are obligated to do so by the treaty. Clearly that undercuts any sanctions directed at rogue nations that happen to sign the convention.

3) Defense against chemical weapons. In the years ahead, various groups, inclined to fanaticism, are likely to use chemical weapons as instruments of sabotage or terrorism. To deal with such attacks, it is essential to have continuing efforts on defensive measures.

In this connection, two points must be made. First, the illusion that this convention will provide protection against chemical weapons will tempt us to lower our guard. Second, the sharing of technologies required by Article 10 will provide other nations with the information that will help to neutralize our chemical warfare defenses–and thus expose us to greater risk.

4) Industrial espionage. The convention permits or encourages inspections against any facility deemed capable of producing chemical weapons. This exposes American companies to a degree and to a type of industrial espionage never before encountered in this country. To preclude such intrusive inspections requires the vote of three-fourths of the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Such supermajority votes are unlikely to be forthcoming-and will grow less so over time.

5) How do we respond to violations? Is the convention something more than a feel-good treaty? Is it more meaningful than the more explicit and more relevant ban on use in the Geneva Convention?

Last April, [then-Defense] Secretary [William] Perry (reiterating some of the warnings of Secretary Baker to Saddam Hussein) stated: “Anyone who considers using a weapon of mass destruction against the United States or its allies must first consider the consequences. We would not specify in advance what our response would be, but it would be both overwhelming and devastating.” Administration officials have more recently reiterated that threat. Does this convention oblige us to take actions beyond attacks on ourselves or on our allies? Are we prepared to take action if Iran attacks Tajikstan–or even uses gas against its own minorities? If Syria or Saudi Arabia or Israel or South Africa manufactures gas, what are we prepared to do? What actions would we take, if we discover that Russia or Ukraine or China is engaged clandestinely–or openly–in the manufacture of gas?

Particular Responsibility
As the leading world power and as the initial sponsor of this convention, the U.S. bears a particular responsibility for those signatories who have foregone the right of direct retaliation and who lack the American capacity for a response, both “overwhelming and devastating.” I trust, therefore, that this committee will press for clear answers regarding how we might feel obliged to respond in different hypothetical circumstances.

Mr. Chairman, some treaty proponents, while conceding the lack of verifiability, the lack of broad enforceability, and the other inherent weaknesses of the convention, suggest that it should be ratified because, whatever its weaknesses, it serves to establish “international norms.” If senators are moved by that last-ditch defense of the convention, they should vote for ratification. I urge, however, that senators bear in mind, first, that there already exists a “norm” in the Geneva Convention. Second, most nations do not care a fig for “international norms,” and they remain free to violate this “norm” with relative impunity, since the treaty is difficult to verify and more difficult to enforce.