Al-Shabaab and the Battle for Somalia

On June 8th, al-Shabaab fighters attacked a military base in Puntland, a semi-autonomous region in Somalia. The jihadist group claims to have killed 61 in the assault though Somali officials put the death toll at 38. Witnesses say that al-Shabaab beheaded civilians during the attack.

The attack comes on the heels of Somali authorities’ recent decision to sentence five al-Shabaab members to death. The men were arrested in April after being caught with explosives in Bosaso, a city in Puntland.

Al-Shabaab is an al-Qaeda-linked group that aims to overthrow the Somali government and impose Sharia Law. Its emir, Ahmad Umar, is the successor to Ahmed Abdi Godane, who was killed in 2014 by a U.S. air strike.

Translated to “the Youth” in Arabic,  al-Shabaab emerged out of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006 when Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia and drove out the ICU from Mogadishu. Designated as a U.S. foreign terrorist organization in 2008, al-Shabaab has an estimated 7,000-9,000 fighters and dominates numerous rural areas in Somalia.

Al-Shabaab also conducts attacks on neighboring countries including Uganda and Kenya. Its recent May attack in Kenya killed 8 people.

Part of the reason for al-Shabaab’s past success in Somalia relates to the country’s underdeveloped and corrupt state. Drought, famine, lack of education, economic decline, and government struggles are just some of the current issues facing the nation.

Al-Shabaab’s ability to issue monetary funds to the poor and offer high salaries to potential recruits also help it gain and maintain support.

The group raises funds through local and foreign sources. Locally, it imposes business protection fees, sells ivory, and trades commodities that are difficult to trace funds back to. Internationally, it receives funding from like-minded terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and other groups.

It has also been known to forcibly recruit children and/or provide clothing and shelter to the underprivileged youth for their loyalty. Somalia’s low school enrollment rates – roughly 40% – leave children further vulnerable to this recruitment.

Al-Shabaab vies with the Islamic State (IS) for influence in Somalia, though IS has not established a substantive of presence in the country. In April 2016, IS claimed its first terrorist attack in the region. Around the same time as the attack, it also released propaganda videos in hopes of recruiting al-Shabaab members. But this effort has had little success. Ahmad Umar deters IS recruitment with his continued vehement allegiance to al-Qaeda and warning that al-Shabaab deserters will be killed.

Though IS’s presence seems to be waning in the area, it recently claimed responsibility for the May 23 suicide bombing in Somalia suggesting that it is still in the battle against al-Shabaab for the country. It is logical that IS wants to continue pursuing Somalia. With its coastline that intersects popular shipping lanes, the country’s location is certainly convenient.

In the past few years, al-Shabaab has lost much of its Somali territories; however, it continues to fight the UN-backed government and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and still remains to be a potent presence in the country. As seen by the Thursday attacks, al-Shabaab retains the ability to mobilize and execute successful attacks.

After the June 8 rampage, recently elected President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed declared that Somalia’s army is in “hot pursuit” of al-Shabaab and will show the group “no mercy.” On numerous occasions, Mohamed has said he believes Somalia can conquer the Islamist group within two years.

To do so, Mohamed wants Somali troops to be better-equipped and urges the lifting of the UN’s arms embargo on Somalia that is set to last until November 2017. Even if the UN were to lift the embargo, Mohamed would still face challenges in halting al-Shabaab’s plan to establish Sharia and gain more territorial control in Somalia.

Though al-Shabaab’s loss of territory in the region points to its contraction, its organizational structure allows it to maintain a steady presence. Al-Shabaab is decentralized meaning there are many networks existent within the group that function to some extent independently. With this structure, it can easily adapt and function to volatility, making it a difficult target to eliminate.