THE IRAQ SYNDROME: BUSH ADMINISTRATION IGNORES, FACILITATES SYRIAN ARMS BUILD-UP
(Washington, D.C.): Amidst
expectations that Syrian-Israeli
negotiations may soon produce a separate
peace in one of the Middle East’s most
deadly confrontations — expectations
heightened by official leaks and news
reports — a sharply discordant and
alarming note is being sounded: Damascus
appears simultaneously to be preparing
for a new and far more lethal war with
Israel.
The role of the Bush Administration in
ignoring — if not, in some respects,
actually facilitating — Syria’s
efforts to acquire vast quantities of
advanced conventional weaponry and
weapons of mass destruction technology is
eerily reminiscent of its admittedly
failed policy toward Saddam Hussein’s
Iraq prior to the invasion of Kuwait. The
Center for Security Policy believes that
a “sanity check” concerning
U.S. policy is in order concerning: the
extent and character of Syrian
arms-related activities; what those
activities suggest about the true
intentions of the Syrian despot, Hafez
Assad; and the possibility that the
consequences of a possible repetition
towards Syria of the Bush
Administration’s “Iraq
syndrome” could have even more
disastrous consequences this time around.
What is Syria Up To?
Many Middle East analysts have noted
Syria’s failure in recent years —
despite its seemingly unlimited access to
then-Soviet arms exports — to achieve
military parity with Israel. Recent
developments suggest that Assad has not
given up on the realization of that goal.
Indeed, in some respects, he may be
closer than ever to achieving functional
equivalence with the Jewish state, at
least with respect to weapons of mass
destruction. Consider the following:
- Shortly before the Middle East
peace talks resumed in Washington
last month, the Syrian
regime tested a Scud-C missile
that it had purchased from North
Korea shortly after the Gulf war.
At least two shipments of Scud-Cs
are known to have been received
by Syria in early and late 1991.
There have also been reports of a
third delivery in late 1991. The
Bush Administration initially
signalled a determination to
interfere with one of these North
Korean shipments before it
reached its Iranian transshipment
point in October 1991. In the
end, the Administration decided
to pull its punch, permitting the
missile-bearing freighter to
elude U.S. naval patrols. - Missiles of this type can be
fitted with chemical warheads and
offer far greater accuracy and
range (roughly 400 miles) than
the older Scuds already in
Syria’s arsenal. In Syrian hands,
such Scud-Cs can pose a credible
threat to the entirety of Israel
— and much of Saudi Arabia.
There is a certain irony to the
latter nation’s new
vulnerability: The $500 million
Damascus paid Pyongyang for these
missiles is believed to have come
out of the approximately $2
billion Assad received at
Washington’s urging from the
Saudis as a reward for
Syria’s decision to join the
anti-Iraq coalition. - There are also indications that Syria
intends to develop its own
ballistic missile production
capability. Intelligence
reports suggest that Damascus is
importing, presumably from North
Korea, manufacturing equipment
associated with liquid-fueled
missiles like the Scud-C. It may
also be acquiring — possibly
from China — similar equipment
needed indigenously to produce
solid-fueled missiles like the
Chinese M-9. (The latter
transaction, if confirmed, would
be a serious breach of Beijing’s
commitment not to sell such
missiles or related technology
overseas in accordance with the
terms of the Missile Technology
Control Regime.) - Syria is judged already to have
established the capability to
produce and fill chemical
warheads that could be used on
such missiles. Experts believe
that Damascus may also have the
capacity to manufacture and
employ biological weapons. Assad
is, as a result, in the process
of becoming ever less reliant
upon foreign sources for such
weapons of mass destruction. In
doing so, he is evidently taking
a page out the playbook used by
Iraq and other developing nations
bent on establishing independence
not only of supply but of action. - Syria also utilized much of its
remaining stipend for
“services rendered” in
the Gulf campaign for a massive
conventional weapons shopping
spree. This has included: some
600 T-72 tanks from
Czechoslovakia; negotiations with
India for both T-72s and MIG-29s;
and new contracts with Russia
worth hundreds of millions of
dollars for T-72 and T-64 main
battle tanks, MIG-29 fighters,
early warning radars, command and
control systems, and SAM-11, -13,
and -16 surface-to-air missiles.
