Critics’ Study Makes Case for ‘Layered’ Missile Defense

(Washington, D.C.): A new study, prepared by opponents of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system now under consideration by the Clinton-Gore Administration for deployment in 2005, claims that such a system could be easily defeated by “simple” enemy countermeasures and should not be built. In fact, descriptions of this study’s findings prominently featured in the morning newspapers seem to support the judgment of the man charged with developing that NMD system — Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish (USAF), the Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization — who has recently argued in public for a “layered” anti-missile system to protect the American people.

Gen. Kadish: Ground-based System Not Likely to Be Sufficient Over Time

In remarks at a breakfast meeting on 30 March co-sponsored by the National Defense University Foundation and the National Defense Industrial Association, Gen. Kadish declared that such a layered system, comprised over time of a range of systems to address an evolving threat, would likely utilize sea- and space-based missile defense “layers” to complement and add robustness to the ground-based capability he is preparing for deployment in Alaska.

Specifically, Gen. Kadish observed that the inherent mobility of naval systems, in concert with ground-based Army systems, makes a lot of sense from a theater or national missile defense perspective. He also emphasized the need for boost-phase defenses, for which sea-, air- and space-based weapons will be necessary. Such defenses have the potential to intercept ballistic missiles early in their flight, i.e., before they can deploy the multiple payloads and other countermeasures about which the inveterate critics of missile defense whose study was sponsored by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Union of Concerned Scientists profess grave concern.

If the critics are right — a significant “if” — about the imminence of effective countermeasures falling into the hands of potential adversaries, the argument is only reinforced for pursuing multiple means of acquiring layered missile defenses at the earliest possible time. Specifically, this would mean adapting the Navy’s AEGIS fleet air defense system as quickly as possible to permit it to intercept long-range missiles, especially in the boost or ascent phase where geography permits (as in the case, for example, of North Korea and perhaps Iraq or Iran). Interestingly, two of the most vocal of critics of missile defense — MIT’s Professor Theodore Postol and IBM’s Richard Garwin — have been recently sighted recommending that AEGIS ships be adapted for sea-based missile defenses precisely to address this mission.

Will a Layered Defense be Strangled by Clinton’s Grand Compromise?

The only thing that appears to stand in the way of deploying layered anti-missile defenses capable of ensuring the protection of the American people against present and emerging ballistic missile threats is the Clinton-Gore Administration: It is determined to reach an agreement with Vladimir Putin’s Russia that would foreclose such a possibility by condemning the United States to precisely the sort of limited, ground-based defensive system that the critics now contend would be incapable of dealing with countermeasures, and therefore unjustifiable.

This initiative will surely be given a powerful boost if, as has been reported, the Russian Duma ratifies START II this week. That step will be seen as clearing the way, at last, for the “Grand Compromise” long sought by President Clinton — a two-part deal that would eviscerate the U.S. nuclear deterrent (by agreeing to unverifiable reductions in offensive nuclear arms to perhaps as few as 1,000-1,500 strategic warheads) and strangle in the crib the sorts of promising missile defense options the U.S. needs today and even more so tomorrow. The argument for an early and rigorous debate on the wisdom of this compromise, most especially by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is advanced by the Center’s President, Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., in the attached Defense News editorial.

The Bottom Line

The arguments now being advanced to delay a deployment decision on the Alaska anti-missile system should, instead, lead to an acceleration of the steps needed to bring to bear more comprehensive and robust defenses, starting with a layer utilizing the Navy’s existing $50 billion AEGIS infrastructure. These capabilities will complement the strengths and offset any weaknesses of the ground-based deployment.

If their latest complaints are other than a smokescreen for rationalizing long-standing opposition to the defense of the American people against growing missile threats, the critics should join with proponents of missile defenses in arguing — not for a delay in the deployment of missile defenses — but for an open-ended postponement on any arms control negotiation that would impede the United States’ acquisition and deployment of needed boost- and/or ascent-phase defenses.