Center For Security Policy Disagrees With Crowe

The Center for Security Policy very much regrets Admiral William J. Crowe’s apparent decision to become a spokesman for arms control measures and defense cuts that would — if adopted by the United States — have serious and adverse effects on U.S. and allied security.

In an interview published in this morning’s Washington Post, the recently retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff made several regrettable statements. To name but a few:

Admiral Crowe endorsed a wholly unverifiable and seriously disadvantageous ban on tactical nuclear arms at sea. As Admiral Crowe knows, even with extensive on-board inspections, the United States could have no confidence in the mutuality of such a ban.

The Soviet Union today has vast quantities of naval nuclear arms; the United States could never be certain that some portion of this inventory was not covertly deployed by the USSR. This situation is compounded by the fact that the Soviets would retain the ability to launch such weapons from myriad missile launchers and torpedo tubes that would remain even if a ban were agreed upon. What is more, the USSR would have abundant incentive to cheat since the high value targets that form the backbone of the U.S. Navy — especially its carriers — are particularly susceptible to nuclear attack (a point which Adm. Crowe recognizes).

Curiously, Admiral Crowe implicitly acknowledges that such an agreement is not inherently in the U.S. interest by rationalizing the coupling of American concessions in this area with "major" Soviet concessions in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. He also asserts that the ultimate safeguard in entering into such negotiations is that the United States can always say no if it does not get what it wants. Neither of these statements inspires confidence; there is little reason to believe that any of the foreseeable outcomes in START is going to be so advantageous to the United States as to justify entering into a seriously flawed accord on naval arms. What is more, if past experience is any guide, it is utterly implausible that this country would actually abandon a set of negotiations simply because its objectives were not satisfied.

In short, a naval nuclear arms agreement would not measurably alter the Soviets’ ability to use such weapons against American navies. It would, however, eliminate the United States’ in-kind deterrent to that sort of attack and set the stage for other, ill-advised negotiations on naval forces.

Crowe avers that the Soviet threat is "disappear[ing]." He asserts that "[the Soviets] couldn’t fight a conventional war" and that "the one thing they could still do today…is push the nuclear button."

In fact, the Soviet Union remains equipped with a formidable capability to engage in nuclear and conventional conflicts. Deployments and modernization continues apace throughout all areas of the Soviet armed forces. Admiral Crowe is obliged to try to explain this discrepancy by citing Soviet sources who maintain that "[the Soviets] have cut back on a lot of expenditures in a lot of places that it’s going to take us a long time to detect and to verify."

Admiral Crowe also neglects the political instabilities evident in Soviet society that may well lead to a dramatic turn of events in the USSR. The Soviet leadership could well undergo significant changes in the near future; with or without such changes, we may see an early return to a Soviet Union disposed to assert its power aggressively against the United States, U.S. allies and the countries of Eastern Europe. It is simply not prudent policy to eviscerate the U.S. defense budget in the expectation that promised cuts in Soviet forces will become evident down the road.

And yet, Admiral Crowe is quoted as recommending constraining the SDI program to $3 billion per year and curtailing new weapons such as the B-2. The effect of these actions would be to substantially exacerbate the adverse effect of the coming defense budget cuts in terms of the maintenance of an assured U.S. ability to deter Soviet aggression and to contend with the danger posed by such emerging threats as proliferation of ballistic missile and chemical and biological warfare technologies.

The Center for Security Policy believes that Admiral Crowe’s views must be firmly rejected for several reasons:

• First, as a maritime power we and our allies and friends are critically dependent on naval forces to a measure far beyond that of a land-power like the Soviet Union.

 

• Second, we should not treat unverifiable limitations as constituting serious arms control when in fact their impact may prove illusory and will in any event lead to major instabilities.

 

• Third, we should not fall prey to unproven and premature hopes about drastic cut-backs in Soviet military capabilities.

 

• Finally, the anticipated START-imposed cuts in strategic arms will increase — rather than reduce — the importance of high technology defense programs such as SDI and the B-2 to protect against Soviet arms control cheating and to protect against the plausible possibility of major instabilities and aggressive challenges emanating from the Soviet Union.