What to Do About China

By James Webb
New York Times, 15 June 1998

For more than a decade many concerned observers have warned of the dangers in reaching a
one-sided rapprochement with China. Invariably, such trepidations have been minimized by
“pragmatic” political voices, or shouted down by business leaders who were seduced by China’s
vast potential market only to become hostages should our policies toward that country turn more
confrontational.

The past several years have seen an acceleration of this willing self- deception. The Clinton
Administration, buttressed by endorsements from former Republican officials, speaks wanly of a
strategic partnership with China. Our crucial alliance with Japan has been strained. Our position in
the rest of Asia is being undermined as we shift longstanding trade patterns away from countries
with strong preferences for the free market and democracy in favor of China.

Meanwhile the Chinese Government’s repression and blatant economic corruption have been
explained away as internal matters, particularly by American business. Its courting of Muslim
nations like Iran, Pakistan and Libya and attempts to penetrate the American political process
through campaign donations have been dismissed as presenting no long-term threat.

In the past few weeks the folly of this benign approach became evident with the emergence of
both India and Pakistan as nuclear powers. Our failure to censure China for its unremitting effort
to help Pakistan become a nuclear power has dramatically altered the strategic world order, and
the role the United States must play in it. The implications of world inaction in the face of China’s
audacity are of the utmost gravity, far beyond such matters as gang warfare in Somalia, petty
dictators in Haiti and even the irredentist bloodletting in the Balkans that have thus far sufficed as
foreign policy threats to this Administration.

The actions of the Chinese Government in this turn of events loom much larger than
Pakistan’s or
India’s. It would have been impossible for Pakistan to develop a nuclear capability without the
illicit aid of the Chinese. And while one can justly condemn India for having fired the first shot,
the reality of China and Pakistan combining forces in such a manner makes its actions
understandable if not commendable.

American Government and business leaders are thus left with the unavoidable truth that
China,
despite its constant protests to the contrary, can no longer claim to be a non-expansionist power.
And they must now prepare for the future consequences of that reality.

They can begin by putting American relationships with Japan, India, Israel and Russia on a
much
firmer footing. Along with the United States, these four countries possess the key ingredients of
geography, military and economic power, and technological superiority to insure that China’s
future conduct conforms to international norms.

First, Japan. Despite continual bickering over trade policy and its recent economic problems,
Japan remains our single most important bilateral relationship. At the same time, Japan to date
accounts for nearly 10 percent of direct investment in the Chinese economy, and 30 percent of
China’s external borrowing. Through its power to reorient these activities, Japan has the standing
to influence China’s economic and military conduct, particularly with American backing. As
relations with China enter a new phase, we should work to strengthen this most important of
alliances.

Second, Israel. It stands to lose greatly through the strategic axis China is developing with the
Muslim world. The first foreign official to visit Pakistan after its detonation of nuclear devices
was Iran’s Foreign Minister, Kamal Kharrazi, who proclaimed that “Muslims now feel more
confident that Pakistan’s nuclear capability would play a role of deterrence to Israel’s.” Though
he later played down this statement, the world must consider it in the context of Iran’s attempt to
develop nuclear weapons of its own, also with Chinese — and Russian — assistance. The United
States and Israel must keep the rest of the world focused on this, and should not rule out
pre-emptive military strikes if there is evidence that Iran is building a weapon.

Third, Russia. Its assistance to Iran and even to China seems based on its own economic need
in
the absence of a national strategy, as opposed to China’s conscious designs. With respect to these
two nations American foreign policy has reached a true historic paradox. Having brought the
Soviet Union to its knees, we watched Russia struggle with democracy at the same time we were
flooding nondemocratic China with an excess balance of trade. As a result China now is rich
enough to short-cut its rise as a superpower by buying Russian hardware and technical assistance
off the shelf.

A principal goal of American foreign policy should be to offer Russia incentives to cease
providing China and other nations with such capabilities. Russia itself should need little coaxing.
The Soviet Union developed a strategic alliance with India in the early 1970’s partly as a
counterpoint to then-evolving Chinese power. Russia has a history of immigration and boundary
disputes emanating from 2,600 miles of shared border with China, and remains at risk in its
sparsely populated and mineral-rich eastern territories.

Fourth, India. Its importance to our strategic interests deserves fresh scrutiny. Although
American
businesses have become India’s main trading partners, it has long been ignored by United States
policy makers. India, a democracy with a legal system based on English common law, has the
demographic makeup and geographical position to become an important ally, as well as a trading
partner on a much larger scale. Its population of nearly one billion represents a potential consumer
base almost as large as China’s.

Our past tensions with India can be understood in part by choices made during the cold war,
when
both India and Indonesia sought warmer relations with the former Soviet Union based on their
mutual fear of China’s move toward regional dominance. Although India signed a security treaty
with the Soviet Union in 1971, it did so when the Nixon Administration was vigorously pursuing
fresh relations with China. Nor should stronger relationships with India be interpreted by Pakistan
as a rejection of our interests in that country, any more than Pakistan’s closeness to China has
been viewed here as a rejection of the United States.

In addition to invigorating these relationships and holding on to its traditional base of
European
allies, the United States also must clean its own house in terms of technology transfers and
acquiescence in the face of irresponsible Chinese conduct.

Beyond doubt, China will object to such a refocusing of policy with accusations of an attempt
to
“contain” legitimate Chinese interests. But every expansionist power in this century has made
similar claims against those who have tried to quell their aggression. And it is China, through its
internal repression, encouragement of nuclear proliferation, and even the possible manipulation of
our political process that has made such efforts necessary.

James Webb was an Assistant Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy in the
Reagan
Administration.