View from Japan: Japan’s commitment to military contributions being tested

Editor’s note: this analysis was originally published by the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals and is reposted here with its permission.

Japanese newspapers might have exhausted all possible comments about the latest Japan-U.S. summit. The summary of its significance is that the Biden administration has won Japan’s commitment to play more important roles in U.S. policy on China. The time is coming for the Japanese government to implement this commitment. Aspiring politicians should take this opportunity to develop Japan into a full-fledged nation.

The U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement released after the summit on April 16 said:

“Japan resolved to bolster its own national defense capabilities to further strengthen the Alliance and regional security… [Japan and the United States] resolved to conclude in a timely manner a meaningful multi-year Host Nation Support agreement to ensure the stable and sustainable stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan.”

It may not be strange for a country to bolster its defense capabilities. But I think this is an unusually courageous expression of determination for Japan that has demonstrated an allergy to international military contributions.

Some in LDP indicate hesitancy

The U.S. Democratic Party includes a “weak Japan” faction that has called for preventing Japan from becoming militarily stronger in the context of Japan-U.S. security cooperation. However, in the face of military, political, economic, technological and ideological challenges from China, the Biden administration might have had no choice but to make Japan a key player in Asia. In this sense, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga deserves a great deal of credit for his wise decision in making this commitment.

The problem is how Japan would implement the commitment. A sense of crisis grew within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party when China put into effect its new coast guard law that empowers the Chinese Coast Guard to take any measures required including use of force against any infringement on China’s sovereignty or jurisdiction. This especially concerns Japan’s Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea which Beijing continues to insist belong to China.

When the LDP’s National Defense Division proposed to amend the Japan Coast Guard Act in response to the new Chinese law, its Land, Infrastructure and Transport Division in charge of the Japan Coast Guard opposed the proposal. The LDP made an ambiguous conclusion that new legislation would be considered if necessary.

Accidentally, Japanese and U.S. foreign and defense ministers at their “2 plus 2” meeting on March 16 reaffirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands, indicating that there will be a similar reaffirmation at the April 16 summit. Did the LDP then assume that the crisis regarding the Senkakus came to an end? Members of the LDP Land, Infrastructure and Transport Division might still be unwilling to provoke China.

High hurdles to Japan-U.S. joint operations

What would the Japanese government do in response to a Taiwan contingency? Does it intend to limit Japan’s actions to logistic support for U.S. forces by concluding that such contingency would seriously affect Japan’s peace and safety but fall short of threatening its survival? Could the Japanese Self-Defense Forces conduct the same operations as U.S. forces for their cooperation?

The relationship between politicians and the SDF is a matter of concern

On the occasion of the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, a leftist local governor refrained from requesting to mobilize the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) for disaster-relief operations. But some local government chiefs now easily ask the SDF not only for disaster relief but for distributing water for drivers stuck in traffic jams due to heavy snowfall. Disaster-relief operations are one of the SDF’s missions but not a main reason for its existence, said the late Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida in his book, “World and Japan,” published in 1961.

Since Japan still has failed to clarify the relationship between politicians and the military, it may not be easy to let the SDF work with foreign forces.

Tadae Takubo is Vice President of the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals and a professor emeritus at Kyorin University in Tokyo.