Syria Plans To “Go
Nuclear”
Still more alarming are the recent
indications that Syria appears to be
seriously committed to developing a
nuclear weapons program. In November
1991, Syria signed an agreement with
China to purchase a 30-kilowatt nuclear
reactor, ostensibly for research
purposes. The International Atomic Energy
Agency initially opposed the deal out of
concern over its proliferation
implications. The IAEA relented, however,
on 25 February 1992 when Syria signed a
full-scope safeguard agreement, allowing
international monitors inspection rights
at all Syria’s nuclear sites. Three days
later, Beijing filed a statement with the
IAEA formally notifying it of China’s
intention to deliver a small neutron
source reactor and a small quantity of
enriched uranium to Syria.
To date, the IAEA has not been
provided a list of Syrian nuclear sites,
raising several issues: If the Chinese
delivery has already been accomplished,
Syria is required to provide the site
information to the IAEA immediately,
giving inspectors the right to visit it
at once. The failure by Syria to provide
such site information — if it has
received the reactor — would constitute
a serious violation of the IAEA
safeguards agreement.
The Bush Administration has evinced
little of the concern one would expect at
the prospect of yet another
Middle Eastern dictatorship seeking so
dangerous a technology. Even though its
own Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
stated in a September 1991 report that
Syria is developing a “nuclear
program with suspicious intentions”
and even though Syria has no need for a
nuclear power program, the Administration
seems approximately as unconcerned as it
previously was when Saddam Hussein was
amassing the wherewithal to develop
atomic and thermonuclear weapons.
In fact, an unnamed U.S. official a
few months ago pooh-poohed the
Syrian-Chinese program, telling the California
B’nai B’rith Messenger in January
1992, “It’s not a weapons type
technology; it’s not something that
raises concerns.” This statement
ignores a reality well understood by
nuclear proliferation experts: a common
first step in building a nuclear weapons
program is to develop expertise through
acquisition and operation of
“research” reactors.
Official U.S. insouciance about the
Syrian nuclear program also ignores two
other worrisome bits of evidence: First,
a joint Syrian-Iranian working committee
on nuclear weapons development and
strategy was reportedly established in
January 1992. Second, according to the 17
August 1992 edition of the respected
Paris-based Middle East Defense News
(MedNews) Syria’s advanced
weaponry research agency (Centre
d’Etudes des Recherches Scientifiques)
purchased numerous German “hot
isostatic presses and high temperature
ovens which are of use in producing solid
rocket fuel and in manipulating nuclear
weapons material.”
The Bush Administration —
Part of the Problem?
In addition to helping Assad secure
funds with which to carry out his
arms-buying binge and
looking-the-other-way on its alarming
nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction aspects, the Bush
Administration has taken more direct
steps in support of the Syrian build-up.
For example, in February 1992, over
opposition from subcommittee chairmen and
other ranking members of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, the
Administration loosened the restrictions
on two categories of “dual-use”
technology exports to the Syrians.
Historically, these technologies —
which can be utilized for either
commercial or military purposes — have
been very tightly controlled when
countries on the terrorism list or others
deemed to have hostile intentions towards
U.S. allies are involved, lest they be
used in acts of violence or aggression
against American citizens, friends or
interests. In particular, there has
heretofore always been a presumption
of denial when it came to Syria; it
was, after all, correctly assumed that no
matter what the stated application for
the controlled technology was supposed to
be, the ultimate end-user for such
dual-use items would inevitably be the
Syrian military. The Bush Administration,
however, chose to abandon this assumption
in favor of conducting a
“case-by-case” review of
applications in two categories of
dual-use technology.
The Administration has made no secret
of the fact that this ominous policy
shift — like so many other dubious
initiatives involving Syrian arms, drug
and terrorist activities
— was a reward paid to Syria for its
“cooperation” in the Gulf war,
for its “help” in freeing
American hostages held in Lebanon, and
for its “constructive role” in
the Middle East peace process. This is
evident, for instance, in a letter to
Rep. Dante Fascell (D-FL), chairman of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, sent
in response to legislation that would
have limited the Administration’s
discretion in approving dual-use exports
to countries like Syria. On 3 February
1992, then-Acting Secretary of Commerce
Rockwell Schnabel opposed placing
limitations on exports to Syria and Iran
contending that:
“…In light of [Bush]
Administration efforts to promote
a Middle East peace process as
well as an end to the hostage
crisis…now is not the time to
introduce unnecessary export
restrictions against states that
are central to these
efforts.”
More Commerce Department
Shenanigans?
