Truth or Consequences #6: The C.W.C. Will Not Prevent Chemical Terrorism Against the U.S. or its Interests

(Washington, D.C.): In recent weeks,
proponents of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) have cited the
contribution this Convention would make
to combating terrorists armed with
chemical weapons as an important
justification for the Senate to approve
its ratification. In President Clinton’s
State of the Union address, in successive
op.ed. articles by former Bush
Administration officials and in news
articles and editorials reflecting the
Administration’s pro-treaty line, the
assertion is made that an admittedly
grave problem will be alleviated by the
CWC’s ban on the production, stockpiling
or use of chemical weapons.

According to the Wall Street
Journal, Senator Richard Lugar —
the Chemical Weapons Convention’s
principal champion in the Senate — has
even taken to darkly warning his
colleagues that they better vote for the
CWC lest there be a chemical terrorist
incident in this country which might have
been prevented if only the Convention had
been in place.

The CWC Will Not
Impede Terrorists

Such arguments are highly misleading,
possibly dangerously so, for two reasons:

(1) The ‘Home-Brew’ Problem:
The ability to produce toxic chemical
agents is so widespread — and the
materials required are so universally
accessible and ordinary — that a
treaty banning chemical weapons will have
no effect at all on
small, non-governmental groups determined
to manufacture such agents.
Lethal chemical substances can be
manufactured by virtually anyone with a
good understanding of chemistry and
access to commercially available hardware
and ingredients.

In fact, the Japanese cult, Aum Shim
Rikyo, produced the toxic nerve agent
Sarin it used a few years ago in its
terrorist attack on the subways of Tokyo
in just such a fashion — in a room with
dimensions of eight by fourteen feet.
Suggestions that such terrorist incidents
will be precluded in the future by a
prohibition on governmental stocks of
chemical weapons — a step said to
eliminate the danger some chemical
weapons might be stolen and used in an
unauthorized fashion — ignore the
reality of this “home-brew”
option. The effect of the CWC on this
option will be roughly that an
international treaty foreswearing
bank-robbery by governments would have on
independent bank-robbers, which is to say
no beneficial impact whatsoever.

As a practical matter, neither
the limits imposed by the Chemical
Weapons Convention’s three schedules of
chemicals nor the intrusive inspection
regime mandated by the treaty would
prevent terrorist groups like Aum Shim
Rikyo from garnering chemical weapons
capabilities. This would be true
even were they to produce quantities of
chemical agents deemed by the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John
Shalikashvili, sufficient to have a
“militarily impact” (i.e., one
agent ton).⁽¹⁾

On this point, a declassified Defense
Intelligence Agency report of February
1996 observed:

“Irrespective of whether the
CWC enters into force, terrorists
will likely look upon CW as a
means to gain greater publicity
and instill widespread fear. The
March 1995 Tokyo subway attack by
Aum Shim Rikyo would not have
been prevented by the CWC.”

(2) The Problem of State-Support
for Chemical Terrorism: A
number of the leading state-sponsors of
terrorism — notably, Libya, Syria, Iraq
and North Korea — have indicated that
they will not become parties to this
treaty. As a result, at least some
of those who provide infrastructural
support, training and other assistance to
terrorists will be free to do so in the
chemical arena, as well as with respect
to more traditional tools of the trade
(e.g., Semetex plastic explosive,
fertilizer-based bombs and other
high-explosives).

What is more, since
the Chemical Weapons Convention’s
limitations cannot be monitored with
confidence, it is possible — perhaps
even likely — that at least some
of the nations known to have supported
international terrorism who may become
parties to the CWC (e.g., Russia, China,
Iran and Cuba) will also be able to
assist those interested in performing
acts of chemical terrorism. If the
Convention cannot ensure that such CWC
countries are entirely out of the
chemical weapons business, it certainly
cannot assure that those with whom these
countries deal covertly are out of that
deadly business.

In the final analysis, of course,
state-sponsorship of terrorism is itself
a violation of international law. The
idea that nations that routinely flout
treaty obligations and international
norms will behave differently if only a
new convention is adopted is absurd.
The problem is not a lack of laws or the
“tools” they ostensibly provide
to deal with such nations and behavior.
The problem is, rather, the absence of
will to use the available laws and tools
to penalize state-sponsors of terrorism
and curb their malevolence.

The Bottom Line

The threat posed by chemical terrorism
is a real one. Every American should be
concerned about this danger — and
insistent that it be seriously
addressed by the elected and appointed
officials charged with providing for the
common defense. The predictable effect of
the Chemical Weapons Convention, however,
will be to reduce concern out of a
mistaken belief that the chemical threat
from terrorists and others has been
appreciably lessened.

What is needed now is effective
action, not placebos like the Chemical
Weapons Convention. The 1996
Antiterrorism Act demonstrates that the
United States can adopt legislation
addressing the threats posed by
terrorists without being compelled to do
so by international treaty. That and
other antiterrorism statutes can and
should be strengthened so as to impose
severe criminal penalties on those who
enable, help or execute such attacks.

The existing, relatively verifiable
international ban on use of chemical
weapons should be given enforcement
teeth. U.S. intelligence efforts aimed at
identifying, penetrating and neutralizing
groups that might be inclined to engage
in such activities need to be intensified
and given substantially greater
resources. And a vastly increased effort
should be made to provide protection
against chemical attacks not only to the
U.S. military but also to the American
government and people.

By contrast, a treaty that
will, in all likelihood, have the effect
of reducing investment in
chemical defenses href=”97-D30.html#N_2_”>⁽²⁾
and possibly diminishing
valuable chemical-related intelligence
collection by diverting efforts to the
inspection and other activities mandated
by the CWC,⁽³⁾
may actually make the U.S. more
susceptible — not less — to
terrorists wielding CW. That
could also be the case thanks to the
treaty’s obligation on states parties to
transfer chemical manufacturing
capabilities and defensive equipment to
other member nations. href=”97-D30.html#N_4_”>⁽⁴⁾
Should this obligation be honored by the
U.S. and/or its allies, it will prove a
recipe for intensified threats emanating
from terrorist-sponsoring countries.

Finally, if — as virtually everyone
agrees — chemical terrorism is likely to
occur in the future, Senators would be
well advised to think about whether they
wish to be implicated by having voted for
a treaty falsely advertized as a means to
prevent such incidents, but that will be
seen in retrospect to have done nothing
on that score, and perhaps actually
served to make them more likely.

– 30 –

1. See the
Center’s Decision Brief entitled
Truth or Consequences #3:
Clinton ‘Makes a Mistake About It’ in
Arguing the CWC Will Protect U.S. Troops
(No. 97-D 21,
6 February 1997).

2. Ibid ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-D_21″>No. 97-D 21, 6
February 1997).

3. Douglas J.
Feith, a leading critic of the CWC and
founding member of the Center for
Security Policy’s Board of Advisors, has
likened the Convention’s intrusive
inspection arrangements to those of a
drunk looking under a streetlamp for keys
lost elsewhere simply because the light
was better there.

4. See the
Center’s Decision Brief
entitled Truth or
Consequences #5: The CWC Will Not Be Good
For Business, To Say Nothing of the
National Interest ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-D_27″>No. 97-D 27, 17
February 1997).