Israel and the Palestinians: Ending the Stalemate

It takes two to tango

For their part, the Palestinians’ interest in statehood has never been clear. Like their regional Arab compatriots,¹³ the Palestinians consistently maintain that Israel’s so-called “occupation” is what hinders a peaceful resolution to the conflict. While Israel’s leaders, like their American and European counterparts, assume that the Palestinian demand that the so-called “occupation” be ended is synonymous with a demand for statehood, and that the lands the Palestinians claim are limited to Judea, Samaria and the sections of Jerusalem Israel gained control over in the Six-Day War, the Palestinians have never accepted this claim. In fact, both symbolically and politically, the Palestinian Authority asserts that the areas under the so-called “occupation” include the entire State of Israel.¹⁴

This view was evident in Arafat’s rejection of Barak’s offer at Camp David in 2000. While Arafat never made a counteroffer, he gave three justifications for walking away from an offer that would enable the establishment of a Palestinian state. First, Arafat rejected Barak’s argument that the establishment of a Palestinian  state in Judea, Samaria, Gaza and Jerusalem would end the Palestinian conflict with Israel.

Second, Arafat rejected the Israeli position that the immigration to Israel of Palestinian Arabs who left Israel during the 1948-49 war and their descendants would be limited to family reunification. In Arafat’s words, “the right of return [of the former Arab residents and their descendants to Israel] is sacred and its sanctity is not less than that [assigned to] the holy places [in Jerusalem].”¹⁵

By couching Palestinian rejection of the Israeli offer in such terms, Arafat made clear that the Palestinian demands on Israel are not limited, and so amenable to compromise and conciliation. Rather they are unlimited, and impossible to appease. Here it should be noted that there are no Palestinian leaders who are willing to compromise on the demand that millions of foreign-born Arabs be allowed unfettered immigration to Israel. Moreover, the Palestinians are fully cognizant of the fact that such a move will destroy Israel by overwhelming its Jewish majority.¹⁶ Indeed, Fatah is no different from Hamas or Islamic Jihad—or Iran, for that matter—in its refusal to accept Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state.¹⁷

Finally, Arafat explained that he refused Israel’s offer of statehood because the Palestinian conflict with Israel is not simply a nationalist quest for Palestinian statehood, but an Islamic religious struggle for domination that spans the globe. In a speech to the Arab League in October 2000 just after he had begun his terror war against Israel, Arafat asserted that that conflict was not a nationalist endeavor but a religious struggle: “A new, religious, dimension was added to the Arab-Israeli struggle. Everyone is well aware of the critical nature of this dimension, and knows how difficult it is to contain it and control its repercussions,”¹⁸ he said.

Already ahead of the Camp David summit, the Palestinian Authority had begun mobilizing Palestinian society for war.¹⁹ Young boys under the age of 16 were called on for firearms training, and incitement for violent attacks rose to new heights as major Palestinian figures began calling for or justifying armed attacks against Israeli civilians. Israel and the U.S. did not confront these calls to arms with forceful responses. Rather, they were met with the first overt U.S. and Israeli calls for the establishment of a Palestinian state.