Who will guard the guards? Clues to watch for a power grab against Putin

A coup or other action against Russian strongman Vladimir Putin could come in many forms. That is, if such an action comes at all.

Sanctions against the Russian people are not the optimal means of applying pressure on Putin because the regime keeps such tight controls on information and political opposition. Sanctions of some form against practically all Russians presumes a “color revolution” situation permitting mass action, and that situation does not yet exist.

Sanctions against Russia’s oligarchs, done in their present way of wrecking the fortunes of all at once, deny the US the ability to play off one oligarchic faction against another and drive wider cleavages more deeply into the ruling elite.

The likelihood of change is probably within Putin’s presidential Security Council, home of the siloviki, or what the Russians call “power ministries.” The siloviki run the internal security, national police, secret police, foreign intelligence, border guards, armed forces, presidential guard, and related entities, as well as huge organized corrupt and criminal enterprises and networks that coexist with the official apparat.

Von Stauffenberg seating arrangements

In the days leading up to the invasion and the first few days into it, Putin staged appearances with the siloviki leadership to give him what he thought projected a commanding presence. The first was his February 21 meeting with his entire security council, set in a cavernous room with him seated at a desk, and his security and military chiefs standing ten or fifteen yards away, with a vacuous gap of carpet and stone flooring in between.

Putin spoke to them, asked them questions, and dressed down his intelligence chief. One or two seemed to stammer out their answers, as if fearful of displeasing The Man.

The siloviki have fully supported Putin and his worldview all this time. Concerns in Moscow are that by invading Ukraine, Putin would end up destroying their shared dream of restoring Russia’s historical greatness.

The staging suggested something much different: Putin feared his own power ministers and created that wide physical space to prevent one or more of them from abducting or harming him.

That controversial theory grew into what we at the Center for Security Policy call a “von Stauffenberg seating arrangement,” a reference to German Col. Claus von Stauffenberg, who planted a bomb under a table to assassinate Hitler in 1944.

Putin had himself seated at the end of a ridiculously long table, with a small extension for himself with what appears to be a protective barrier beneath. His siloviki, sometimes as a group, sometimes as few as two, sat almost as far as possible away at the other end.

Putin kept similar distances during meetings with visiting foreign leaders, including the presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and France.

What to look for

In terms of watching for clues about a suspected conspiracy or coup against Putin, many observers pay close attention to the Federal Security Service (FSB). The FSB is the re-named Ministry of Security that Putin once headed, and which before had been the Second Chief Directorate and other units of the Soviet KGB.

The FSB is arguably the most powerful entity in Russia, with vast internal security functions and a relatively new foreign intelligence role. Its director, General Alexander Bortnikov, ran the FSB by himself until Putin recently assigned him a first deputy director (and therefore a potential designated successor), Colonel General Sergei Korolev, after the invasion. Korolev had run the FSB’s economic security unit to crack down on corruption – a politically motivated post in Putin’s Russia to eliminate rivals.

Others watch the Ministry of Defense, led by longtime Putin confidant Sergei Shoigu. The military, under Shoigu’s leadership, has not acquitted itself well in Ukraine and is reported to be under severe strain.

There are other ministries, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), which runs the national police and riot police, but the MVD is weak as an instrument of political control, without much of an internal intelligence or covert capability of its own.

The place to watch is the Federal Protective Service, also known as the Federal Guard Service, whose acronym is transliterated to FSO. The FSO is the re-named KGB 9^th Chief Directorate. It is the primary node on which Putin relies to protect himself and control the rest of the siloviki.

The 50,000-person FSO provides Putin’s personal security and the security of his family, as well as the technical means for him to keep political and administrative control. It answers directly to Putin.

The FSB also controls the personal security of almost everyone in Putin’s inner circle who could move against him: FSB Director Bortnikov, SVR foreign intelligence Director Sergei Narishkin, Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev (Putin is the chairman) and Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, State Duma and Federal Assembly Chairman and Security Council member Vyacheslav Volodin, Defense Minister Shoigu, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, and others.

Control of the FSO means control of the security of Putin and the entire siloviki and political leadership.

It was the FSO, with an internal security unit of the FSB, that is reported to have raided the FSB’s 5^th Service, responsible for Ukraine matters, and 20 other sites on March 11. That was the day the chief of the 5^th Service, Sergei Beseda, and his deputy, Anatoly Bolyukh, were placed under house arrest.

Watch for what happens within the FSO: Leadership changes, reassignments, anything ese that might indicate either Putin’s worries about long knives.

Of course, coups and other power changes can come far more quickly than anyone imagines. Or they might not come at all.