Why the U.S. Can’t Promote Democracy in Burundi

On Tuesday, Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza’s party, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (NCDD-FDD), won 77 of 100 seats in the Burundian parliamentary election that was boycotted by most other parties and widely panned by international observers.  The presidential election will be held next week under the same circumstances.  When the NCDD-FDD announced that they would nominate Nkurunziza earlier this year, despite his ineligibility due to term limits, protests broke out. An initial crackdown was followed by a failed coup and an estimated 70 protester deaths.  Efforts by regional leaders and Western powers to promote democracy in Burundi have been tepid at best.

During his 10 years in office Pierre Nkurunziza had committed his country’s soldiers to the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to fight Al Shabaab.  With growing connectivity in the region between Islamist movements near and far from AQIM to Boko Haram being fueled by IS, al Shabaab networks have shown logistical presences and capability in most of the countries surrounding Burundi.

A large part of the calculation for a poor country to contribute its resources to an international counter terrorism effort is to increase positive relations with Western and regional powers.  During the Cold War, membership in NATO, then later membership in the EU, gave many countries an opportunity to create a niche in a community of Western capitalist democracies that helped free them from the sphere of Russian influence.  In the both military alliances for the wars in Iraq, participation by smaller countries provided opportunities to gain military experience in cooperation with the big boys.  Similar rules apply for U.N. missions generally.

Look directly to the north of Burundi and you will find one of the most beloved darlings of the West in the person of Rwandan President, Paul Kagame.  Kagame’s resume is insignificantly different from that of Nkurunziza if you subtract the support he has enjoyed from the U.S. in years past.  Go a bit farther to the North and you will find Uganda’s president Yoweri Museveni.  When Museveni is standing next to Kagame you have two things: First, you are looking at former U.N. ambassador and National Security Adviser Susan Rice’s favorite cocktail party buddies and second, you are looking two African leaders who have not been challenged significantly by the U.S. about unconstitutional third terms or human rights issues.  Rwanda’s support of the M23 rebels in Eastern Congo, for example, ran rampant and unchecked while Rice repressed the U.N. report on the connection.  After months, the State Department finally claimed that the threat of removing U.S. military aid to Rwanda helped achieve the peace, even though many Congolese citizens where killed while our U.N. ambassador gave Rwanda political cover.

Imagine that you are Nkurunziza.  Why would you not believe that you would enjoy the same passive approach, having been a faithful security partner in the fight against al Shabaab?

But there are other forces for democracy in Africa.  The recent coup in Burundi almost mimicked Burkina Faso’s election late last year.  At the hint that Blaise Compaore would run for another term after 27 years, protests broke out.  The Burkina military stepped in after riots and successfully installed an interim government that would later ban Compaore and associates from running for office.  Likewise Burundians see neighbors participating in the democratic process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whose citizens are signaling that they won’t accept an unconstitutional third term from DRC President Joseph Kabila.

There are two interests here for U.S. diplomacy: security and democracy.  One of the fatal flaws of the current administration’s foreign policy has been to create the appearance of impartiality when there truly is none.

The U.S. has different interest and different priorities for different countries.  If you want regional stability, you may have to sacrifice democracy.  This can be a trap because without the long term stabilizing effects of democracy, you can rapidly lose regional stability.  As things are playing out in Burundi, it appears that the Western powers talking about promoting democracy, while not actually taking steps to do so, helped tip the needle towards instability. Former Burundian general Leonard Ngendakumana has threatened an uprising and has already blamed Nkurunziza for the coming civil war.

During the one press conference that president Nkurunziza held in the wake of the failed coup in May he spoke of al Shabaab as a national security threat and said nothing of the recent coup attempt. The al Shabaab reference seemed out of place in light of the glaring domestic coup issue at hand. The mention could have been to reference an unspoken understanding among AMISOM participants, that U.S. counterterrorism partners would not be challenged on democracy.

A second fatal flaw of U.S. diplomacy in Africa is the inability to determine priorities and influence outcomes when trying to appear impartial (i.e. in Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan, Nigeria, and Libya). There were real questions about how the next leader of Burundi would impact regional security regarding Hutu/Tutsi relations and regional Islamist movements including the Allied Defense Forces from Uganda and al Shabaab.  The U.S. didn’t seem to realize they had a stake in knowing what to emphasize and who to support.  Had the U.S. marked Nkurunziza as an established security partner they would have a stronger position to promote democracy in the future and a stronger ally against al Shabaab now.

The same uncertainty in U.S. policy is playing out in neighboring D.R.C.  All are concerned that president Joseph Kabila will make a play to extend his rule.  Some Africa watchers believe the U.S. has cut a deal to accept him as another long-term ruler because he has made progress in securing the unstable eastern part of Congo that border Rwanda and Burundi.  Yet, John Kerry has pledged big dollars to promote democracy there, $35 million for the 2016 election to be precise.  However, there is little reason to believe that money will amount to diplomatic influence.  Ultimately, Kabila will do what he wants to.

The lesson for the U.S. in Africa is this.  The U.S. doesn’t seem to know who its friends are or what it wants in its long term relationships in Africa.  Meanwhile China, Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, Islamic State, al Shabaab, Boko Haram, and AQIM are all moving forward with fruitful relationships and clear interests on the ground in Africa.