HAITI: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED

by Elliott Abrams
The Weekly Standard , December 11, 1995

Elliott Abrams, who managed U.S.-Haiti relations
when he served as assistant secretary of state in the
Reagan administration, is a senior fellow at the
Hudson Institute.

BOSNIA WILL BE BILL CLINTON’S second military venture
— after Haiti. Fifteen months ago he sent 6,000 American
troops there with the promise that they would restore
democracy and then leave. What is the situation in Haiti
as 1995 ends, and are there any lessons in it?

For nearly a year after the Americans arrived, Haiti
looked far better than c onservative critics had
predicted. The Clintonites had promised that President
Aristide would champion reconciliation and economic
reform, abandoning his hist ory of class-warfare rhetoric
and liberation-theology economics. In fact, the l evel of
political violence dropped fast, a new economic plan was
adopted, and a political debate began within Haiti among
democrats of the right, center, and left. American
officials had deified Aristide in order to win public and
congressional support for military action aimed at
putting him back in the presidential palace; and they
continued to play favorites by supporting Aristide’s
people as against Haitian democrats who did not like him.

Only one year later, Aristide has reverted to form.
His prime minister quit recently because Aristide blocked
the privatization program and seems to have developed no
taste for free-market economics. More importantly, he
gave a fierce rabble-rousing speech in mid-November that
led to a wave of mob violence against his political
opponents. And although he now promises to step down on
February 7, 1996, in accordance with the Haitian
constitution, Aristide’s long delay in announcing his
decision leaves only days to organize the December 17
presidential election. It will be a mess.

Given the level of violence in Haiti, many
administration officials admit privately that the only
way to keep the peace there is to leave some American
soldiers on the ground through next year. But at the same
time they fret that our troops, who are potential mob
targets, are a source of vulnerability as well as
strength. We value democracy in Haiti and those soldiers’
lives; Aristide has different standards. Others in the
administration warn that the troops will have to be out
by election day 1996, whatever the effect of that
withdrawal on Haiti.

Any lessons for Bosnia?

First, the presence of soldiers is a double-edged
sword. It is arguable that we could come down harder on
Aristide (with diplomatic and economic pressure) if he
had no leverage on us; but we need his help in
guaranteeing the safety of our troops, and that
complicates our situation. Apparently our soldiers in
Bosnia will be heavily armed, but the point still
applies.

Second, a large (for the neighborhood) military force
may achieve peace while the troops are there but have no
permanent effect. Our presence has suppressed violence in
Haiti, but the number of murders and burnings is rising
as our departure date comes closer. It appears that we
have achieved in Haiti what Tito achieved in Yugoslavia:
the temporary burial of disputes, not their solution.

Third, it is dangerous when local electorates are
less committed to peace and democracy than we are. The
administration that gave Aristide a halo finds itself in
an embarrassing position when he shows his tail — and
his supporters love him all the more for it. How will we
cope with Serbs who may be acting amiably and reasonably
now but are probably war criminals, or with
democratically elected officials whose irredentist
speeches may provoke violence against our troops?

Fourth, this administration always acts with both
eyes firmly fixed on domestic politics. Our troops
restored Aristide to power because that was the only way
the president could defend sending all the Haitian boat
people back home. (With Aristide restored to power, Haiti
was a democracy, right?) The vast majority of our troops
will be pulled out next year regardless of events on the
ground in Haiti, for the president is up for re-election.
One cannot say precisely how electoral politics will
affect our troop deployment in Bosnia, but one can say
with certainty that our reaction to any significant event
there will be the combined decision of Lake, Christopher,
Holbrooke, Shalikashvili — and Carville, Morris, Dodd,
and the rest of the crew.