Assad’s Syria is No Reliable ‘Partner for Peace’

(Washington, D.C.): The Clinton Administration has made clear that, as soon as the Israeli
election process is finished, its campaign will resume to induce the Jewish State to make territorial
concessions on the Golan Heights in order to secure a “peace” agreement with Hafez Assad. 1
Mr. Clinton and his subordinates have made no effort to conceal their hope that Ehud
Barak, a
man reportedly disposed to take such steps, will be elected the next prime minister of Israel.
Indeed, they have repeatedly intervened in the internal affairs of a democratic ally to assure that
outcome. 2 Whether the Administration’s wish is realized or
not, the time has come for a fresh
assessment of whether Assad’s Syria can be considered a worthy, not to say reliable,
“partner for peace.” On the basis of the available evidence, the answer must be “No.”

Consider a few of Assad’s alarming activities that belie any contention that he is now
committed
to peace with Israel and a constructive regional role:

Syrian Preparations for War

As the Zionist Organization of America noted in a press release issued yesterday3:

The Middle East Newsline, a news service run by Israeli and Palestinian Arab
journalists, reported
on 3 May 1999, that [Syria is building a nationwide network of] tunnels to hide and
protect
its Scud ballistic missile force]…with the assistance of North Korea, which has its own
network
of tunnels to hide its missiles and nuclear weapons development.

So far, Syria has completed the construction of five tunnels to conceal Scud C
missiles, with a
range of 500 kilometers, Middle East Newsline reported. “This would put Syrian
missiles in
striking distance of virtually any target in Israel.” An additional nine tunnels are under
construction, to house Syria’s entire stock of 1,000 Scud C missiles.

[Furthermore,] Damascus, with the help of North Korea, is developing the Scud D missile,
with a
projected range of more than 700 kilometers. Syria also has produced non-conventional
warheads for its missile arsenal. These include warheads filled with the nerve agent, Sarin.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Unfortunately, Sarin is not the only weapon of mass destruction Syria has
acquired. Assad is
believed to have a thriving chemical weapons program that, with the help of the Russians, has the
ability to disperse VX nerve gas from aircraft as well as surface-to-surface missiles.

Syria has not only the capability indigenously to produce VX and Sarin. It probably has a
biological weapons capability, as well. And it can certainly independently manufacture and/or
augment the range of its Scud missile force of some 600 ballistic missiles and at least 60
transporter erectors launchers (TELs), affording Assad the means to strike Tel Aviv, Beirut and
Amman.

Abetting Hizbollah

Iran is the primary patron of the Islamic terrorist group Hizbollah operating in southern
Lebanon.
Iranian clerics and Revolutionary Guards played a key role in creating Hizbollah in 1982. Like
Hizbollah, Iran has consistently called for Israel’s destruction, an end to Middle East peace talks
and the purging of Western influence from the region. Despite recent cutbacks in Iranian aid to
Hizbollah, Iran still provides about $300 million annually to underwrite Hizbollah activities, and it
arms and trains Hizbollah through its Revolutionary Guard contingent in Lebanon.

Syria’s support for Hizbollah is less obvious, but still material. It maintains
about 35,000
troops in Lebanon. These forces serve to protect Hizbollah’s base of operations; they also allow
the Islamic extremists to operate in Syrian-controlled territory, notably the Bekaa Valley. In
addition, Damascus has clearly tolerated, if not actually instigated, attacks by Hizbollah against
Israel’s forces, southern Lebanese allies and communities. Syria also allows Iran to use Syrian
territory and facilities, such as the Damascus airport, to provide arms to Hizbollah.

Destabilizing Regional Activities

Despite Assad’s decision to expel the leader of the terrorist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK),
Abdullah Ocalan — in the face of overt warnings from Turkey of hostilities if he did not do so —
Syria continues to antagonize Turkey by covertly supporting the PKK. [Add
here?]

