Gaffney on global warming

Sponsored by the National Center for Policy Analysis and
the Competitive Enterprise Institute

29 September 1997
The Dirksen Senate Office Building

I have an admission to make that is unusual for a briefing of this kind: I am unable to say with precision how badly the national security will be affected by the draconian reductions in fossil fuel consumption contemplated by the Clinton approach to the Global Climate Change Treaty (GCCT). Unfortunately, it seems pretty clear that no one else can either — not the Pentagon, not the White House, not the Congress.

In no small measure, this uncertainty is due to the as-yet-unspecified nature of the timing, character and magnitude of the reductions that will be required, either by the treaty to be signed at Kyoto and/or by an Executive Order that is said to be in the offing.

It seems safe to project, however, that in the words of the Clinton Administration’s Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Environmental Security, Sherri Goodman, requirements for significant cuts in greenhouse gas emissions could have “large impacts” on the U.S. military. The armed forces are, after all, the Nation’s largest consumer of fossil fuels.

If at this moment it is impossible to quantify exactly how “large” and deleterious the impact will be, one can anticipate some of the areas likely to be affected. These include the following:

• Readiness: Unfortunately, the U.S. military is already at risk of being “hollowed out.” After twelve years of real reductions in defense spending, America’s armed forces are at the ragged edge of what is required to perform competently in wartime and, perhaps, even to operate safely in peacetime. What if training has to be cut back further to reduce fossil fuel emissions? There will be still fewer flying hours, steaming days and training opportunities in tanks and other gas-guzzling motorized vehicles.




• Presence: A related impact will be felt if, as seems predictable, the cutbacks translate into reduced overseas deployments whether because it is deemed necessary to do so in order to meet lower levels of emissions or to hoard emission chits against future warfare requirements. A related question involves the treatment of American forces on foreign soil: Will their emissions count against our national allowances — or against those of the host governments? If the latter, it seems predictable that this will only increase the pressure for reducing U.S. forward deployments.




• Will to Fight: The American people are always reluctant to go to war. That reluctance may translate into an absolute refusal to do so — even if important national interests and alliance commitments are at stake — if the practical effect will be to cripple the U.S. economy by diverting emissions from fossil fuel consumption in the private sector to the military.




• Procurement: A particularly insidious effect of the GCCT could be its impact on the qualitative technological edge the U.S. military relies upon to deter war and prevail if it occurs. Will we allow the determinant of weapon systems no longer to be standards like mission effectiveness and survivability but emissions considerations?





Think about it: smaller, lighter tanks — with less armor and less powerful guns and engines; planes that may be obliged to avoid supersonic operations to reduce fuel consumption; liquid-fueled rockets chosen instead of more reliable ones that use solid propellants, propellants that produce large quantities of greenhouse gas-emissions. These trade-offs may result in costs that will be very high in terms of the lives of service personnel and outcomes on the battlefield.






At the very least the costs will be high in terms of dollars. Even if, as Secretary Goodman has claimed, new technologies will make the next generation of combat jets more fuel efficient and “greener” in terms of their emissions, and even if the U.S. military can afford to buy such next generation equipment, no one has identified the vast sums required to retrofit these engines into existing fighter, bomber or transport aircraft. Will those have to be retired before their time in the interest of reducing fuel emissions? What will that mean for preparedness and warfighting capabilities?





• Sovereignty: Finally, it must be asked: What will “cap-and-trade” arrangements governing greenhouse gas emissions mean for the Nation’s ability to go to war? Could we go do so if necessary without getting emission chits from prospective enemies or their non-aligned friends? Absurd as this might seem, the new one-world mega-bureaucracy that would be required to facilitate, monitor and regulate such a regime could prove an enormous impediment to American national security as well as a grievous infringement on U.S. sovereignty.





A further national security concern could arise if, as has been widely predicted, the GCCT results in a further inducement for American industry — particularly “smokestack” companies providing goods critical to the Nation’s defense — to move offshore. This could compound the already considerable problem of foreign dependency/availability in wartime.

Perhaps the greatest danger of all is that the cumulative effect of these impacts could be to create the impression in the minds of prospective adversaries that the United States is unable or unwilling to protect its interests around the world. History suggests that such a perception is an invitation to aggression, making war more likely and adding further, albeit utterly unquantifiable costs to the potential bill associated with greenhouse gas emission control regimes.

In conclusion, it appears reasonable to assume that there will be real, possibly very great down-sides if the United States embarks, either through unilateral or multilateral action, on such a course. It seems inconceivable that we would submit to these risks without a very clear-cut case for the science of global warming and equally clear proof that the proposed remedy will actually mitigate that claimed phenomenon.