Update on Iran

First of all, there are credible reports that several cities — or at least core structures such as Basiji/IRGC bases and government buildings — have been taken over by the revolt. It started with the fall of an IRGc installation in Fasa, but there appear to be credible videos of government buildings and security installations burning in numerous cities geographically well-dispersed across Iran.

Second, the revolt continues to both expand to more town and cities, and it is getting bigger in each city. At this point, between 50-65 cities appear to experience major unrest.

Protesters clearly have overrun police, security forces, and taken their weapons. Several police stations and arsenals have also been overrun in several places with their weapons falling to the protestors.

The slogan most chanted is “Javid Shah,” or “long live the Shah,” referring to Shah Reza Pahlavi II, as well as a marked amount of positive slogans and references to Israel or Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu. There seems to be a broad view they will save the nation.

The extent of the revolt is stretching the security forces very, very thin. So far, neither Baluchistan nor Kurdish areas have revolted massively, but one must remember, they were the focus of the Mahsa Amini ( Women, Life, Feedom revolt) revolt only three years ago and are seething. It would seem quite possible that the next two or three days will see them erupt, especially Sanandaj in the Kurdish areas and Zahedan and Chabahar in the Baluch areas. Indeed, in the last hour, the first reports are appearing of mass demonstrations in Zahedan. And when they populations in those town do rise, it will be very hard for the regime to hold onto those and other major cities there. They will be stretched very very thin. Moreover, these are areas where a significant armed resistance is likely to emerge early, given recent signs that armed militias have turned in recent months there.

The regime is likely bringing its mercenaries. Some Iranians have been caught be the rioters. But the use of mercenaries is both compromised and fraught with danger for the regime. Hizballah is still devastated and, if reports coming from Israel are true, may be attacked in the next days by Israel. So, planes from Russia perhaps carrying other mercenaries are arriving. But Russia hasn’t a great stable of surplus fighting men, Chechen or otherwise, right now.

The use of foreign mercenaries can also unleash the regular army against the regime. The army is hesitant to intervene beaten Iranians, as it posits itself as the protector of the nation. But if the regime slaughters too many people, and especially us a foreign force is used to do so, the army will see itself as the shield of the people against these mercenaries, and would tip the scale for them to intervene against the regime. So far, individual soldiers may have defected, but not whole units. Given the use of live fire and the first reports of mercenaries, that may change soon.

Several additional things are very important to keep in mind:

1. This started in the Bazaar in Tehran. The last time upheaval began there was in 1979.

2. ⁠the regime has long been torn between two ideologies: the Valiyat e-Faqih, or Rile of the Jurisprudent, which is essentially a clerical/jurisprudent total dictatorship to serve as an Ersatz Mahdi until he returns. The clerical establishment is this camp largely. Opposed to them are the Mahadists, those who believe we are the final days before the great apocalyptic battle that mark the imminent return of the occulted Mahdi. No Ersatz Mahdi is needed, just total faith in Islam and its impending victory and confidence in his imminent return. The IRGC and even Ayatollah Ali Khamenei seem to be adherents to this more mystical outlook. These two ideological outlook have a geographic dimension; their respective epicenters of the revolutionary ideology — Qom as the clerical “rational” school of Valiyat e-Faqih and Mashhad as the mystical Mahdi school that define the top levels of the IRGC — are now both in revolt. This alone is devastating.

3. The key oil centers of Qeshm Island (which has never seen revolt) and Abadan, namely the Ahvaz province, effectively can control or paralyze the economy and are critical — like Gdansk shipyards was for Lech Walesa to succeed in 1981 in Poland. These two oil centers are now both in revolt.

Tabriz so far has not reported major demonstrations, and was key in 1979. But it is Azeri. That the Bazaar in Tehran is in revolt, however, is suggestive. It is a largely Azeri-dominated structure, so its revolting indicates that Tabriz is likely not far behind.

4. The last year has created dangerous new dynamics for the regime. A regime like Iran’s depends on an image of omnipotent brutality. Indeed, this is the most important, verily critical asset it possesses. And yet, Israel has over the last year exposed the regime as impotent and cowering. Moreover, in the war last summer, Israel killed many of the most competent commanders controlling the regime’s apparatus of repression. And the Iranian people assume that Israel could do the rest as well.

5. Finally, the President’s 02:50 AM tweet supporting the Iranian people and warning the regime not to turn to live ammunition and shoot. Until now, the dark shadow that loomed over every wave of Iranian demonstrations, whether in 2009 or three years ago, was the expectation of American betrayal, namely that the U.S. did not really support regime change, and instead wanted to use regime instability only as a leverage snd the people risking their lives as pawns to reach another nuclear deal. In the end, that constant fear capped these upheavals and gave the regime the required confidence to suppress and kill to survive.

That this time the President has issued such a strong unequivocal and even regime-threatening statement is a game changer. Added to that is that while in the past, Israel expressed strong support for the Iranian people, its voice was insufficient to matter — until last summer. Israel has acquitted itself as such a capable and powerful regional actor, one capable besting the Iranian regime on its home turf, that its support means far, far more than it did before June — perhaps even as much as American support.

These aspects alone tell you the regime is reeling dangerously.