In addition, Hafez Assad has recently taken several ominous steps toward collaboration with
his
long-time enemy, Saddam Hussein. As the ZOA reported yesterday:

The Times of London, quoting Middle East intelligence sources, reported on 8
March 1999 that
Syria has agreed to provide Iraq with 60 million worth of military equipment,
including
“spares for anti-aircraft facilities hit by recent American and British bombing, lorries, aircraft and
helicopters, and ammunition.” The report noted that “Since the 1991 Gulf War, President
Saddam Hussein has faced a severe shortage of spare parts for his army because of the
international arms embargo.” Under the Damascus agreement [with Iraq], Syrian spare
parts
for military equipment would be converted for use by the Iraqi Army. The parts would
include engines for Russian-made tanks and tracks for armored fighting vehicles. (Emphasis
added.)

Garrotting Lebanon

Syria’s continuing occupation of Lebanon has contributed to the latter’s economic decline, a
situation evident in the steady attrition of the country’s human and capital assets. In the absence
of any sustained international pressure, Syria has paid no price for breaching its November, 1989
pledge made at Taif, Saudi Arabia to withdraw its forces from most of Lebanon and limit its
deployment in that country to the Bekaa Valley.

Far from bringing much desired stability and prosperity — the reasons the Syrians cite to
justify
their continued occupation, Lebanon under de facto Syrian rule has been afflicted
with human
rights abuses, political intrigue, economic exploitation, violence in the south, drug-trafficking and
the continued usage of Lebanon as a haven for international terrorism. Since this arrangement
serves Assad’s strategic interests, there is no basis for believing that he will agree to
relinquish Lebanon even if he secures from Israel the Golan Heights as part of what will be
presented as a “peace agreement” between Syria and the Jewish State.

The Bottom Line

The Syrian government of Hafez Assad remains not only a totalitarian menace to its own
people
but a threat to any hope that Israel, Lebanon and Jordan might harbor for peace, political freedom
and economic opportunity. Irrespective of the outcome of the incipient Israeli election, the
United States must come to grips with the reality that the Syrian dictator is not now and
can
never be a constructive and reliable force for peace in region. Rather than concentrating
on
ways to weaken Israel’s ability to protect itself against his abiding malevolence, the U.S.
government should be seeking ways to undermine Assad’s regime, freeing Lebanon and
safeguarding Syria’s neighbors from the multifaceted threat that regime will pose as long as
it lingers on.

In particular, the United States should do everything it can to ensure that Hizbollah is not
“legitimized” in Lebanon. Only this country has the resources, both human and technological,
needed to monitor and counter the international terrorist cells Hizbollah is building beyond
Lebanon as a hedge against a future in which that country may no longer be available as a base
from which to launch attacks against Israel and its friends. The United States should make use of
all such assets to stymie Hizbollah’s efforts to “go global.” And it must insist that Syria move
against Hizbollah in conjunction with Lebanese forces as a first step toward, at last, its withdrawal
from Lebanon and as a precondition to any Syrian rapprochement with Washington.

¹ In a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations on 22 April 1999,
Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern Affairs Martin Indyk made the following statement:

After the Israeli elections, the timing may also be propitious for a new effort to
achieve a
final status agreement on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks. There have been no direct
negotiations in 3 years; when there were negotiations, progress was made but significant gaps
remained, particularly in the all-important area of security arrangements. If the parties
are
willing to match our effort, we are prepared to make peace between Israel and Syria a high
priority in our Middle East diplomacy. This is not only because of our commitment to a
comprehensive peace. It is also because an Israel-Syria peace agreement would have important
regional benefits: a secure Israeli-Lebanese border; the ending of the Arab-Israeli conflict; the
isolation of those parties that continue to reject peace and reconciliation; and the easing of
pressure against normalization of relations between the Arab world and Israel.

² See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled
Is The Clinton Administration Really Pro-Israel —
Or Merely Pro-Labor? (No. 99-D 49, 27 April
1999).

³ See the Zionist Organization of America web site (www.zoa.org).