Wisdom of Senate Rejection of C.T.B.T. Confirmed as ‘Alternative to Testing’ Runs into Technical, Political Trouble

(Washington, D.C.): A hardy perennial of the sales job for President Clinton’s
Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has been that the complex and aging U.S. deterrent could be maintained
indefinitely without further nuclear testing, thanks to the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP).
Fortunately, the United States Senate — which takes the responsibility of assuring the continuing
effectiveness, safety and reliability of America’s nuclear forces more seriously than the
Clinton-Gore team — saw this assertion for what it is: a complete fraud.

Now, even the fatuously pro-CTBT New York Times has had to confirm that the
centerpiece of
the SSP, the National Ignition Facility (NIF), has fallen into serious difficulty — so much so that
“its role as a leading justification for ban on nuclear tests” has been “undermined.”

A ‘Bird in the Bush’

Even before the recent revelations about huge cost-overruns, as-yet-unsurmounted technical
challenges and lengthy delays in the NIF’s availability, the Senate majority appreciated that the
Stockpile Stewardship Program remained a gleam in the eye. The National Ignition Facility and
other ambitious technology development initiatives — intended to permit the U.S. nuclear
weapons laboratories to perform vastly improved surveillance and diagnoses of the condition of
old nuclear “pits” and other weapons components — were many years and scores of billions of
dollars from realization.

Worse yet, even if the technology actually panned out and the requisite funding were
forthcoming, were the United States unable to assure itself that these new devices faithfully
simulated nuclear tests by conducting real detonations for calibration purposes, it would be
impossible to have the necessary, high confidence in the SSP and the judgments it would inform
about the status of the Nation’s nuclear arsenal.

These were among the reasons that fifty-one Senators voted in an extraordinary exercise of
political courage and legislative responsibility to reject a zero-yield test ban. As a result
of that
action, the United States is free to conduct the sort of periodic underground nuclear tests
that it will surely need in the future — either to perform competent “stockpile
stewardship” in
the absence of the high-technology capabilities of the SSP and/or to conduct the calibration shots
required to bring those capabilities on-line.

The NIF is in Trouble

According to a report published in the Times on 21 December, the National
Ignition Facility has
suffered a number of setbacks since August. The NIF would use powerful lasers to simulate
conditions that are similar to those found during a nuclear explosion. Despite repeated, highly
publicized representations by Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson to the effect that the NIF was
on-budget and on-time, ¹ it has actually experienced to date
a cost overrun of SSP of at least
$400 million and is many months behind schedule.

The New York Times quotes the leader of the Department of Energy’s review
team for the NIF
project, Dr. John McTague, as saying that the majority of the problems associated with the cost
overruns and other difficulties stem from the fact that the DoE vastly underestimated the
technical hurdles necessary to complete the Facility. This view was seconded by the private,
anti-nuclear Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), whose spokesman told the
Times:
“Difficulties in producing the laser’s optics and fuel pellets…could prevent it from
ever
operating properly.” (Emphasis added).

NIF’s Other Problem – CTBT Radicals

The NRDC is but one of the partisans of radical arms control that have not only pushed for
the
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The more zealous of these activists argue
that the CTBT’s absolutist prohibition on testing should prevent the construction of the NIF and
other SSP components. The goal of unilateral U.S. nuclear disarmament would certainly be
advanced by such an interpretation, as the Nation would thereby be denied any hope
of assuring
the continuing effectiveness of its deterrent arsenal.

Citing the Clinton-Gore Administration’s post-vote contention that the United States
remains
bound by the CTBT — notwithstanding its rejection by the Senate, Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA)
argued in a late October letter to Secretary Richardson that the National Ignition Facility could
violate the zero-yield test ban. Sen. Harkin wrote: “It is troubling that we are planning to ignite
thermonuclear explosions at the NIF that may violate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty’s ban
on nuclear explosions.” It is predictable that the Senator and his allies like the NRDC will
happily seize upon any pretext — let alone the NIF’s present, serious problems — eventually to
prevent the Stockpile Stewardship Program from coming to fruition.

Sen. Harkin’s assertion only serves to reinforce the point that President Clinton stance on the
current status of the CTBT with respect to the United States threatens one of the most important
provisions of the Constitution — the Senate’s co-equal role in the making of treaties. If the
President can disregard the Senate’s decision that a treaty is not acceptable and continue to
subordinate American defenses and policies to the strictures of a repudiated accord, he is clearly
contravening the plain meaning and intention of the Framers’ Article II.

The Bottom Line

The technical, financial and political troubles currently plaguing the NIF are not the only
reason
for skepticism about the CTBT proponents’ appeal that they be trusted to assure the future
viability of the nuclear deterrent in a permanent no-test environment. Such difficulties
nonetheless helpfully showcase the Senate’s wisdom in rejecting that treaty, while further
rebutting preposterous claims by its champions that partisanship and isolationism — rather than
legitimate concerns about the CTBT’s myriad flaws — led to that salutary outcome. Under these
and foreseeable circumstances, the United States must preserve and exercise its right
to conduct
periodic underground nuclear tests.

¹ Questions about the competence of Richardson’s own stewardship
at the Department of
Energy have been raised by his indignant assertion that he was blindsided by program managers
who misled him about the actual status of the NIF program. It must be asked: What else is the
Secretary of Energy unaware of about the SSP — or for that matter the rest of his portfolio? And
what other representations is he making that will prove equally misleading, if not actually false?