Is Japan ready for war? Not yet

China has wanted to teach Japan a lesson for a long time – as was obvious to anyone paying attention.  Not enough people in Nagatacho were.  But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has apparently woken up Japan’s government.  And it is feared Taiwan will be the ‘Asian Ukraine’ – and that will involve Japan, like it or not.

Japanese politicians are saying “Taiwan’s defense is Japan’s defense” (which is true), and Prime Minister Kishida promised that Japan will double defense spending and “fundamentally strengthen” Japan’s defense capability.

There’s a widespread sense of urgency and general agreement on this.  But it will take some time.  Kishida suggests five years.

However, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) may not wait while Japan gets ready.

So if China attacks Taiwan (or Japan) within the next few years, is Japan ready to fight a war?

The short answer:  No.

But Japan spends $50 billion a year on defense, has the world’s fifth or six largest military – on paper, has lots of modern hardware, puts on impressive Fuji Firepower shows every summer, and has a defense alliance with the United States.  And alliance managers on both sides regularly declare: “the alliance has never been stronger.”

It’s not considered polite to say the following, and maybe this is why I never get invited to the Fuji Dialogue love-fests.  But with the People’s Liberation Army breathing down Japanese and American necks, here goes:

The Japanese military is not built or configured for or capable of fighting an actual war against a serious opponent.  And the Chinese are a serious opponent.

To fight a war the following are some (but not all) basic requirements – at which Japan is falling short:

• Unified command and control

(might exist on paper, but not in practice)

• Joint operations and communications

(JSDF has minimal ‘joint’ capability and ‘joint comms’ are a problem too)

• Logistics

(Not ready for ‘combat’ logistics)

• Timelines and sequences for mobilization

(Doubtful)

• War stocks (extra ammunition and materiel)

(Lacking.  When a war starts, arsenals and magazines empty quickly.)

• Manpower and recruitment

(JSDF misses recruitment targets by 20% a year.  Has too few personnel – in peacetime)

• Medical care and casualty replacements

(Unprepared)

• Reserve system

(Exists, but poorly utilized)

• Industrial capacity to build or repair ships, aircraft, hardware

(Insufficient.  And Japanese industry doesn’t see defense as a moneymaker.)

• Realistic war-fighting training and exercises

(MSDF does useful war-related training, and GSDF has done some better training in recent times, but overall this is lacking.

(You’ll notice that none of this involves ‘high-priced’ hardware and silver-bullet weaponry.  Instead these are ‘procedural’ and ‘infrastructure’.  But no less important.)

Japan’s civilian leadership is mostly to blame for this state of affairs.  If it was serious about national defense it would have ensured these issues were addressed years ago.  It is their job.

Instead, Japanese leaders (with encouragement from the leftist media and academia) withheld necessary resources and prevented the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) from developing into the kind of military Japan needs.  They also ignored looming dangers facing Japan.

Make no mistake, JSDF personnel quality is excellent.  They are the equal of American forces – if given proper resources and opportunity to develop into a professional, balanced, joint force designed (and mentally prepared) to fight a likely enemy.  This also requires allowing officers, NCOs, and troops at all levels to use initiative and judgments.  And the Jieitai (and Jieikan) could also do with some better treatment and respect – not least from Japan’s ruling class.

The following are very brief observations of Japanese military services:

MSDF:  Highly professional, and excellent niche capabilities – submarines, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), surveillance, surface warfare, mine-warfare.  Provides good support to US Navy.  But needs to double in size to handle mission requirements.  Has limited ‘air support’ from JASDF, and ships need air cover.  The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has around 350 ships and is rapidly expanding – plus a couple hundred coast guard ships – some are built for naval combat.  MSDF has about 75 warships and submarines.  The Japan Coast Guard adds to these numbers, but not enough.   You can do the math.

GSDF:  Ground Self Defense Force needs to hurry and become a more mobile force – and that requires changed mindsets.  The development of the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade has been successful.  ARDB can operate in a maritime environment like the Nansei Shoto, and also operate with MSDF – a welcome example of ‘joint’ capability in JSDF.  GSDF anti-ship missiles are especially useful against the PLA Navy.  GSDF plays a ‘National Guard’ role for natural disasters response.  That diverts resources from ‘combat readiness.’

