Mission Impossible: The Case Against A U.S. Deployment On The Golan Heights

A Precis

The Center for Security Policy will shortly release a major new study of the strategic, military,
diplomatic and political implications of a U.S. deployment on the Golan Heights. Such a
deployment is now under active consideration as an element of a peace agreement between Israel
and Syria that would result in Israel’s surrender of part or all of the Golan to the Syrians. There is
reason to believe that the Clinton Administration is desperate to complete such a deal before the
November elections.

The study, entitled Mission Impossible: The Case Against a U.S. Deployment on the Golan
Heights, reflects the analysis of a number of prominent American foreign and defense experts,
former policy-makers and retired military officers. It weighs the putative benefits against the
myriad costs associated with a United States deployment on the Golan from an American
perspective, albeit one shaped by a shared commitment to a strong U.S.-Israeli relationship.

Among the principal findings contained in the draft study now undergoing final editorial review
are the following:

• American troops on the Golan Heights would be at considerable risk, even if they do not
  get caught in the middle of a future Israeli-Syrian conflict. Terrorist organizations
  operating from Syria and Syrian-controlled Lebanon have demonstrated a willingness to attack,
  torture and kill U.S. military personnel when presented with the opportunity to do so. If, as is
  expected, Syria repopulates the Golan following its return, as many as 200,000 potentially
  hostile civilians may provide cover and support for such terrorist operations.
• In a number of respects, the U.S. deployment on the Golan Heights now being
  contemplated bears no resemblance to the American involvement with the Multilateral
  Force and Observers (MFO) based in the Sinai as part of the Egyptian-Israeli peace
  treaty. Whereas Americans in the Sinai are far removed from any populated areas, situated
  well away from any likely lines of attack and responsible for doing nothing more than
  monitoring compliance with the agreement, those deployed on the Golan would find
  themselves directly in harm’s way, particularly if they were to assume responsibility for
  providing early warning, deterrence or defensive capabilities for Israel.
• Under present and foreseeable circumstances, the United States is unlikely to have the
  option of trying to mitigate the threat to its personnel on the Golan by making the
  deployed contingent a large and heavily armed one. Were the U.S., for example, to
  commit an armored or mechanized brigade to this task, it would effectively be tying up three
  times as large a force — a full division (due to rotation, training and other requirements). Since
  the American force structure contemplated by the Clinton Administration’s “Bottom-Up
  Review” envisions only having 10 active-duty divisions in the entire inventory, it is unlikely
  that such a commitment could be made. And even if it were, the Administration has made it
  clear that it may not be sustained in the event crises elsewhere required the use of troops
  assigned to peacekeeping or other “smaller scale” operations like this one.
• Alternatively, the United States might find itself facing an open-ended commitment to a
  deployment — the sort of undertaking the American public has exhibited less and less
  willingness to undertake. Any appetite for doing so in this case will, moreover, almost
  certainly evaporate should casualties be taken.
• Deploying U.S. forces on the Golan Heights would link the United States tightly to local
  Israeli actions in a way that would not serve either countries interests. Both the United
  States and Israel benefit from Israel’s freedom of action — Israel’s ability as a local power to
  act boldly and swiftly against regional threats, as it did when it struck Iraq’s nuclear weapons
  facilities in 1981 and its continual disruption of international terrorist bases in Lebanon. The
  United States benefits from these moves, but it benefits also from not bearing responsibility for
  Israel’s independent decision to make them. If Israeli action will endanger U.S. forces
  stationed on the Golan, however, Israel will necessarily have to draw the United States into
  action decisions that Washington would be better off not entering. It is unwise for the United
  States to transform a strong ally capable of defending itself and taking independent action in
  our mutual interest into a vulnerable dependent.
• Making the United States a full party to or guarantor of an Israeli-Syrian agreement will
  almost certainly oblige Washington to “wipe the slate clean” on Syria’s ongoing
  misconduct. This includes its involvement in international terrorism, drug trafficking,
  strategic cooperation with the Islamic revolutionary government of Iran, acquiring
  weaponry of mass destruction, counterfeiting U.S. currency, etc. Doing so would
  unavoidably compromise the claims and grievances of American citizens against Damascus.
• A U.S. deployment on the Golan could also cause real harm to the important American-Israeli relationship. If the United States is obliged to play the role of neutral or “honest
  broker,” it may find it difficult — if not impossible — to perform its traditional role of Israel’s
  principal international supporter. Such considerations could impinge significantly upon U.S.
  willingness to share intelligence with Israel, its readiness to allow Israeli pre-emptive action in
  the event a new threat from Syria emerges and its commitment to resupply Israel in the event
  of hostilities.

In short, the Center for Security Policy believes that there are sufficient grounds for concern
about any U.S. deployment on the Golan Heights to demand careful congressional review and
prior approval of this initiative before any formal American commitment is made to
undertake it. This study demonstrates that the problems with such a deployment can usefully be
considered analytically — even in the absence of specific details concerning the exact size,
armaments and disposition of the U.S. contingent. If such consideration is postponed until after a
peace agreement featuring such a deployment is announced, it is, as a practical matter, too late for
Congress to become involved. Unless it relishes the prospect of another, and far more
strategically portentous, consultation-after-the-fact such as it has been treated to on Haiti, the
Congress must initiate immediate hearings on the wisdom of deploying American forces on the
Golan Heights.