Where are the carriers?

Last week, the Navy announced it had capped production of the DDG-1000 destroyer at two ships.   One of the main reasons given for this decision was the class’ inability to deal with future cruise- and ballistic-missile threats.

Critics have often cited exactly these threats when calling into question the utility and survivability of the Navy’s most effective power projection platform, its aircraft carriers.  

Ironically, there are rumors of flagging Navy support in recent budget deliberations for a program that could effectively provide U.S. carrier battle groups with several means for mitigating these missile threats: the Navy Unmanned Combat Air System (N-UCAS).

The Navy is developing N-UCAS as a stealthy, carrier-based unmanned aircraft that would allow Carrier Strike Groups to operate effectively from outside the envelope of enemy missile threats and could act as a prime hunter against missiles and their launchers before and after launch.

Pay Now or Pay Later

As the DDG-1000 proves, transforming a force while at war is never easy. Hard-pressed military planners are often tempted to create a force geared to defeat a specific, current enemy, while neglecting investment in the more broad-based capabilities required to meet future threats.  Additionally, in time of conflict, needed advances may be delayed on the grounds that their benefits materialize too far in the future to warrant the use of limited resources in the face of present demands that are perceived as more pressing.

What makes the cancellation of the Navy Unmanned Combat Air System (N-UCAS) all the more puzzling is that it would provide critical capabilities needed both today and in the future:

• With 50-to-100 hours of endurance per sortie, the system can conduct broad-area persistent surveillance-attack operations from outside the range of enemy missile threats.   High persistence is essential for irregular warfare, such as we face today.   It is also needed for operations against future adversaries who will employ large numbers of mobile missile systems as well as mines and submarines that force the carriers to operate far from the enemy’s coast.
• A tail-less flying-wing platform such as N-UCAS is ultra-stealthy, and able to operate even in the face of the most advanced air defenses.
• Obviously, an unmanned system does not put pilots at risk of capture or death.   Potential adversaries will realize that the fear of pilot loss will not deter the US from acting against them, if necessary.
• The endurance advantage means that a far smaller – and thus, cheaper – force of N-UCAS is required relative to manned systems to achieve the same capability.

Although DoD’s current generation of UAVs have performed admirably in Iraq and Afghanistan, these systems are primarily relevant to low spectrum conflicts, or against militarily outclassed adversaries and insurgencies. These UAVs can not survive against an enemy with credible air defenses.

The future for Intelligence , Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) and strike aircraft is stealth, extreme range, and extended persistence on-station. N-UCAS delivers all of these attributes efficiently and affordably.   When the Navy began N-UCAS, it became a world leader in the development of the next generation of UAVs. However, in order to realize the promise of this revolutionary capability, the Navy must fully fund the N-UCAS Carrier Demonstration and Technology Maturation programs from today through their conclusion in 2013.   Conducting these demonstration programs will allow the Navy to make an informed, low-risk decision about the acquisition of an operational UCAS system later in the decade.

The Bottom Line

Current and foreseeable strategic problems – whether from an insurgency or a peer competitor – are prompting some to reevaluate the carrier strike group’s necessity and survivability.   With manned aircraft, carriers are not a cost-effective way to counter insurgents and terrorists, and will face budget cuts in order to fund other, less costly sources of airpower.   With manned aircraft, carriers cannot counter cruise and ballistic missile threats from a survivable distance, and will face budget cuts on grounds of vulnerability, just as the new class of destroyers did last month. An unmanned aircraft like N-UCAS solves both these problems at once, providing a cost-effective capability that allows the carriers to find and attack terrorists and insurgents, and also to counter cruise and ballistic missile threats from a survivable distance.

The nation’s strategic problems will inevitably force the Navy to acquire N-UCAS, but the question is how the Navy will do so. The Navy’s choice is clear: develop and acquire N-UCAS now, in a low risk, cost-effective manner, or make the false economy of cutting funding now and then developing N-UCAS as a high risk, crash program later.  

The future of the carrier strike group and naval aviation clearly requires N-UCAS. But to realize that future, the Navy will have to demonstrate the vision and apply the resources necessary to assure the viability of both – starting with full funding of the N-UCAS carrier demonstration and technology maturation programs in 2010.   If necessary, the Office of the Secretary of Defense may need to require further development of these programs as per previous guidance in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review [1] and elsewhere .