Ehud Olmert’s “Convergence” Plan for the West Bank and U.S. Middle East Policy

In an interview with The Wall Street Journal[1], Olmert stated that he expects his convergence plan to cost some $10 billion, although Israeli economists have argued that it will more likely require at least twice that amount.[2] Olmert hopes that during his upcoming visit to the U.S. he will secure a U.S. commitment to underwrite these costs. Olmert further seeks U.S. government acceptance of the to-be-revised barrier route as Israel’s political border.[3] As currently conceived, the route will place on the Israeli side 5-10 percent of the West Bank and some neighborhoods in Jerusalem that were taken byIsrael in the 1967 Six Day War, including the Temple Mount.

Olmert maintains that his plan will advance Israel’s national interests and the interests of the international community led by the U.S. in the following ways:

1.  Strengthen Israeli democracy. Olmert claims that according to current population forecasts, by 2015 Jews will be a minority in the area that includes sovereignIsrael and the West Bank. On strength of this population projection, which is based on a census carried out by the Palestinian Authority in 1997, Olmert argues that the convergence plan will enable Israel to secure its Jewish majority.
2. Enhance regional stability. Olmert argues that by removing Israelis from the overwhelming majority of the West Bank, he will contribute to the stabilization of the region and the diminishment of terror levels. His assessment is based on the assumption that the transfer of Israeli-free land to the Palestinians will mitigate their desire and the desire of their state-supporters to attack Israel, and will strengthen forces of moderation in Palestinian society.
3. Ending Israeli “occupation.” By vacating the vast majority of the West Bank and Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem, Israel will end its partial control over the Palestinian population in those areas and thereby enable them to live independent of Israeli control. The end of the so-called occupation will mitigate European and Arab criticism of the United States and Israel that is based on their rejection ofIsrael’s right to exert any control over Palestinian Arabs and so enhance American and Israeli standing in the international arena.

Precedents

Olmert, like Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz and other Left and Center-Left Israeli political leaders, has pointed to the precedents of Israel’s withdrawal from South Lebanon in May 2000 and to Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza and northern Samariain September 2005 to defend the convergence plan. They note that since Israel vacated South Lebanon and Gaza only three Israelis have been killed in South Lebanon and none has been killed in the Gaza Strip. [4] They further maintain that international pressure on Israel and the United States to end Israel’s occupation of those areas abated since Israel’s withdrawal. In light of this, they believe that international pressure onIsrael and the U.S. due toIsrael’s military and civilian presence in the West Bank will subside afterIsrael withdraws from the West Bank and converges into areas that are heavily populated by Israeli Jews and that are territorially contiguous with the 1949 armistice lines.

Conceptual Drawbacks of Olmert’s Convergence Plan: The Gaza Precedent

Olmert’s defense of his convergence strategy suffers from several conceptual defects. First among these is its failure to grapple with the lessons of the Gaza withdrawal.  This withdrawal, like the historical record of Israeli withdrawals since the start of the Oslo Israeli-Palestinian peace process in 1993, suggests that handing territory to the Palestinian Authority will not enhance democratic institutions either in Israel or among Palestinians, and that it will destabilize, rather than stabilize the conflict.

In touting the convergence plan for the West Bank, Olmert attempts to avoid this conclusion through the tautological use of precedents. He and his associates argue that no Israelis have been killed in Gaza since Israel withdrew from Gaza and that only three Israelis have been killed in South Lebanon[5] since Israel withdrew from south Lebanon. Yet this statement is largely insignificant. Obviously, if Israel vacates an area of all Israeli presence then it will be impossible to attack Israelis in that area. The larger question is whether these areas represent a greater security risk to Israel and its allies now that Israel has vacated them. This question is not addressed by Olmert and his associates.

Olmert and his allies plug the convergence plan as a unilateral Israeli move which – unlike the conduct of negotiations toward peace – is purportedly wholly independent of events in Palestinian society specifically, and in the Arab and Islamic world more generally. Because Israel can enact withdrawals without Palestinian cooperation, Olmert and his colleagues argue that it is unnecessary to consider the impact of the proposed withdrawal from the West Bank on the Palestinians or on any other state or non-state actors.