Why U.S. Intelligence is Inadequate, and How to Fix It

Collection

US intelligence has never had more than a few sources of human reporting of which it could be certain, and the capabilities of US technical collection devices, both imaging and electronic, are too well known.

Money has never been the problem with CIA’s espionage. Its clandestine service has some 2500 “case officers” abroad. But this “clandestine” service is clandestine in name only. 98% of its officers are spooks only to the point of claiming they report to some part of the US government other than CIA. The 2% super spooks hide their connection to the US government but make no attempt to hide the fact that they are Americans. Rather than prowling the back alleys pretending to be Ruritanian arms dealers, or using identities of convenience to worm information out of unwitting sources, CIA officers are limited to the kinds of contacts that US embassy personnel have.  Because personnel standards at CIA are lower than for the Foreign Service, the quality of CIA reporting seldom has equaled that of the State Department.  In Iraq they live and work behind a screen of American soldiers. Everywhere they deal either through translators or with English speaking foreigners. Even less than diplomats do they know languages, or the substance of any subject matter that would lead to natural contact with sources. As for work that requires the use of weapons, CIA policy has always been to hire contractors. In sum, CIA’s concept of its case officers as gentlemen spies is the wrong concept, resulting in a service full of the wrong people.

Their relationship with spies typically consists of managing relations with foreigners who seek them out – so called walk ins. The chief problem here is figuring out whether self proposed agents are really working for a hostile intelligence service. That problem is most serious when foreign intelligence services themselves are providing information. This is especially so regarding terrorism, since Arab governments – whose agendas run counter to America’s – supply a substantial portion of CIA’s information on it. The smelliest information comes from “interrogations” conducted by ignoramus officers, of prisoners who may or may not know anything but who are constrained to say something.

Collection by various kinds of cameras and electronic intercepts suffers from problems not entirely dissimilar. CIA wallpapered its lobby with a drawing of downtown Moscow copied from satellite photos, showing every building. Its implication, added to the well advertised fact that the best resolution of satellite photography could theoretically read license plates, gives the impression of omniscience. The equally well advertised fact that US antennas on satellites, on land, sea, and air, intercept billions of communications strengthens that impression. Theoretically, these antennas can also tell when a truck’s engine is on, among other things. Yet cameras and antennas are much less useful than they seem, especially with regard to terrorism.  Satellites travel paths and cover areas at times that are predictable years in advance. They neither see beneath roofs nor into the hearts of men. Hiding from high altitude photography is child’s play, as is spoofing it. The US and Britain misrepresented D Day preparations from German aircraft, the Soviets prevented US satellites from seeing anything of its fourth generation missiles except holes in the ground that may or not have been filled, and during the Gulf War Saddam Hussein managed to hide from satellites and aircraft every last one of the mobile Scud launchers that hit Israel and US troops. When the US government has struck terrorism on the basis of satellite reconnaissance, its bombs and missiles have destroyed empty mud huts. “Pounding sand” is what the pentagon calls it. When the Pentagon used satellites to pick targets for its “shock and awe” campaign against Iraq in 2003, it ended up destroying empty buildings.  Electronic intercepts are even more problematic. Theoretically, if the enemy does not know that his electronic messages are intercepted, we could read them. And if the enemy does know, he must chose between having them intercepted and not sending them.  In fact, just as in the case of satellites, the enemy can use his knowledge to give us the impressions he wishes, while sending messages either non electronically or through means he knows are safe. The Soviets long ago developed unbreakable codes. Most governments and serious criminals nowadays have them. Mere individuals as well as governments use multiple cell phone numbers or calling cards from public phones for real communications, while calling between phones they know are monitored to watch in glee as we scramble with security measures.