ASDF:  Professional but stretched very thin.  Too small.  Unclear how it operates with the other services.  Thus, not as useful as should be.

JCG:  Hardworking and serious, but outmatched by the Chinese navy – not to mention China Coast Guard.  And when the Chinese fishing fleet and Maritime Militia show up in Japan’s southern territory, JCG can be overwhelmed – even if MSDF helps.

All in all, JSDF is not the sum of its parts.  But this can be improved quickly if the JSDF is allowed to focus on developing a ‘joint’ capability whereby the services are able to operate in smooth coordination. Otherwise, imagine if your arms and legs did whatever they felt like – rather than what the brain tells them.

The JSDF has a ‘Joint Staff Office’ but there is no ‘Joint Operational Headquarters’ where the defense of Japan is conducted.

If you don’t have that…good luck.

Japan’s civilian leaders should have insisted on this years ago.  JSDF leaders understood the requirement but were silenced.

But maybe these problems don’t matter since the Americans will take care of things?

Once upon a time, maybe.  But no longer.

The Americans must have JSDF fighting with them.  So how well can the Americans and Japanese operate together?

The US Navy’s 7^th Fleet and the MSDF operate well together.  But beyond that, the two nations’ forces will have a hard time synchronizing operations – even though the US Navy and Marines and GSDF / MSDF are making some recent progress.

Just ask:  where is the Joint US-Japan Operational Headquarters?  There isn’t one.  The plan seems to be to ‘wing it’ when the Chinese attack and then ‘figure things out.

Once again, why hasn’t Japan’s civilian leadership insisted that both a JSDF joint headquarters and a Japan-US joint headquarters be established?  The Chinese should say “thank you”.

There are excuses.  “Politics”, “public opinion”, “culture”, “too expensive”, “Asahi Shinbum”, etc.   But with a war on the way, none of the excuses matter.

Improving JSDF capability will not be easy. But sometimes a bite-sized approach to reforming a larger organization can work.

One thing Japan’s civilian leaders can do – and that will show they are serious – is to direct JSDF leaders to establish a standing permanent Japan-US Joint Task Force to defend the Nansei Shoto and the East China Sea — including the Senkakus and surrounding areas (including Taiwan.)

A good way to learn about warfighting is for JSDF commanders and personnel to work alongside US forces to defend Japanese territory from an imminent threat.

Japanese and Americans will need to allocate forces, develop joint contingency plans and hold regular and realistic training, simulations and warfighting labs. And conduct actual operations – in an area where the Chinese will be coming, soon enough.

This would build joint capability between the JSDF and US forces. And it also can further professionalize a chunk of the JSDF that wants to master its profession and learn real warfighting while going where the action is.

In the process, parts of the GSDF, ASDF, and MSDF will be forced to cooperate with each other.  And maybe the jointness “bug” might infect the larger JSDF.

“Not only would such a standing combined US-JSDF task force HQ allow relationships to develop and to function better in a crisis, but just the mere establishment would serve as a deterrent to Chinese adventurism,” a former senior US defense official commented to this writer.

Japan’s leaders should think beyond the amateurish approach of buying this or that piece of expensive hardware and counting on the Americans to fill in the gaps.  Weaponry and hardware are important, of course, but so are the ‘fundamentals’ listed at the beginning of this article.  So address those issues, and also take what Japan already has and use it better – i.e. joint capability within JSDF, and joint capability with US forces.

Only then, address hardware requirements – based on a comprehensive threat assessment by people who know what they are doing – and ideally, don’t have a financial stake in the matter.  If the latter is impossible, the former will do.

As for the Japanese public?  No public anywhere is ever really ready for war, but some respond better than others.  Japan’s government needs to speak clearly about the threats facing the nation and lay out what needs done.  It should have done so years ago.  It may be surprised at how Japanese citizens respond to some straight talk and leadership.