Hobson’s choices (cont.)

 At last, the debate has been joined about the future direction of America’s nuclear deterrent – or indeed, whether there will even be such a deterrent down the road. Its start may have been modest, namely an exchange of op.eds. in the Washington Times by Center for Security Policy President Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. ("Hobson’s Choices," January 4) and Rep. David Hobson, the Ohio Republican who chaired the House Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee during the 108th Congress ("Forward Thinking on Nuclear Policy," January 10).

What ‘Forward Thinking’?

Since what is at stake is so momentous, this small beginning must now evolve into an informed and thoughtful national discourse. Toward that end, the following thoughts are offered as a further response – and corrective – to several of Mr. Hobson’s contentions:

First, the Congressman avers a commitment with which surely most legislators and their constituents would agree: "Our nuclear arsenal remains an important component of our overall national security program. And, let me make clear my support for maintaining our current stockpile."

Unfortunately, Rep. Hobson’s actions do not bear out that commitment. At the very least, they make the maintenance of our current stockpile problematic. They also raise real questions as to whether our nuclear arsenal can remain "an important component of our overall national security program."

Mr. Hobson was able last Fall to exploit the classic "smoke-filled room" process that shaped the 2004 omnibus appropriations act to decimate President Bush’s plans for assuring the continuing effectiveness of today’s deterrent, as called for by the 2002 Nuclear Program Review. For example:

In his op.ed. article, Congressman Hobson contemptuously dismisses contrary judgments like those President Bush has made as "the desires of Cold War fighters for new weapons and facilities." As former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Keith Payne observed in Sunday’s Washington Times in an essay entitled "Cold War Thinking on Nuclear Policy," such a criticism is all the more ironic for it coming from a man who would condemn America to retaining, at best, an arsenal designed to deter our Cold War foe – not those we confront today and tomorrow.

The folly of this approach was dissected in an excellent November 16, 2004 op.ed. in the Washington Post published by one of the Nation’s most respected experts on nuclear weapons, former Defense Nuclear Agency chief Vice Admiral Robert Monroe USN (Ret.) He noted:

No other nation has the global responsibilities the United States bears, and we must take the actions needed to meet them — particularly those involving deterrence. To be effective deterrents in the future, our nuclear weapons must have greatly increased accuracy, reduced yields, specialized capabilities (such as deep earth penetration) and tailored effects (such as ability to neutralize chemical-biological agents)….In a dangerous world, with many states and organizations committed to acquiring and using nuclear weapons, it would be unwise for the United States not to make our nuclear deterrent force more effective.

What ‘Majority’?

Finally, Mr. Hobson claims that his positions enjoy majority support in the Congress and that representations to the contrary are "simply inaccurate." In fact, the full House and Senate were given successive opportunities to vote last year on who was right – President Bush and experts like Admiral Monroe, or Mr. Hobson and anti-nuclear activists opposed to the Bush defense program. Each time, the Bush position prevailed. The Hobson choices were enacted only when, in the Omnibus bill, neither the 108th Congress nor the President had the opportunity to address them individually.

The Bottom Line

Now, it falls to the 109th Congress to correct the damage Rep. David. Hobson’s choices threaten to do to our nuclear deterrent. In that debate, Mr. Hobson should, of course, have his say. But it should not be from the vantage point of chairman of the relevant appropriations subcommittee, a position of responsibility that – as the outgoing chair of the House Veterans Affairs Committee recently learned the hard way – is not entrusted by the leadership to those with their own agenda.