‘GOTCHA’: U.N. TEAM FINDS GERMANS ENGAGED IN MISSILE PROLIFERATION

(Washington, D.C.): The United Nations
inspection team charged with
investigating nuclear weapons
capabilities in Iraq has assembled over
the past several months shocking
information: German companies
were knowingly involved in enhancing the
destructive power of Saddam Hussein’s
Scud missiles. One such
extended-range missile resulted in the
deaths of 43 American servicemen and
women in the course of the Gulf war.
These findings are contained in a U.N.
Inspectors’ Report obtained by the Center
for Security Policy which references not
only extensive photographic evidence, but
the actual nameplates removed
from the Scuds which are those of German
companies.

This evidence is all the more striking
insofar as it flatly contradicts
extensive representations made by German
Embassy officials last March. At that
time, when rumors of German involvement
in the Iraqi Scud program began to
circulate, Bonn’s representatives in the
United States averred that the Scud
missiles that landed in Israel and Saudi
Arabia provided:

“no proof that Western (also
German) technology is involved in
the range extension or other
modifications of the Scud
missiles and is in accordance
with previous findings of the
Federal Government. According to
that, the range of those Scud
missiles (500 KM) which have been
launched up until now has been
achieved exclusively with Iraqi
technology.”

U.S. officials were skeptical about these
disclaimers when they were tendered,
particularly in view of the fact that
German customs had shortly before seized
motors that appeared to be associated
with rockets linked to the Iraqi Scuds.
While absolute proof tying German
companies to the Scud range-extension
program was lacking, Bonn’s categorical
denials were unpersuasive to those who
had heard the same claims made concerning
Libya’s Rabta chemical weapons facility
and other dangerous technology transfers.

The U.N. Inspectors Report (German
Team) — which was shared with the German
government last July — contains
the following findings:

• Approximately 20 percent of the
  pressure lines in the missiles
  which extended from the high
  pressure air tanks back to the
  control mechanisms of the missile
  were made in Germany.
• Three missiles — numbers 853426,
  863729, and 866669 — included
  clearly altered parts of the
  pressure monitoring system; the
  pressure gauges were marked in
  German and the electrical plugs
  were manufactured by a German
  company named Hirschmann.
  Parts numbers 90 and 91,
  according to the report, were
  expressly manufactured in Germany
  for the missile application.
  German pressure gauges were also
  found in one of the missiles.
• The launchers for one of the
  extended-range Scuds, the
  Al-Walid, also were partly of
  German origin, including: the
  load bearing chassis (Goldhofer);
  the superstructure (including a
  laterally mounted German-made
  motor); the four high pressure
  air bottles; the electrical
  distributor of the upper portion
  of the launchers (Siemans);
  and an electrical switch control
  board (Polyma).
  Similarly the fluid containers,
  pressure hose connectors and
  towing vehicles, were
  manufactured by German companies.
• The launcher for another
  extended-range Scud, the Al-Nida,
  included the following German
  parts: hydraulic distributors,
  portions of the chassis, the
  missile elevation system and the
  towing vehicle (Mercedes
  Benz). (Russian-made
  vehicles and Swedish SAAB
  flatbed trucks have also been
  seen with Scud launchers.)
• Parts of a third extended-range
  Scud system, the Al-Hussein, was
  also composed of “specially
  constructed parts” made in
  Germany.

As the author of the U.N. Report
states: “Given the conditions
governing a U.N. inspection, there was
not opportunity for a careful and
comprehensive investigation of German
participation. The evidence which was
identified represents only a
portion of the total picture.
The missile systems under consideration
have now been destroyed; the material
presented herein is therefore
unique.”

Among others, the U.N. Inspectors’
Report raises the following serious
questions:

1. If the German government was
   given this Report in July 1991 by
   the U.N. Inspectors Team, why
   didn’t German officials at a
   minimum convey to appropriate
   U.S. government officials that
   their March representations were
   in error? (According to
   informed sources, no such
   contacts were made.)
2. Why didn’t the German
   government announce an immediate
   investigation into the findings
   of the U.N. inspectors report?
3. As a member of the Missile
   Technology Control Regime (MTCR),
   why hasn’t the German
   government abided by the MTCR’s
   rules which require members to
   “exchange relevant
   information with other
   governments?”
4. Why haven’t the Scuds
   that were launched against Saudi
   Arabia and Israel — parts of
   which were recovered — been
   properly examined and the results
   announced?

The Center for Security Policy
believes that it is inappropriate for the
United Nations to withhold the reports of
its U.N. inspection teams operating in
Iraq. Withholding such information is
contrary to the principles of
transparency and democracy the United
Nations is supposed to exemplify and
threatens to damage the organization’s
credibility. In any event, it serves to
impede the judicial process in many
member countries; were it to occur in the
United States, withholding such evidence
could itself represent a criminal act if
it documents illegal behavior.

The Center for Security Policy
believes that all information — with the
exception of data that shows how to
build weapons of mass destruction,
which the U.N. should destroy just as it
would such weaponry — should be
released. Because of the rising
world-wide concern about the
proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, the Center urges the
Security Council to consider releasing
the full Iraq inspection reports as soon
as possible. At the very minimum, the
Security Council should debate this issue
in the open so that the public can judge
why certain members of the international
community oppose releasing these
materials.