C.T.B.T. Truth or Consequences #5: Opposition to a Zero-Yield, Permanent Test Ban’s is Rooted in Substance, Not Politics

(Washington, D.C.): Advocates for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) have
recently
engaged in a form of political contortionism that would impress Houdini. Having insisted on the
Senate’s immediate consideration of this accord in time for a CTBT review conference held last
week in Vienna, they were initially surprised, then seemingly pleased when Senate Republicans
agreed two weeks ago to a fixed period for debate and a near-term vote. Accordingly,
every
single Democratic Senator and those relatively few Republicans who have declared their support
for the CTBT agreed — obviously with the Clinton White House’s blessing — to a “unanimous
consent” agreement designed to do just that. In other words, when they thought they had
(or
could get) the necessary votes, the CTBT’s proponents were quite content with this arrangement.

As it became clear that the treaty’s opponents had easily the 34 votes needed to defeat
President
Clinton’s permanent, zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban, however, the Administration and its
allies began to complain that the arrangement they had agreed to was no longer satisfactory.
Suddenly, they claimed the CTBT was in danger of falling victim to “partisan politics” and that
only by delaying the vote would that accord receive the deliberate consideration due it.

Unfortunately for the pro-CTBT contortionists, the announcement on 7 October by Senator
Richard Lugar (R-IN) of his adamant opposition to the present Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
makes such arguments untenable. Sen. Lugar is, after all, a man with a record of unwavering
support for arms control and unfailing willingness to pursue bipartisan approaches to foreign
policy issues. His closely reasoned and well-researched grounds for his declared intention to
vote against this CTBT makes it clear that he and other like-minded Senators will do so for
legitimate, substantive reasons.

Reduced to its essence, Sen. Lugar’s critique — which is likely to prove highly influential
with
other centrist Senators — reads as follows:

“The goal of the CTBT is to ban all nuclear explosions worldwide: I do not believe
it can
succeed. I have little confidence that the verification and enforcement provisions will
dissuade other nations from nuclear testing. Furthermore, I am concerned about our
country’s ability to maintain the integrity and safety of our own nuclear arsenal under the
conditions of the treaty.

“…While affirming our desire for international peace and stability, the U.S. Senate is charged
with the constitutional responsibility of making hard judgments about the likely outcomes of
treaties. This requires that we examine the treaties in close detail and calculate the consequences
of ratification for the present and the future. Viewed in this context, I cannot support the treaty’s
ratification.”

Highlights of Senator Lugar’s critique should be required reading for Senators and their
constituents alike:

• Bad Arms Control: “I do not believe that the CTBT is of the same
  caliber as the arms
  control treaties that have come before the Senate in recent decades. Its usefulness to the goal
  of non-proliferation is highly questionable. Its likely ineffectuality will risk undermining
  support and confidence in the concept of multi-lateral arms control. Even as a symbolic
  statement of our desire for a safer world, it is problematic because it would exacerbate risks
  and uncertainties related to the safety of our nuclear stockpile.”

• No Safety Net on the SSP: “At present our nuclear capability provides a
  deterrent that is
  crucial to the safety of the American people and is relied upon as a safety umbrella by most
  countries around the world. One of the most critical issues under the CTBT would be that of
  ensuring the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile without testing. The safe
  maintenance and storage of these weapons is a crucial concern. We cannot allow them to fall
  into disrepair or permit their safety to be called into question.

“…Unfortunately, the jury is still out on the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The last
nine
years have seen improvements, but the bottom line is that the Senate is being asked to trust the
security of our country to a program that is unproven and unlikely to be fully operational until
perhaps 2010.

“…The Congressional Research Service reported last year that: ‘A problem with one warhead
type can affect hundreds of thousands of individually deployed warheads; with only 9 types of
warheads expected to be in the stockpile in 2000, compared to 30 in 1985, a single problem
could affect a large fraction of the U.S. nuclear force.’ If we are to put our faith in a program
other than testing to ensure the safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent and thus our
security, we must have complete faith in its efficacy. The Stockpile Stewardship
Program falls
well short of that standard.

