Will al Shabaab Join Islamic State?

The past weeks of debate regarding the relationship of Boko Haram and IS paints a picture of the how Western analysts weigh relationships between Sunni Islamic movements.  Most analysis in the media weighed tactical considerations that proved to be superficial in the end.

The overarching predictor of behavior for the allegiance between Boko Haram and IS was their strict religious interpretation of Islamic Law.  This is why the Threat Information Office at the Center for Security Policy so confidently predicted the acceptance of allegiance from Boko Haram by IS.

The tactical superficialities often discussed included egos among leadership in the groups, Arab racism toward black Africans, and propaganda ploys made in desperation.  All of these lines of inquiry are factors that merit assessment but ultimately they are symptoms.   Good intelligence analysis should not resemble an after action report.  It should predict behavior in order to prevent strategic surprise.

One of the symptoms or tactical superficialities that came into focus just before the alliance was the upgrade in Boko Haram’s media capability.  This led many to speculate that they had help and training from IS for their propaganda division.  The assistance could have as easily come from al Shabaab.  Al Shabaab has long had an impressive media capability but the latest video on their invasion of Mpeketoni in Eastern Kenya seems to be a leap forward none the less.  If the propaganda videos released by each group serve a purpose, it is to teach us about tactics and goals.  Emphasize the goals over the tactics and you will have a better handle on behavior.

It has been the over-emphasis on tactics that has cost us the big picture.  Again, it was strict religious interpretation which trumped racism that U.S. intelligence officials said would prevent an allegiance between Boko Haram and IS.  The Ansaru faction of Boko Haram for example came from the mind of Mokhtar Belmokhtar (of AQIM at the time).  The media picked up on Ansuru’s condemnation of Boko Haram’s horrific tactics.  If one were to be specific, Ansaru’s issue was with Boko Haram’s horrific treatment of it’s own members.  Not infidels generally.  In fact, by Belmokhtar’s design, Ansaru was meant to be a regional actor where Boko Haram was local.  Maaman Nur led Ansaru and connected with al Shabaab between 2009 and 20011.  Nur, like Abubakar Shekau, was a disciple of Muhammed Yousef.  Many of Yousef’s followers joined Al Qaeda after his death.

This is all to say that the things that divide these groups do not deter them from their long term goals.  There are now hints that Al Qaeda linked al Shabaab will be the next to pledge to IS.  We can continue to ask if tactical factors will cause significant divisions.  One of the big question that remains is whether alliances between these groups will strengthen them tactically.

Despite military success of western alliances in Nigeria, Somalia, or the Middle East, these allegiances will strengthen these Sunni Islamist groups.  In one sense, they already have because policy makers have alluded themselves that the different banners under which global jihadists fight are more significant than they seem.  Now, as they move toward one banner with four globally connected Jihadist groups holding territory (Taliban, Boko Haram, IS, al Shabaab) the threat will extrapolate.

Consider the ten thousand fighters from Western Europe living in democratic societies whose beliefs caused them to heed the call to battle once IS declared the Caliphate and gave them and accessible place to live out their belief.  Success is a great propaganda and recruiting tool.  Every new place they can paint the black flag of Jihad on the map, more will rally to their banner.