In the face
of continuing congressional criticism
over such a dangerous loosening of
restrictions governing the transfer of
technology to Syria, Administration
officials have simply dissembled. For
instance, Commerce Deputy Assistant
Secretary James LeMunyon did so in
responding to accusations that he and his
colleagues were simply repeating with
respect to Syria the mistakes they
earlier made toward Iraq. In testimony
before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee in July 1992, LeMunyon stated
that “most” applications to
both Syria and Iran were still routinely
refused.
In fact, the Commerce Department’s own
data with respect to Syrian licenses
suggests that this statement is, at best,
misleading. At worst, it
represents the same sort of willful
misrepresentation to Congress perpetrated
previously by LeMunyon’s organization
regarding licensing of dual-use
technology to Iraq. During the
present fiscal year to date, out of a
total of 74 applications for licenses of
dual-use technology to Syria, many
more have been approved (thirteen) than
have been rejected (three).
Importantly, the preponderance
(fifty-eight) are still pending. Since 1
October 1985, moreover, some 511 export
license applications for Syria valued at
some $198 million were received by the
Commerce Department; of these 259 have
been approved. Only 10 percent of them
were rejected and the balance are still
pending.
Given present Administration policy,
it seems reasonable to expect that most
of those will also be approved.
Incredible as it may seem, among the
pending license applications are:
“equipment for production of
chemical weapons precursors,”
“items on the International
Munitions list” and
“commodities on the International
Atomic Energy list.” Even more
sobering is the reality that — thanks to
the Bush Administration’s benighted
efforts to decontrol many sensitive
dual-use technologies — no licenses are
required for their export to Syria.
Consequently, it is most problematic to
establish precisely what strategic items
are now in the hands of the Syrian
military.
Has the U.S. Government
Once More Approved Nuclear
Weapons-related Exports?
It is also noteworthy that a large
percentage of those licenses that have
been approved involve sales to Syria
of equipment to be used for oil-field
exploration and logging operations. While
the shipment of these highly advanced
technologies has been critical to
developing Syria’s oil production
potential, the technology at issue is
considered also to have potential utility
for Syria’s incipient nuclear weapons
program.
According to a Simon Wiesenthal Center
Special Report published with MedNews
this year entitled, Weapons of Mass
Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria,
and Libya:
“The equipment used to
detect underground oil deposits
and carry out seismic analysis
has direct application to nuclear
weapons research and development.
Indeed, the Syrian engineers who
handle such research for the
major oil-welling and logging
companies are almost exclusively
nuclear physicists. High power
neutron generators, with a
similar design to those used to
trigger a nuclear explosion, are
used in oil exploration….”
Needless to say, the U.S. decision to
change Syria’s access to dual-use
technology has a multiplied
effect insofar as it sends a
signal to other Western nations that
Damascus enjoys Washington’s equivalent
of the “Good Housekeeping Seal of
Approval.” Unfortunately, even in
the absence of such encouragement,
several of these nations — notably
Germany and France — have been all too
willing to do business with Middle
Eastern terrorist nations. The American
signal can only serve to expand and
accelerate such recklessly shortsighted
transactions.
The Bottom
Line
Far from its avowed purpose of
preventing an arms race in the Middle
East, the Bush Administration seems to be
encouraging — and in some ways abetting
— a qualitative and quantitative
military build-up in the region. The fact
that the principal beneficiary of that
build-up is Syria, a nation that sponsors
international terrorism and remains
firmly in the grip of a dictatorial
regime known for its regional ambitions
and immutable commitment to the
destruction of the state of Israel, is
all the more frightening.
Real or imagined progress in
the peace process is unlikely to alter
the likelihood that Hafez Assad’s Syria
will soon become a far greater threat to
U.S. allies and interests in the Middle
East than Saddam Hussein’s Iraq ever was.
This grim prospect adds further urgency
to the Center for Security Policy’s call
for immediate and full congressional
hearings into the Bush Administration’s
misguided and increasingly risky Syrian
appeasement policy.
– 30 –
1. See,
for example, the Center’s recent Decision
Briefs entitled “The
Syrian Connection: Bush’s Determination
To Befriend Assad Ignores Damascus’ Huge
Role As U.S. Enemy in Drug War (
August 1992); and “‘Getting
Away With Murder’: Bush-Baker Enable
Assad To Go On Sponsoring International
Terrorism,” (
August 1992).
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