Let’s Not Pretend Operation Tomodachi Was A Success

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Originally published by Japan Forward

Japan’s ruling elite — including some in the media — sentenced disaster victims to death years earlier by refusing to allow the Japan Self-Defense Force to equip, organize, and train for such contingencies.

March 11, 2011.

One feels immense sadness even now. Hopefully, the victims and their surviving loved ones have found some measure of peace and comfort.

This is the 10th anniversary of the earthquake/tsunami that killed nearly 20,000 people in northern Japan. This writer has noticed several events scheduled in Tokyo and the United States to commemorate, or even celebrate, Operation Tomodachi and the efforts of Japanese and U.S. forces to respond to the 3.11 disaster.

One event promises to highlight “how decades of friendship and cooperation led to the success of Operation Tomodachi.”

People on both sides indeed did their absolute best to respond to the disaster, but we all see things through our own “prisms” — and perspectives change as time passes.

On reading the aforementioned event flyer, I replied to the friend who sent it:

“I actually see Operation Tomodachi as highlighting the dereliction of duty on the part of many U.S. and Japanese leaders — political and military — who, for 60 years, ignored the need for a well-planned, well-practiced capability to respond immediately, effectively and ‘jointly’ (U.S. and Japanese forces operating together) to such emergencies. The fact that everyone had to ‘wing it’ is to me an embarrassment rather than cause for celebration.”

On March 11, 2011, except for the two navies — the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) and the U.S. Navy — the American and Japanese forces had near-zero ability to operate together.

The MSDF was able to launch a task force towards Tohoku quickly.  But, once there, they were unable to get into the affected areas and save lives in the crucial first 24 to 48 hours when people were still alive.

Most notably, the Japanese Navy and Army lacked an amphibious capability — including the hardware, the know-how, and the ability to combine air, sea, and ground capabilities — essential for rescue operations in coastal areas.

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