US needs to fix weaknesses in its Indo-Pacific strategy to counter China

In this edition of Indo-Pacific: Behind the Headlines we speak with Grant Newsham, a retired United States Marine Corps (USMC) Colonel, a lawyer, and a former US Foreign Service Officer who specialized in insurgency, counter-insurgency, and commercial matters.

He served as the reserve head of intelligence for Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), as well the head of Plans and Policy for MARFORPAC. He was the Marine attaché in Tokyo and the first Marine Liaison Officer to the Japan Self-Defense Forces. In the latter role he helped create Japan’s “Marine Corps”.

Q: What are the new plans for the US Marine Corps?

A: A few years ago, the Marine Commandant, General David Berger, came up with a new plan for the future of the Marine Corps. It made sense to reassess—the Marines kind of got hidebound in their thinking.

The Commandant’s plan is to focus the Marines mostly on the Pacific, in preparation for the big fight with the Chinese as the primary adversary. According to the plan, the best and brightest Marines are going to be sent to the Pacific—which of course was a blow to all Marines, as we all think we are the best and the brightest.

What he’s called for is to make the Marines less heavy, less ponderous—a lighter force. That has meant getting rid of all Marine tanks, bridging equipment, some regular tube artillery, amongst other changes.

He wants to deploy small detachments, on small islands, equipped with things like anti-ship missiles, long-range rockets such as HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems. The idea is these will be small units—there is even some talk of making them self-contained or at least not having huge logistics requirements, and having them rely on concealment and movement to survive. Sort of like the Coastwatchers in the Solomon Islands during World War Two.

The plan calls for them to be placed mostly on islands along the First Island Chain, and present webs of interlocking long-range fires giving the Chinese navy and marines a long afternoon if they try to come through. Under the plan, Marines are to play a support function to sink the Chinese ships before they can get to the US Navy, and otherwise facilitate naval operations.

The idea of dispersal has a logic to it, and it makes sense to use the geography of the Western Pacific for this purpose. The First Island Chain really does hem in the Chinese as they try to break out into the Pacific. He’s using geography for advantage—to make the Chinese have to fight through what American forces would have to get through if attacking into PLA defences.

Q: Are there weaknesses in the plan?

A: Marines, active and retired, have been arguing about this non-stop. But let’s just look at one aspect. If you have these small Marine units, where are you going to put them?

It’s a very short list of places that have the welcome mat out for these sorts of unit. The relationship with the Philippines is sometimes iffy. The Indonesians aren’t too keen. The Malaysians? Probably not. The Solomon Islands aren’t too welcoming at the moment. The Japanese appear willing to allow Marine HIMARS teams to operate on one of their southern islands, and the Australians are always helpful, and Palau is a possibility. But other than that…

You can see the dilemma.

The basic idea is an ok one, but there is this problem of where will you actually set them up. The idea of them being welcomed in is one thing, but if they come in unwelcomed that obviously presents some extra problems.

Even if they are welcome, you still have the problem of keeping them hidden. And on any inhabited islands it is going to be pretty obvious you have Marines around.

Also, across the region, there are small shops owned by recently arrived ethnic Chinese, who may let their embassy know of any unusual activity. In the maritime domain, there are Chinese fishing fleets all over that operate under Beijing’s civil-military fusion doctrine. And with satellites getting better and better, it’s now easier than ever to track people down.

Hopefully, someone has thought of how to keep the Marines hidden enough to avoid Chinese rockets. But if they have, it’s not clear who.

Q: Is there a missing component of the planning process?

A: I’ve just described it. The Marines have set up this scheme without knowing where they will—or even can—operate.

The Marines apparently have not laid the political groundwork for what the Commandant’s plan describes. The Marine headquarters in Hawaii used to have a section called the G5 that handled plans and policies. Over 18 to 20 years it set up a pretty good set of connections around the region, attracted good officers, and had permanent staff who knew their countries and key people in them.

With a little bit of adjustment, the G5 could have really opened some doors region-wide for the Commandant’s scheme. To give an idea how successful the G5 was on occasion, getting the Marines into Darwin in Australia [where they now train] was largely due to a young Major in the G5 who refused to listen to why it wasn’t possible. And the effort to create a Japanese amphibious force was launched by the effort of one of those G5 officers with the magic to get things done.

But then, a few years ago, a new commanding General came to Hawaii and disbanded the G5 because he thought its work could be handled by other sections.

That commanding General is the current Commandant of the Marine Corps. There is certain irony in the one section in the Marine Corps that could have helped him set up this plan was disbanded—by him.

Go figure.

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