“…I am concerned further by the fact that some of the weapons in our arsenal are not as safe
as
we could make them. Of the nine weapon designs currently in our arsenal, only one employs all
of the most modern safety and security measures. Our nuclear weapons laboratories are unable to
provide the American people with these protections because of the inability of the Stockpile
Stewardship Program to completely mimic testing.

“At present, I am not convinced the Stockpile Stewardship Program will permit our
experts to maintain a credible deterrent in the absence of testing. Without a complete,
effective, and proven Stockpile Stewardship program, the CTBT could erode our ability to
discover and fix problems with the nuclear stockpile and to make safety
improvements.“

• An Unverifiable CTBT: “The U.S. must be confident of its ability to
  detect cheating among
  member states. While the exact thresholds are classified, it is commonly understood that the
  United States cannot detect nuclear explosions below a few kilotons of yield. The Treaty’s
  verification regime, which includes an international monitoring system and on-site
  inspections, was designed to fill the gaps in our national technical means. Unfortunately, the
  CTBT’s verification regime will not be up to that task even if it is ever fully deployed.”

“The verification regime is further bedeviled by the lack of a common definition of a
nuclear
test. Russia believes hydro-nuclear activities and sub-critical experiments are permitted under the
treaty. The U.S. believes sub-critical experiments are permitted but hydro-nuclear tests are not.
Other states believe both are illegal. A common understanding or definition of what is and what
is not permitted under the treaty has not been established.”

“The CTBT’s verification regime seems to be the embodiment of everything the
United
States has been fighting against in the UNSCOM inspection process in Iraq. We have
rejected Iraq’s position of choosing and approving the national origin of inspectors. In addition,
the 50 square kilometer inspection-free zones could become analogous to the controversy over
the inspections of Iraqi presidential palaces. The UNSCOM experience is one that is best not
repeated under a CTBT.”

• Mission Impossible — Enforcement of the CTBT: “Even if the United
  States were
  successful in utilizing the laborious verification regime and non-compliance was detected, the
  Treaty is almost powerless to respond. This treaty simply has no teeth. Arms control
  advocates need to reflect on the possible damage to the concept of arms control if we embrace
  a treaty that comes to be perceived as ineffectual. Arms control based only on a
  symbolic
  purpose can breed cynicism in the process and undercut support for more substantive
  and proven arms control measures.

“The CTBT’s answer to illegal nuclear testing is the possible implementation of
sanctions. It
is clear that this will not prove particularly compelling in the decision-making processes of
foreign states intent on building nuclear weapons. For those countries seeking nuclear
weapons, the perceived benefits in international stature and deterrence generally far
outweigh the concern about sanctions that could be brought to bear by the international
community.”

• Fraudulent ‘Norm’: “I believe the enforcement mechanisms of the CTBT
  provide little
  reason for countries to forego nuclear testing. Some of my friends respond to this charge by
  pointing out that even if the enforcement provisions of the treaty are ineffective, the treaty
  will impose new international norms for behavior. In this case, we have observed that
  “norms” have not been persuasive for North Korea, Iraq, Iran, India and Pakistan, the very
  countries whose actions we seek to influence through a CTBT.

“If a country breaks the international norm embodied in the CTBT, that country has
already
broken the norm associated with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Countries other than the
recognized nuclear powers who attempt to test a weapon must first manufacture or obtain a
weapon, which would constitute a violation of the NPT. I fail to see how an additional
norm
will deter a motivated nation from developing nuclear weapons after violating the
long-standing norm of the NPT.”

The Bottom Line

The Clinton Administration’s transparent intent to use the CTBT as a political weapon
against its
critics makes Senator Lugar’s statesmanship and courage in opposing this treaty as a matter of
principle all the more commendable. Although the Indiana Senator has made clear his preference
not to vote on the CTBT in the coming days, the substantive case he has made against this accord
should be dispositive to his colleagues in deciding to reject the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty
now, rather than be subjected to endless political attacks until such time as the Treaty is
once
again placed on the Senate calendar.