China’s Indian Ocean build-up

Originally published by The Washington Times:

In May 2018 the United States military renamed the “U.S. Pacific Command” to the “U.S. Indo-Pacific Command” in a largely symbolic gesture as no significant policy changes or shifts in military activity have been announced in conjunction with the move to rename. However, the lack of necessary policy and action items to accompany this step should be an item of legitimate concern as words without action create Paper Tigers.

The aggressive military build-up of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the South China Sea, and the ongoing conflict this has created with the United States and others in the region, has been the focus of a substantial amount of attention by U.S. foreign policy-makers and U.S. armed forces in the Indo-Pacific Command region for several years now.

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR), by contrast, has neither been a region of serious concern for Washington nor an arena of significant action for the U.S. armed forces at any point in recent memory, a circumstance only propelling the PRC to establish themselves as a regional hegemon en route to global ambitions.

The Indian Ocean Region spans from the western shores of Sumatra, Indonesia, to the coasts of Mozambique in sub-Saharan Africa, the ladder of which is a part of a continent regarded as one of the globe’s last economic and strategic frontiers. For two decades the Chinese government has “quietly” placed substantial focus on developmental and strategic projects in Africa largely unimpeded by any other great or regional power. This monumental Chinese effort is part of the well-known “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative fixated on economic dominance, military prowess and “soft-power” (influence) necessary for challenging the United States as the global hegemon.

The most immediate concern for U.S. strategic interests in the region is China’s establishment of a new major military base in Djibouti, China’s first ever beyond the South China Sea region. The base, capable of housing up to 10,000 soldiers at a time and in close proximity to the strategically significant Bab-el-Mandeb strait, includes a port, a free-trade zone, and provides logistical support for China’s naval force which protects China’s commercial fleet from piracy and other threats in the region.

The large, permanent presence of Chinese forces in the region now allows the PRC to militarily and strategically contend with Western powers already long-present there including U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) at Camp Lemonnier, the only permanent U.S. military establishment on the African continent. Hence, the base gives the Chinese on-demand response capabilities to any potential militarized conflict in the Indian Ocean Region and the ability to impact routine U.S. naval activities in a manner unprecedented for them in the past.

Chinese strategic ambitions in the Indian Ocean Region are also reflected in their serious uptick in relations with Pakistan, a major component of which is the One Belt, One Road-based China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project that includes the construction of Gwadar port, which provides China a direct point of access to the another critical energy shipping chokepoint in the Straits of Hormuz. Construction has also commenced on China’s second overseas military base in Jiwani, Pakistan.

The Jiwani installation will allow the Chinese to guard their military-economic interests in the eastern half of the Indian Ocean Region in conjunction with its forces in the South China Sea and to militarily assert themselves in Middle East affairs. Further, the PRC has also established several smaller strategic installations across the IOR capable of being militarized in a short-time span if necessary, including in the Maldives and Tanzania to name a couple.

The aforementioned developments allow China to militarily project power further than they ever have before as well as the ability to maintain any territory, seaway(s), or otherwise that they deem to be strategically significant. This reality presents an undoubted challenge to U.S. naval power projection in the Indian Ocean Region which stems primarily from its heavy military presence in the Persian Gulf, the only U.S. naval fleet with sole focus on the IOR but that remains continually occupied with ongoing conflicts in the Middle East.

The strategic placement of military installations across the Indian Ocean Region also gives the Chinese an extensive supply-line from Beijing to Dar es Salaam that significantly optimizes the operational logistics of their participation in any future conflict throughout the entirety of the region. If the U.S. wishes to maintain any strategic edge in the IOR, significant tangible efforts are needed immediately to bolster its armed forces in the region while also contributing to development there in order to counteract Chinese “soft-power.”

Not since the peak of the Cold War has the United States faced another nation with the desire and potential capability of challenging its status as the sole world superpower. Challenges to global hegemony start with challenges to regional hegemony, and Beijing has made China’s intentions very clear. It is only with U.S. military strength where this challenge will be met.

• Michael Bender is a security analyst for the Center for Security Policy, based in Washington, D.C.