‘CHEERS!’ PERRY LAUNCHES, THEN TOASTS THE ‘PLUTONIUM TRIANGLE’ — THE EMERGING MOSCOW-TEHRAN-PYONGYANG NUCLEAR AXIS

(Washington, D.C.): Arguably, one of the most
ignominious moments in recent American diplomacy occurred when
the Bush Administration’s National Security Advisor Brent
Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger
toasted the Butchers of Beijing in the immediate aftermath of the
Tiananmen Square Massacre. But the moment captured yesterday by
Agence France Press in a wire-photo that appeared in today’s Washington
Post rivals that sycophantic act of kow-towing to brutal
autocrats: It showed Secretary of Defense William Perry lifting
his glass to his Russian counterpart, Defense Minister Pavel
Grachev, whose steely gaze was fixed not on Mr. Perry but on the
camera and whose hands held no beverage, conveying unmistakably
his utter contempt for the man toasting him.

Familiarity Breeds Contempt

It is not hard to understand why: After all, Secretary Perry
had just undergone a thrashing at the hands of Pavel Grachev on
several scores:

• Moscow told Secretary Perry to drop dead regarding U.S.
  objections to Russian’s commitment to provide Iran with
  key ingredients of a nuclear weapons production complex
  in the guise of a nuclear power reactor deal.
• Grachev dismissed Dr. Perry’s pitch to halt Russia’s
  genocidal campaign against Chechnya — a campaign being
  run by Marshall Grachev.
• The Defense Minister served notice that Russia was
  prepared to withdraw from the Conventional Forces in
  Europe (CFE) Treaty if NATO proceeded with an eastward
  expansion deemed unacceptable to the Kremlin. This threat
  comes on top of Russia’s incipient violation of that
  accord as it maintains levels of forces in its southern
  region that exceed the CFE Treaty’s limits.

Shades of Jim Baker

Grachev’s disdain for Secretary Perry — and the American
administration he represents — could only have been further
intensified by the Bakeresque concessions proferred in the face
of such a wholesale rebuff. First, Dr. Perry compromised the
Clinton Administration’s fall-back position that was supposed to
be unveiled at the upcoming Moscow summit: He signalled that the
United States would be willing to accept Moscow’s assurances that
safeguards would be put in place to prevent Tehran from diverting
Russian-supplied nuclear technology or materials for
weapons-related purposes. Even Secretary Perry could not bring
himself, however, to say that he thought such promises would
prevent Iranian diversions.

Then, the Secretary of Defense took an even more astounding
step. He cleared the way for the Kremlin to secure one of its
most prized global objectives — allowing it to muscle in on a
Western-financed supply contract for significant components
associated with the two light-water reactors Pyongyang has been
promised by Washington. This commitment, enshrined in a so-called
“Agreed Framework” between the United States and North
Korea, was already a highly dubious one. After all, it will
allow, according to former Science Advisor to President Reagan,
William Graham, Pyongyang to:

“produce 300 times as much plutonium as the 20
megawatt reactor [which it had under construction]. Running
at full power, the large reactors the Administration proposes
to give North Korea would produce enough plutonium when
separated from the uranium by chemical extraction, to make
several nuclear weapons each week!”⁽¹⁾

Debacle Watch

If Moscow is allowed to participate in this reactor deal,
several consequences — all seriously detrimental to U.S.
interests — are predictable:

• The U.S.-South Korean relationship — already under
  severe strain as a result of Washington’s go-it-alone
  negotiations with the North — would be further
  undermined if the United States blatantly double-crosses
  Seoul on its oft-stated pledge that the North Korean
  reactors would, for all intents and purposes, be built by
  the South Koreans.
• The most important part of this mutual agreement — that
  is, the United States’ ability to withdraw from it if
  Pyongyang does not comply — would be seriously
  compromised. It would be tricky enough to cancel the
  reactor construction project if only Western corporate
  equities are on the line (e.g., once construction of the
  enormously expensive reactor vessels begins). It will, as
  a practical matter, become impossible once Moscow is
  inserted as a significant “subcontractor.”
• Moscow will be able to position itself as a major nuclear
  supplier to both Iran and North Korea — two countries
  that not only share a common commitment to acquire
  nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems
  but that are actively cooperating with one another in
  these (and other) areas pursuant to a strategic marriage
  of convenience. An American blessing on — to say nothing
  of sponsorship of — this Plutonium Triangle
  between Moscow, Tehran and Pyongyang will greatly
  complicate U.S. options for staunching the hemorrhage of
  nuclear weapons technology, even as it exponentially
  increases the need for such options.

The Bottom Line

Regrettably, Secretary Perry’s deplorable performance in
Moscow is reminiscent of the Bush Administration’s worst moments
in one other way: In the Clinton team’s drive to finesse
short-term tactical problems, it is undermining fundamentally the
United States’ vital, long-term security interests. As a
result, America is now in the business of brokering nuclear deals
with both North Korea and Iran which will ultimately
enhance their respective (and cooperative) nuclear weapons-making
and -delivery capabilities. Worse yet, the United States may
actually help finance — directly or indirectly — these
insidious activities.

While the U.S. exposure on the North Korean deal is fairly
clear-cut, the American taxpayer’s role in the Iranian deal is
less obvious. Based on Moscow’s past practice of offering
supplier credits to its more destitute client states — and
Tehran’s bankrupt condition — it is reasonable to assume that
the Kremlin has offered such credits to Iran to nail down the
reactor deal. If this proves to be the case, then U.S. tax
dollars supplied through Russia’s front-door (in the form of
foreign aid, defense conversion or Nunn-Lugar funds) could wind
up exiting the back door to help underwrite Iran’s nuclear
weapons program.

Now that the first 100 days of the Contract With America is
completed, the Congress must turn to another urgent order of
business: Preventing the Clinton Administration from formulating
or executing dangerous new contracts with members of the
Plutonium Triangle.

(1) From a forthcoming op.ed. article by
Dr. Graham, a distinguished member of the Center for Security
Policy’s Board of Advisors, entitled, “Going from Bad to
Better: An Alternative to the North Korean Nuclear Reactor
Deal.”